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A  Technical Note about the Text o f the Essays Following
One technical aspect o f this volume requires a b rie f comment, or 
more o f a technical note, referring to differences in the Australian habits 
o f spelling and punctuation. Separated as is well known, by the spoken 
variants o f common English usage, Australians and Am ericans share a 
few distinct printed differences. With m inor exceptions, involving minimal 
editorial intrusion (mostly by way of extending, perhaps excessively, 
clarifications o f Australian nomenclature), the editors o f this volume 
present these essays in a linguistic fashion acceptable to Australian 
readers. Some practices may then strike American readers as odd or 
even as incorrect. The most obvious examples are of the kind which find 
the use o f “c ” in the Australian spelling o f “defence” , or variant letter 
order as in “centre” for “center” , “theatre” for “theater", and so on. 
Punctuation is the other most obvious area where American usage more 
happily accepts (and occasionally demands) more diacritics generally 
(especially commas), than some Australian usage always requires.
The option to normalise these essays to US expectation seemed 
to the editors both unnecessary for the relatively few cases where 
genuine confusion might eventuate and, more importantly, it seemed 
very unsound as a matter o f principle. Given the volum e’s intent to 
uncover the Australian experience as sim ilar to, though different from, 
Am erica’s Vietnam, unusual spelling and punctuation effects stand as 
signs, m inor perhaps, o f those differences.
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Australia R&R: 
Introductory Comments
Jeff Doyle and Jeffrey Grey
“Australia R&R”— the title o f this introductory essay should, for 
many in the United States, evoke recollections of pleasant times spent 
away from the war zone, times of rest and recuperation at one o f several 
ports-of-call in the Asia Pacific region. Known to some servicemen, one 
o f those ports-of-call may well have been Australia, chiefly in one or other 
o f her major eastern cities—Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane—where, by 
all accounts, the R&R in whatever form it was taken was very fine indeed. 
“R&R”, whatever its strict definition—rest and recreation, rest and 
recuperation, recovery and recreation, or some other combination— is 
useful then as a title to a volume devoted to introducing the Australian 
experience o f Vietnam to a wider American audience—the term is at once 
familiar as R&R and unfamiliar to most when it is re-located to Australia; 
as metaphor for the method of this volume it is doubly valuable since it 
suggests, severally, notions of recovery, recuperation, and revaluation 
which the analysis of Vietnam in the US, and now more recently 
Australia, has been undergoing for some time.
For that reason R&R is immediately useful for those American 
readers— "in country” veterans and others—who know something of 
Australia’s involvement in Vietnam; this volume will provide various 
kinds of recuperation of their memories of that involvement. For other 
American readers, who know less o f allied participatants in Vietnam, 
this volume it is hoped will provide an introduction— a means of 
recovering some of the representations of Australia’s roles as ally. For all 
readers, the volume is offered as a means o f reinterpreting, and hence 
revaluing, the roles Australia played during and after the Vietnam War. 
From the perspective offered by 20-30 years distance, it is not the 
primary intent o f these essays to make inferences about the way America 
revalues its roles, nor that of its allies, but to some extent the nature of 
the major power-minor power alliances played out in Vietnam and 
subsequently make some implications, if not stronger inferences, 
inevitable. Perhaps part o f the “recovery” Australia, or at least numbers 
of Australians, need(s) to make from the Vietnam W ar is a stronger 
revaluing of the way they write, think and function in regard to the 
American alliance. This applies in all fields, social and intellectual, and 
not just in the more obvious military and political spheres. If Vietnam as 
event and/or cultural subject is the 1960s’ watershed (or even the
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product o f the crises of 1960s culture) it is often held to be, then 
Australia’s part in the event of Vietnam may well come to have far more 
significance than its many commentators have recognised so far. 
Useful too in the metaphoric halo of R&R is the sense conferred of a 
relocation of American experiences of Vietnam to another place— 
another location. To Americans in Vietnam it was “Nam”, “in-country” , 
and most tellingly “Indian country” (with all its interlayering o f Puritan 
mythology)— all strange locales but, as it has been argued in many 
American critical accounts, all ultimately accommodated to an American 
vision of the nation’s place within the world pattern o f events. To most 
Australians Vietnam has yet to find such a happily resolved mythic 
location as “Indian country” allows; For Australia even within the face of 
conflating and comforting drives, Vietnam remains inertia-ridden as, 
and seems set to remain at least for the foreseeable future, a very 
different place— the “funny place” (often expressed in other and less 
polite terms)— a topography of the unfixed or a dis-location.
The essays in this volume offer then for the specialist and general 
reader alike, some Australian R&R— some recoveries, recuperations, 
revaluing and reinterpretations, and finally, an uncertain relocation of 
the Vietnam War. The essays present versions o f the history of the 
Vietnam W ar as experienced by one o f its principal allies: “versions of 
history” since one o f the problems also inherent in recovery and 
recreation is the effect that time has on the memory of the past as it 
“actually happened”— those so-called events of history; “versions of 
history” too, since the writing of any kind of history, social, literary or 
military is no longer a simple matter (if it ever was) o f collecting and 
reporting the concrete “actual” events, documents and figures; “versions 
of history” since Vietnam as American history is hardly a straightforward 
topic, as Australian history the complexity is increased with the necessity 
o f writing and rewriting in the face o f the massive US output of Vietnam 
as history, as film, as novel, and as myth.
And given that massive output, this introductory commentary 
takes, what may be the unusual step, as its starting point the volume's 
last two entries— the Chronology which speaks for itself attempting to 
locate Australian involvement in the wider context of the Asia Pacific 
region, and the Select Bibliography. Apart from its obvious function as 
a resource for future studies, on the one hand, a reading o f the 
bibliography in conjunction with the preceding essays provides some 
insight into the range and depth (or lack) o f study Vietnam has received 
at Australian hands. For example, for Australia, neither the MIA nor the 
racial issues have any significant impact, as they did and continue to do 
in the American revaluations of the war. It is hardly surprising that there 
are virtually no studies concerned with such matters. A  number o f other 
areas of major concern to Americans may similarly be revealed 
unexpectedly in absentia from Australian concerns. Part o f this volume 
aims to “explain” those gaps; not so much fill them in, for they mark some
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o f the differences between the two country's experiences o f Vietnam. On 
the other hand, even a brief reading of the bibliography will reveal areas 
where considerable discussion of the war was and is an active concern, 
sometimes in areas less central to the United States. Australia’s continu ing 
concern with its role, status and future alliances within the immediate 
southeast Asian region is one such area, and this explains why to 
Australian sensibilities the Vietnam W ar is intimately linked with the 
politics and history of the whole region— a region somewhat larger than 
American focus sometimes appears to understand. This regional emphasis 
is brought out in a number of the essays following, and it explains in part 
the breadth of reference to books and articles which to American eyes 
may not be at once directly relevant to the Vietnam War.
Moreover the Select Bibliography reveals in more than a 
quantitative way the presences and lacunae of Australian studies: first, 
it may be a surprise to some, especially those in some areas of the 
scholarly community, to see references to quite so many professional 
magazines, journals and to the kind of specialist publication devoted to 
technical data o f a military kind, in a bibliography primarily biased to 
academic—that is literary and historical— studies. In part these special 
references are explained by the editorial desire to be as comprehensive 
as possible, and thereby to allow the widest possible access to a general 
readership. In part it is linked methodologically to the kinds of study 
which as yet remain mostly unwritten. It is more than anecdotally 
significant to note that the bibliography is larger than the editors 
expected it to be when its compilation was first begun. Vietnam had long 
been an area of scant attention: and moreover, the editors believed that 
even with the blooming of Australian writing on Vietnam, mostly in the 
1980s, the quantitative product could not hope to match, even 
proportionately, the extent, o f the US output. There has been an 
explosion of literature devoted to Vietnam in the 1980s, but the 
bibliography's size is due also to the inclusion of those specialist 
publications. They require further comment.
Academic writing has habitually sectioned off certain areas as 
unworthy of more than scant perusal. Some technical and professional 
writings, while acknowledged in some m ilila iy histories, have received 
little attention by other kinds of scholarly practice— notably in the social 
or literary-cultural histories. Many have noted how the helicopter 
dominates the iconography of Vietnam, even it must be said of the 
Australian imagery, where the helicopter played a slightly less central 
role; but while studies based in the humanities regularly note this, they 
have yet to investigate the material connections between the helicopter’s 
tactical role and its representations— put simply, between the way the 
battlefield was changed by the machinery available, and the way this 
comes to materially effect the writing o f the battlefield. More inferences 
such as these may be forthcoming; and, Australian rewriting of Vietnam 
offers a good area for such discussion because of the profound material.
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indeed m ateriel, d ifferences between Australian and Am erican 
expectations of, and practices within, the theatres of the Vietnam War. 
Noting this is not to suggest that the following essays have on the whole 
achieved this nexus between technical materiel and a “material culture” 
reading, though both Terry Burstall’s and Jan Bassett’s essays lean in 
that direction. Rather the compilation of the bibliography and, it is 
suggested, its reading as an account of Australia’s Vietnam, highlights 
those areas which promise much for future rewriting.
The second way in which the Select Bibliography functions is to 
provide a context for the essays. While each essay in this volume is self 
contained, each essay also derives some o f its meaning from the 
cumulative effect o f the sequence and also from the effect o f being read 
within and to some extent against the context provided by the bibliography. 
These essays present introductions to general readers, and at the same 
time re-write and re-value Australia’s Vietnam, as it stands so far, 
summarised in the bibliography and chronology which, perhaps 
contrarily, conclude the volume.
From another viewpoint, to begin appropriately for a re-valuing 
the volume begins with the official historian of the Vietnam W ar Peter 
Edwards’ “The Australian Government and Involvement in the Vietnam 
War”, a judicious gleaning o f the major political and military events, 
discusses the parallels and differences of the pathways leading the 
Australians and the Americans to war in Vietnam. Shifting his focus 
from the world scale events of the war, to their social and political 
reflections within Australia, Edwards explicates: the Australian shift 
from United Kingdom to US alliance: the evolution of the concerns with 
Indonesia and Asian communism within Australian society: and the 
effects these events and concerns had on shaping the large and small 
scale political allegiances within Australia and the wider region. His 
essay clarifies the links between the large scale political manoeuvring 
within the southeast Asian-Pacific region with the specific national 
concerns of a small population uncertain of its role and future in that 
wider context.
Jeffrey Grey’s “Vietnam as History: the Australian Case” traverses 
much the same terrain adding extra documentation and variant readings 
to many of the same events and political couplings. A  significant 
difference lies in Grey’s focus on the handling of the events as translation, 
that is, as they are written as history. At its most straightforward Grey’s 
essay provides a telling series of critiques of the several key texts of 
historical, political and social analysis of Australia’s Vietnam—that is, 
in part he critically reads substantial sections o f the Select Bibliography. 
On the one hand, his essay provides entry to those texts suggesting as 
he assesses their strengths and weaknesses (Grey is forthright in 
apportioning the latter), their originating contexts, ideologies and methods. 
On the other hand, and more pertinently for this volume. Grey assesses 
the wider context of the writing of history, particularly military history.
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in Australia. In doing this he places the events of Vietnam into a broader 
nexus of events, representations and ideologies which constitute a major 
aspect of Australian national identity—the network of military myth and 
cultural accretion known as the Anzac legend. Importantly Grey points 
to the way in which the Australian national identity has been, and it 
seems continues to be, partially moulded by the way the country accepts 
or rejects its military history. This he argues is dependent on the way its 
historians, specialist and popular alike, choose to write that history. By 
comparison with the pattern of writing about Vietnam in the United 
States, where Grey contends that the “historiographical battle lines . . . 
match those drawn politically during the war” , the Australian 
historiography is both more complex and less well advanced in practice. 
More complex, since there are more groups competing for the rights of 
controlling the publicly accepted representations of the war, and less 
well advanced in the depth of analysis obtained from that writing, as his 
critiques display. This lack of depth he sees as due less to the restricted 
access to data (a reference to the 30 year closure o f official documents 
operating in Australia, which prevents all but selected personnel access 
to the governmental and institutional archives), than to the fundamental 
failure o f much Australian historical writing to interrogate its own 
ideological biasses.
As a first move in the kind of rewriting of Vietnam which Grey 
calls for, Terry Burstall's “Policy Contradictions of the Australian Task 
Force, Vietnam, 1966” marks a strong re-assessment of the practices, at 
the material level, of the Australian Forces in 1966 in operations with its 
US allies in PhuocTuy province. His essay is a salutory revaluation of the 
Anzac myth o f the Australian as the “natural fighting man”, as he 
juxtaposes the pattern of Australian operational decisions against the 
expectations, disappointments and frustrations of the US commander. 
General Westmoreland. This assessment will be the more shocking to 
Australian sensibilities since not only does it weaken the image of 
Australian prowess, but it flies in the face of the popular image of 
American military incompetence in Vietnam, commonly held and voiced 
by Australian troops—who saw themselves as the professional and 
combat superiors o f the indisciplined and careless American troops. 
Burstall adds more since he argues that the combat weakness of the 
Australians (to be sure a quantitative weakness, not a quantitative one) 
was structural, deriving from failures as much of military as political 
inexperience.
Where Burstall’s essay looks at the way that the revision of Anzac 
will reflect the material conditions of the field, Jane Ross’ “Veterans in 
Australia: the Search for Integration”, continues her substantial analyses 
of the reception of the returned servicemen. In a wide ranging and 
densely documented essay Ross details the competing images of the 
veteran (noted briefly in Grey's essay as one of the problem areas), 
forwarded variously by the Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia,
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the Returned Service’s League, and several government departments, 
chiefly the repatriation system. Nor she notes has this struggle been 
confined to the relatively narrow concerns of the veteran communities 
and their “service” associations and agencies. Focussing on the popular 
media and the government systems, Ross demonstrates the way each in 
its way has from time to time deployed one or other image of the veteran 
as the “exclusive” image to achieve their political ends. She contends that 
the media in particular have treated the war and its veterans with “glib 
and often inaccurate analysis” using images based on the “sick” veteran 
borrowed unthinkingly from the US media, when other information 
contended that this applied only to a minority, albeit a politically vocal 
minority of veterans. Her essay delves into the political and moral 
implications of such competition, closing with a series of strongly worded 
questions about the cultural impact of these implications.
“Who Cares for the Caregiver?” by Jan Bassett advances another 
area all too often neglected in Australian writing on Vietnam, the 
participation o f women, in this case nurses of the Royal Australian Army 
Nursing Corps (RAANC). Bassett’s essay is based on the results of a 
questionnaire surveying a large proportion of the nurses on active duty 
in Vietnam. Not the least interest in this analysis is the way that the 
nurses themselves have felt the neglect of their participation; it is clear 
that for some their responses to the questionnaire provided an outlet for 
previously withheld emotions; for others it was a means of making 
trenchant criticisms o f both the necessarily expeditious treatment they 
were able to give to their patients (and, often implicitly, the nurses 
lament the attenuation of the treatment effected by early evacuation of 
the patient to Australia), and the, at times, traumatic effect the pattern 
of instant and short-cut treatment had upon the caregiver herself.
Care for victims in Bassett’s essay is widened to include those too 
easily taken for granted in war. Together with Ross’ case of the struggle 
for the veteran image, the two essays suggest some significant gaps 
within the study o f Australia’s Vietnam experiences— immediately obvious 
as victims are the wives and families of the veterans, be they combatants 
or caregivers. This has been the issue motivating some aspects o f the 
veterans’ community groups, and the government studies of the effects 
of Agent Orange are focussed on familial effects, particularly on offspring, 
and not exclusively upon the soldier. There are a number o f filmic and 
fictional accounts, and it is certain that care for the families is built into 
the repatriation system and the practices of the veterans associations 
themselves, but there are not yet enough substantial studies o f the 
effects o f the psychological traumas o f Vietnam upon the immediate 
relatives o f Australian soldiers and nurses.
Other victims and apparent victims o f Vietnam are the subject of 
James E. Coughlan’s “International Factors Influencing Australian 
Governments’ Responses To The Indochinese Refugee Problem”, which 
charts, in a similar fashion to Edwards’ essay, the political as well as
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humanitarian evolution of the refugee problem and how Australia’s 
response continues to reflect its sense of its role and future in the 
southeast Asian-Pacific region. As in Edwards’ chronicle of the events 
leading up to and through Vietnam, Coughlan details the anticipations 
and reactions of the various Australian political parties as the world 
political spectrum engages with Indochinese refugees. His analysis of 
the policy formation o f successive Australian governments explains the 
political intentions of Australia’s desires to cement alliances within the 
larger national and multi-national groupings. At the same time he shows 
how Australia attempted to maintain in its immigrant populations, 
which included the refugees, an ethnic mix acceptable to the wider 
Australian electorate— an electorate at times more or less sympathetic 
to its newest, and sometimes it was felt forcibly introduced, citizens. The 
refugee problem, as well as the contentions surrounding the status of the 
veteran, are related in Australia to the level o f economic tolerance the 
nation can “afford’’ lo extend to such claimants upon its welfare system. 
And in the case of the refugees this climate is confused by the nation’s 
desires to preserve if not enhance their standing within the southeast 
Asian-Pacific community. These desires are complicated by the need to 
fend off the longstanding damage to the national image of a racist 
Australia, remaining from its once touted White Australia Policy. As 
such the democratic self-presentation of the Anzac as the “natural 
fighting man” and egalitarian advocate of the “fair go” for all, Australians 
and would-be Australians alike, has been and is likely in the future to 
be sorely tested by the racist undertones of Australian national reactions 
to both former allies and enemies alike.
The last two essays in this volume turn from more directly 
“historic” events to their representations in the literary and some of the 
electronic media. Where the historical and political writing has focussed 
indirectly on the way Vietnam has highlighted the precarious or marginal 
“place” of Australia, Peter Pierce’s “The Funny Place’: Australian Literature 
and the W ar in Vietnam" engages with the dislocation of the national 
identity evident in the literary experience o f Vietnam. The Australian 
soldier’s term for Vietnam, “the funny place” , becomes a revivified 
metaphor for an Australian sense of the uncertainty of self and nation, 
characteristic o f much Australian writing, as well as that of the soldier- 
writers’ narratives of Vietnam. Considering aspects of the soldier as the 
“occidental tourist" o f Asia. Pierce details the curious variations and 
surrogacies of the Australian literature of Vietnam and juxtaposes them 
with both the well known US fictions of the war and with earlier 
Australian narratives of warfare. Placement alongside the American 
fiction displays the difference in handling between Vietnam as “Indian 
country" and Vietnam as "funny place” . For Australians the “funny 
place" eventually became the no-place, as the soldier failed to relocate 
his experience within the specific myths of Anzac. As Pierce writes there 
was no “clear cut ideological victory”, nor a clear cut enemy to complement
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either the national sense of m ilitaiy prowess (either the Vietcong were 
too good or not present as enemies), or at its most extreme the race­
hatred characteristic o f earlier anti-Asian feeling. The latter gives way to 
a vague but often strident anti-Americanism, vague because the target 
is so unfocussed, yet strident because it picks up threads o f generalised 
anti-imperialist and post-colonialist feelings which had also been 
substantial underpinnings of the Anzac tradition. Much oftheAuslralian 
literature of the Vietnam war is infused with a general spirit that the 
soldiers were fighting on the wrong side. Unfocussed too. since the 
feelings of contradiction are enhanced by a rampant distrust of the Asian 
“other".
Relocation takes also the form o f writing not about the Vietnam 
War but the great occasions of Anzac legend. Pierce concentrates lastly 
on the evasion-relocation evident in the literature of the 1970s and 
1980s which consciously or otherwise seemed to have re-written the 
foundation events of the Anzac legend in the First World W ar as if they 
were pre-visions o f Vietnam. Far from providing a sturdy moral foundation 
from which the nation might progress. Australian Vietnam literature 
accommodates a parade of abiding national anxieties, enhancing the 
uncertainty entailed in the Vietnam war, not recuperating from it.
Television and cinema in Australia have developed relatively few 
“texts” in comparison with the massive output of the US media. There 
are a few distinctive Australian products however, providing islands 
within the ocean of American material which otherwise regularly gets 
broadcast on the Australian airwaves. Jeff Doyle's “Dismembering the 
Digger: Australian Popular Culture and the Vietnam W ar” assess three 
maj or examples, two from the television miniseries genre, Vietnam (1987) 
and Sword ofHonour (1987), and one feature film. Tom Jeffrey’s The Odd 
Angry Shot (1979). Accepting the notion that the products o f popular 
culture, particularly television miniseries, tend on the whole to make 
comfortable, to ameliorate the events o f history and the vagaries and 
inconsistencies o f character by presenting the most average and 
acceptable (the most ideologically neutral) images or representations, 
Doyle argues that each of these three texts rehearse Australia’s inability 
to find a satisfactory resolution to its response to the Vietnam War. In 
spite o f their careful plotting, setting and handling of narrative closure, 
a measure o f each text’s desires to make their images conform, and 
hence comfortable, to a resolution, each o f the texts dismembers or 
dislocates the events of Vietnam away from that resolution, into a 
televised version o f Pierce’s “funny place” . Together these last two essays 
profer a wide-angled re-assessment o f the preceding essays’ focus on 
their “versions o f history”— on Vietnam as a series of events, with a series 
of competing explanat ions. In denying the possibility of any neat closure, 
the last two essays relocate the whole volume as a necessary reminder 
of the difficulties inherent in evaluating the effect o f Vietnam within 
Australian culture.
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Until recently, almost specifically the time o f the Australian 
Welcome March in October 1987, Vietnam had been nearly forgotten in 
the widest popular areas of Australian society. The exigencies o f the 
nation, as in many other western nations at the time, lay mostly in the 
problems of national economic management, operating on the margins 
of a volatile world economic system. Intimately allied to the swings and 
sweeps of the balances of military power. In its place on what the west 
would take as the far rim of the Asia-Pacific region, Australia continued 
along a path o f supporting those powers whose views most nearly 
reflected its own desired consensus of economic, political and cultural 
outlooks. Crudely pul, in the period since the Second World War, 
allegiances switched from Eurocentric, and specifically British orientation, 
toan American dominated though significantly Asian-Pacific orientation. 
Such shifts— often rapid, sometimes expedient, sometimes principled— 
tested many o f the established traditions of a fundamentally post- 
colonial but still European-leaning nation. Hardly in isolation, but 
almost certainly as one of the major events since Second World War, the 
Vietnam W ar marks the watershed of change, both chosen and enforced, 
within Australian society; it is arguably, and despite the earlier evasion 
of its effects, a watershed of change that impacts in a manner more 
profound and far reaching upon Australian society than the changes 
which the war has wrought in the United States. This small volume is in 
its way one aspect o f that impact, traversing most o f the terrain, and 
remaining as yet unresolved.
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W hen I say to an American that I am working on a m ajor history 
o f Australia's involvement in the post-1945 southeast Asian conflicts, 
culm inating in the Vietnam war, I usually meet one o f two reactions. The 
first is obvious surprise that Australia was involved in Vietnam. W hen 
Am ericans refer to Vietnam, they generally mean “the United States in 
Vietnam ”. Am erican histories o f the war, whether intended for a popular 
ora scholarly readership, usually have little to say about the involvement 
o f allies. The proverbial visitor from outer space could read books 
totalling hundreds, even thousands, o f pages on how the United States 
became involved and, with only the briefest lapses in concentration, not 
become aware that American allies were present at all. The second 
reaction is usually encountered from Am ericans who themselves served 
in Vietnam. They often have no difficulty in recalling that Australians 
were present in Vietnam, a recollection generally accompanied by a smile 
and something sim ilar to the words: “Boy, could those guys put away 
beer!”
The ability o f Americans to recall whether Australians fought 
with them in Vietnam is more important than it may seem. One o f the 
fundamental m otives for Australian involvement was to produce a sense 
o f gratitude on the part o f Americans, both in official circles and in the 
general public. It was, to use a phrase much used at the time, an 
insurance policy, a premium paid in Vietnam towards an assurance of 
support for Australia against problems which already existed or which 
might arise in the future, possibly even closer to Australia’s shores. But 
it was more than just an insurance policy. Australia had its own 
concerns about communism in southeast Asia, concerns that ran 
parallel to those of the United States. Policy-makers in Australia ’s 
capital, Canberra, supported the domino theory as vigorously as their 
counterparts in Washington. Indeed, the concern was probably even 
greater because in its more extreme versions (including President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s celebrated statement o f April 1954) Australia 
itself was seen as one of the last dominoes in the sequence that began 
in Indochina.
At the same time, a small to middle power located on the fringes 
o f southeast Asia inevitably had different priorities from those of a 
superpower an ocean away from Indochina. There were therefore both 
similarities and differences between the paths taken by the United 
States and Australia towards involvement in Vietnam. This paper is
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intended to give an overview, for an American readership, o f some of 
those parallels and differences.'
To set out the major steps in the development of Australian policy 
will indicate many of the parallels. Australia recognized the state of 
Vietnam, established with French sponsorship under the former emperor 
Bao Dai, on 8 February 1950, the day after the United Kingdom and the 
United States had done so. Australian officials were well aware of the 
fragility o f the Stale o f Vietnam, and of the strong popular support for the 
rival Democratic Republic o f Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh; but in the 
interests of the worldwide struggle against communism, the Australian 
Government felt it had no choice but to support the Bao Dai gamble. In 
1953 it invited Jean Letoumeau, the French minister in charge of 
relations with the Associated States (as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia 
were then known), to visit Australia. Letoumeau was offered arms and 
equipment for the French war in Indochina. The materiel that was 
eventually sent in 1953 and 1954 largely comprised obsolescent 
equipment, and was in any case a token gesture by comparison with the 
enormous economic and military assistance being given by the United 
States. Nevertheless, Australia was clearly signalling that it regarded the 
war in Indochina, not as merely a colonial rearguard action by France, 
but as a struggle between communism and democracy (or, at least, 
potential democracy).
In 1954 Australia had only observer status at the Geneva 
Conference, where its main diplomacy was sorely tested by the attempt 
simultaneously to maintain close and cordial relations with both the 
United Kingdom and the United Stales. Immediately after the Geneva 
accords, Canberra shared the widespread pessimism over the future of 
the non-communist regimes in Indochina, and unhesitatingly became a 
founder member of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
at Manila. In the late 1950s, Australia shared the growing optimism over 
Ngo Dinh Diem’s apparent success in sustaining the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN). In 1957, soon after visiting the United States to be hailed 
as a “miracle man” by Eisenhower, Diem became the first foreign head 
of state to visit Australia, where his welcome was almost equally 
enthusiastic.
As the communist-led insurgency grew in the early 1960s, 
Australian military involvement ran parallel to that of the United States, 
albeit on a far smaller scale. A  team of advisers, initially comprising 30 
officers and non-commissioned officers, was committed in 1962, growing 
to83 in  1964 and 100 in 1965. InApril 1965 the first battalion of infantry 
was committed to Vietnam. In 1966 the commitment was increased to 
a two-battalion Task Force, and in 1967 the Task Force was further 
augmented by a third battalion. Units of the Royal Australian Navy and 
the Royal Australian Air Force were also committed. At the height of the 
war Australia had about 8000 service personnel in Vietnam at any one 
time. In 1971 the withdrawal of the Task Force began and by the end of
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1972 virtually all Australian military personnel had been withdrawn, 
apart from an embassy guard. In all, about 50,000 service personnel 
served in Vietnam and 500 lost their lives.2
All o f this will sound familiar, suggesting perhaps a microcosmic 
imitation o f the American commitment. But there were significant 
differences between Australia’s and America’s paths to Vietnam. The 
first concerns the role of the Australian-American relationship itself, a 
topic obviously o f much greater concern to Canberra than to Washington. 
While Australian policy-makers shared much of the American perception 
of a threat o f communist expansionism in southeast Asia, they were as 
conscious of Australia’s weakness as the United States was o f its military 
might. If critics o f American policy referred to “the arrogance of power”, 
critics of Australian attitudes referred to the “frightened country", the 
nation that had an almost pathological fear of being “the last domino”.3 
Curiously, given the longstanding fears in the Australian community of 
threats from the north, much of the weakness was self-induced. In the 
early 1950s, during the Korean War, serious efforts were made to 
improve Australia’s defence capacity but thereafter, for the remainder of 
the decade, defence expenditure was kept artificially low. The Government 
argued that its most useful contribution to the struggle against 
communism was to develop the country’s economic base: investment 
was therefore directed towards “national development” rather than to 
defence.
This kind of thinking lay behind the frequent references by 
Robert Gordon (from 1963 Sir Robert) Menzies, Prime Minister from 
1949 to 1966, to the importance of Australia’s “great and powerful 
friends”, by which he meant principally the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The Menzies Government took the view that Australia, with its 
vast territory and small population, could not defend itself, but relied on 
its alliances, principally SEATO, ANZUS (the Australian-New Zealand- 
United States security treaty signed in 1951) and to a lesser extent 
ANZAM  (an A u stra lian -N ew  Zea land-U n ited  K ingdom  defence 
arrangement for the Malayan area). This reliance on allies, however, led 
to another fear, that the great and powerful friends might withdraw from 
the region, leaving Australia isolated and defenceless as the dominoes 
fell. The United States and the United Kingdom could never leave the 
north Atlantic, but they could leave southeast Asia. SEATO was 
therefore seen from the outset as a less reliable shield than NATO. From 
the negotiation of the Manila treaty, Australians expressed concern over 
whether SEATO had sufficient “teeth” , by which they meant principally 
whether it was a sufficiently strong guarantee of United States military 
support in times o f need.
Much of Australia’s effort in defence and foreign policy was aimed 
therefore at trying to ensure that the United States would retain its 
presence in southeast Asia. These efforts were further encouraged in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s by signs that the United Kingdom was likely
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to withdraw its forces from east of Suez, in order to concentrate on 
developing its relations with the European continent. At the same time, 
both the United Kingdom and France were becoming increasingly 
reluctant to support western military intervention in Indochina, making 
SEATO look even more “toothless”. Strange as it may now seem, the 
underlying concern o f the Australian Government in the early 1960s was 
that the new Democratic administration of John F. Kennedy might not 
share the determination of its Republican predecessor to resist communist 
expansionism in southeast Asia. Despite the obvious signs that Kennedy 
and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, were steadily raising the stakes 
in Vietnam, this fear persisted.
The congressional resolution secured by Johnson after the Gulf 
o f Tonkin incident in August 1964 was welcomed by Menzies in the 
Australian federal government’s lower house, the House ofRepresentatives, 
with an almost tangible sense of relief, as a sign that the United States 
was irrevocably committed to maintaining the security of southeast 
Asia.4 Even so, traces of the fear of American withdrawal persisted. In the 
diplomatic exchanges of late 1964 and early 1965 the Australian 
Government offered a battalion of combat troops when the United States 
had not even asked specifically for assistance in that form. It was as 
much an encouragement to the United States to stay the course as it was 
a response to years of pressure from Washington to show that Vietnam 
was a cause for the whole “free world” , not just for the United Slates.
Indeed, one Australian historian has argued that Johnson might 
not have made the major American troop commitments in 1965 had he 
not received such strong and consistent encouragement from Australia.5 
This seems rather unlikely. In all the thousands o f words that have been 
written on United States intervention in Vietnam, based on incalculable 
amounts o f research on official and private records, no-one has seriously 
suggested that Australia had such a crucial influence on United States 
policy. That is not to deny that Johnson undoubtedly welcomed the 
strong support he received from Australia, when so much o f the rest o f 
the world was turning against him. There was clearly a genuine personal 
as well as political rapport between Johnson and Menzies’ successor, 
Harold Holt, which was made manifest in 1966 when Johnson became 
the first incumbent United States president to visit Australia. The visit 
became a triumphal procession, paving the way for Holt's huge election 
victory later in the year. When Holt drowned, in an apparent accident, 
at the end o f 1967, Johnson again visited Australia, this time to attend 
the funeral. His personal attendance was a notable mark o f respect and 
friendship, but there is little evidence to suggest that Australia had any 
significant effect on the course o f American policy, other than to confirm 
Johnson on a course he had already chosen.
While much has been written about the cordiality o f Australian- 
American relations in the Vietnam period, and about the degree to which 
either party was pushed or pulled into commitment by the other, another
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aspect has been less noticed. W hile Australia had been afraid that the 
United States m ight withdraw from the region, it also had a recurring 
fear that W ashington had not always thought through the implications 
o f its policies, running the risk o f precipitating a wider war. During the 
Indochina crisis o f 1954, Australia was clearly concerned by the 
possibility that the “united action” which Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles was encouraging might lead to a larger war, possibly including 
China, and also possibly leading to the use o f nuclear weapons. 
Similarly, during the Laos crisis o f 1961, Australian m inisters feared 
that western intervention might provoke a massive response from North 
Vietnam and China, in turn leading to pressure by the western military 
commanders for the use of nuclear weapons. This fear was a recurring 
theme in Australian consideration of policy towards southeast Asia in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, although it was generally suppressed 
beneath the greater fear o f the spread o f communism.
But the Australian fear of the expansion o f communism through 
southeast Asia was not confined to the possible fall of the “dom inoes” on 
the mainland, running from Vietnam through Laos, Cambodia, Burma, 
and Thailand to Malaya. Australians were usually at least as concerned 
with Indonesia as with Indochina. This highly populated country, 
geographically so close to Australia, was not seen as simply another 
domino. Australian policy-makers always recognized that the struggle 
between communists and anti-communists in Indonesia was largely 
separate from that on the mainland, and o f much greater importance to 
Australia. Developments there took on added urgency in the late 1950s, 
as President Sukarno raised the pressure in his campaign to incorporate 
western New Guinea, which had remained in Dutch hands after the rest 
o f the Netherlands East Indies had gained independence as the Republic 
o f Indonesia. Success in this campaign would mean that Australia in a 
sense shared a land border with Indonesia, because Australia  
administered the eastern half o f the island of New Guinea under a United 
N a tion s  m andate . I f  the In don es ian  C om m un ist P a rty  (PK I) 
subsequently came to power, Australia could thus find itself cheek-by­
jow l with a populous country under communist control, without the 
comfortable insulation of the m iles o f land and sea between mainland 
Australia and mainland southeast Asia.
The major difficulty for Australia was that, on this issue, Canberra 
and W ashington did not see eye-to-eye. The United States did not 
support Dutch and Australian opposition to the Indonesian claim to 
western New Guinea. On the contrary, it saw acquiescence in this 
expansion as the best way to keep Indonesia in the non-communist 
camp. Particularly after the end of 1961, the United States facilitated the 
transfer o f power in western New Guinea, nominally under the aegis of 
the United Nations, from the Dutch to the Indonesians. Australia could 
do nothing but accept the inevitable with as much grace as possible.
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These events underlined the extent to which Australia, by 
restricting its defence expenditure in favour of economic development, 
had made itself dependent on the goodwill of the United States. 
Consequently in the early 1960s the Australian Government took every 
step it could to try to win that goodwill. It informed Washington that it 
would do everything possible to meet any American requests for base 
facilities on Australian soil. Several such agreements were reached, 
providing for co-operation between defence and civilian agencies in 
communications, space research and meteorology. The most important 
was the approval in 1962 for a Very Low Frequency (VLF) naval 
communications station at North-West Cape in Western Australia, to 
facilitate communications to United States submarines operating in the 
Indian Ocean. The Australian Government took a very compliant attitude 
to this request, determined to allow no obstacle to the creation o f a facility 
which would further commit the United Stales to the defence of Australia 
and its region.
It was in this context that Australia considered American requests 
in the early 1960s for advisers and other forms of civilian and military 
assistance in South Vietnam. At the same time, it was receiving similar 
requests for support for the new nation of Malaysia, formed in 1963 by 
joining Malaya, Singapore and former British territories on the island of 
Borneo. The Indonesians had declared a policy of “Confrontation" 
towards Malaysia, involving diplomatic opposition and small-scale 
military harassment. Britain, Australia and New Zealand were supporting 
Malaysia, but once again the Americans were reluctant to take steps that 
would antagonize the Indonesians. The linkage between Vietnam and 
Indonesia in Australian minds was most clearly demonstrated in May 
1964, when the Johnson administration made a concerted eiTort to have 
“more flags” in Vietnam. The Charge d Affaires at the Australian Embassy 
in Washington, Alan Renouf, reported to Canberra that United States 
policy on the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation was not as “firm” 
(that is, supportive of Malaysia) as Australia would wish. Vietnam, he 
therefore suggested, was an area where Australia could pick up credit in 
Washington. Australia should seek “to achieve such an habitual closeness 
of relations with the United States and sense o f mutual alliance that in 
our time of need . . . the United Slates would have little option but to 
respond as we would want”.6
The relationship between Australian policy towards Indochina, 
especially Vietnam, and that towards Indonesia was complex, especially 
in late 1964 and early 1965. Australian policy makers had to balance 
pressure from the United Kingdom, to give greater military support to 
Malaysia against Indonesia, against pressure from the United States, to 
support its effort in South Vietnam. The commitment of an Australian 
battalion of combat troops to Vietnam in April 1965 is widely remembered, 
having been seen at the time and ever since as a significant step in 
Australian defence and foreign policies. By contrast, the similar
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commitment of another battalion only a few weeks earlier, to support the 
British and Malaysian effort in Borneo, has generally been forgotten. The 
crucial decisions on Vietnam by Australian policy-makers were taken in 
an atmosphere of conflicting pressures from two “great and powerful 
friends" over two different conflicts in sou theast Asia. Indeed, uppermost 
in their minds at some crucial times was the possibility o f a third conflict, 
which they thought might be precipitated by Indonesian subversion and 
infiltration into the Australian-administered territories in eastern New 
Guinea. We now know that this never came to pass, just as we know that 
the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation eased in late 1965 and formally 
ended in 1966: but that could not be foreseen by the policy-makers in 
late 1964 and early 1965.
Another element marks a major difference in the paths by which 
the United States and Australia came to be in Vietnam. Unlike the United 
States, Australia had been involved in the campaign against communist 
insurgents in Malaya in the 1950s, generally known as the Malayan 
Emergency. When the state of emergency was declared in 1948 the 
Australian Government, under Labor Prime Minister, J.B. (Ben) Chifley, 
had resisted pressure from London to give military support to the battle 
against the insurgency, but in 1950 the newly elected Liberal Government, 
under Prime Minister Menzies, sent bombers and transport aircraft of 
the Royal Australian Air Force.7 In 1955 the commitment was 
significantly increased when Australia sent troops and other elements 
from all three armed services to Malaya, to join British and New Zealand 
elements in forming the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. 
These forces helped the British and Malayan forces fighting the insurgents, 
both before and after Malaya gained its independence in 1957, and until 
the Emergency was declared over in 1960.
In several respects the commitment was comparable with that in 
Vietnam in the 1960s. Australia was responding to a request from one 
of its great and powerful friends to intervene in a campaign to put down 
a communist insurgency in the jungles of southeast Asia, in a country 
which was, or had been, a European colony. It saw the conflict as a 
theatre of the Cold War, not as the suppression of Asian nationalism. 
Australia had reservations about the wisdom of some of the tactics used 
by its major ally, but having taken the decision to intervene it remained 
a firm and loyal ally.
During the early years of the commitment in Malaya there were 
critics who argued that Australia was placing itself on the wrong side of 
Asian nationalism. This western military intervention, they claimed, 
would make Australia highly unpopular as soon as British colonial rule 
was replaced by an independent government. This claim was disproved 
when Malaya gained its independence in 1957 and its freely elected 
government asked the Australian and other Commonwealth forces to 
stay. They did so, and in 1960 the Australian Government could claim 
part o f the credit for a success. The communist insurgency had been
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defeated and Malaya had an independent, pro-western government with 
which Australia had excellent relations. On the basis of this experience, 
it was understandable that a few years later the Australian Government 
was inclined to believe that intervention in Vietnam need not necessarily 
lead to disaster; while the critics who rightly pointed to the dangers of 
involvement in Vietnam had had their credibility weakened, like the boy 
who cried “W olf”.
This is not to say that Australians saw the commitment in 
Vietnam as simply a repetition of the successful venture in Malaya. The 
ethnic, geographic, religious, political, military and other differences, 
which made the position in Vietnam so much more difficult for the west, 
were well understood before the principal Australian commitment was 
made.8 Nevertheless there is evidence that the comparison was very 
much in Australian minds. When considering precedents for the position 
in Vietnam, Americans generally thought of Korea, while Australians 
remembered Malaya.
This raises the question of public attitudes. This paper is 
concerned essentially with governmental decisions, but in a parliamentary 
democracy these decisions must take note of the attitudes of both the 
Opposition in Parliament and extra-parliamentary groups. For the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) these were the years in the wilderness, as 
it remained out of office at the federal level from 1949 to 1972. The length 
of ALP exclusion was caused largely by a major split in 1955, when a 
section of the party broke away and subsequently formed the Democratic 
Labor Party (DLP). The DLP, predominantly Catholic in membership, 
was vehemently anti-communist in both domestic and foreign policy, 
accusing the ALP of being too sympathetic to communists. Although the 
number of seats won by the DLP in federal and state parliaments was 
small, their influence on the outcome of elections was considerable 
because of the preferential nature of Australian electoral systems. The 
existence of the DLP was therefore an additional reason for the 
government to maintain a resoutely anti-communist stance in foreign 
affairs.
The ALP was weakened in the late 1950s and early 1960s not only 
by this split, but by divisions within its own ranks. Although factions 
within the party were not then as institutionalized as they later became, 
there was a clear division between a left and a right wing, made 
particularly obvious by the issue of the VLF station at North-West Cape. 
The left was suspicious of the United States and reluctant to be 
associated in any way with nuclear weapons; the right emphasized its 
loyalty to the American alliance and was not far from holding the same 
views as the government in most aspects of foreign policy. As policy 
towards southeast Asia came towards the top of the political agenda in 
the 1960s, this division vitiated the ALP’s criticisms of the government’s 
policies. Not until after the government had committed the first battalion 
of combat troops did the ALP unite behind a firm policy of opposition to
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the commitment. Its leader. Arthur A. Calwcll, gave a powerful, and in 
some respects prescient, speech foreshadowing many of the problems 
that were to become evident in later years;9 but by this time it was much 
too late to have any effect on government policy.
Outside Parliament there were several groups who could together 
be categorized as an anti-war movement, but they remained on the 
margins of politics in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1949 an Australian 
Peace Council was formed, effectively a branch of the World Peace 
Council, bringing together communists, Christians and intellectuals. In 
the 1950s this council organized a major congress, at which the principal 
guest speaker was the Dean of Canterbury, England, Dr Hewlett 
Johnson, widely known as “the Red Dean“ for his admiration for Stalin 
and the Soviet Union. In a highly publicized and controversial tour of 
Australia, Johnson described communism as “a Christian movement 
that is surging upward in every part of the world” and he advised 
Australia not to become involved in an “imperialistic” war, “a war against 
the people” in Malaya.10 Not surprisingly, Menzies and other conservatives 
came to regard the clergymen and other non-communists in the anti-war 
groups as naive dupes of the communists, used to provide a respectable 
front for a movement which existed essentially to support Soviet policies 
and oppose those of the west. Thus, when a group of Anglican bishops 
wrote to Menzies in early 1965 to urge him to support a negotiated rather 
than a military solution in Vietnam, they were given little credibility." 
Their arguments had decidedly more substance than those of Dr 
Johnson and the clergymen known as “the peace parsons” in the 1950s, 
but the Government and the public had become accustomed to dismissing 
views from this quarter as naive and ill-founded.
In fact the anti-war movement by the mid-1960s was becoming 
much less the exclusive property of those who adopted a basically pro- 
Soviet line. The Communist Party of Australia was much weaker than it 
had been in the years immediately after the 1939-1945 war, and middle- 
class liberals were beginning to draw attention to issues in and around 
the Pacific, such as Chinese and French nuclear tests, rather than more 
remote concerns like Algeria and Cuba. Congresses in 1959 and 1964 
helped to give the movement a stronger administrative structure, but 
this was not to become evident until later. As late as October 1964, just 
before the introduction of conscription and six months before the 
principal commitment to Vietnam, an anti-war congress seemed as 
ineffectual and marginal as ever. It was only after the first conscripts 
were sent to Vietnam in 1966 that a significant protest movement 
emerged. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Government could 
claim broad public support for its policy of close alliance with the United 
States and the United Kingdom in opposition, by military means if 
necessary, to the expansion o f communist influence in southeast Asia.
Australia, therefore, came to be involved in Vietnam by a path 
that was similar, but by no means identical, to that of the United States.
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Australian policy was not merely a clone or an echo o f that o f its 
superpower ally. Australian policy-makers had their own concerns and 
took their own decisions. They deserve the credit for those decisions that 
proved wise, and they cannot escape the blame for those that proved 
unwise.
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W ar has played a large part in the shaping of Australian society 
and national identity, but occupies a much less prominent part in the 
writing o f the nation’s history. And in contrast to the situation in the 
United States, where the flood o f published material o f all types 
threatens to overwhelm  the student o f the subject, Australian historical 
writing on the Vietnam  W ar is still in the early and tentative stages of 
developm ent.1 Equally, because Australia ’s involvement was smaller in 
relative terms than Am erica’s, and because that involvement did not 
pose such fundamental questions for Australians, there is less to be said 
about it.
Participation in the two world wars was followed by the 
commissioning o f large, multi-authored official histories which, for their 
time, were remarkably sophisticated and thorough. Indeed the history 
o f Australian efforts in the First World War, and more especially its editor 
and principal author C.E.W. Bean, has had a long-lasting influence 
upon the shape o f historical writing on war in this country.2 In contrast 
to the official histories elsewhere, written often to defend as well as 
explain the conduct o f the war. Bean’s history concerned itself with the 
extraordinary deeds of ordinary men, the soldiers themselves, and had 
less to say about strategy and virtually nothing on generalship, logistics 
or administration. The history written after the Second W orld War, 
edited by Gavin Long, took its cue from  Bean and again concentrated on 
a trench level view o f the fighting, although because o f the vastly greater 
mobilisation o f national resources involved between 1939-45 this series 
devoted much more attention to activities in the domestic economy and 
society.
In both world wars Australian correspondents were attached to 
the forces to report on their activities, and in both cases a decision was 
made to commission an official history before the conflict had ended. In 
the numerous smaller wars and warlike actions in which Australia found 
itself engaged after 1945— in Japan on occupation duty and in the 
Korean War, Malayan Emergency, Indonesian Confrontation and Vietnam 
— histories were commissioned long after the events they were to 
analyse, and the authors appointed had no first hand experience o f these 
conflicts. The history of the Korean W ar was completed only in 1985,3 
and an official historian for the postwar southeast Asian conflicts, o f 
which Vietnam is the centrepiece so to speak, was appointed only in 
1983. The restrictions o f the relevant archival legislation which, as in
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Britain, precludes public access to government records until they are 
thirty years old, together with the absence, as yet, o f any official history 
as was published for earlier conflicts, means that Australian writing on 
the Vietnam W ar lacks an authoritative official work which establishes 
the record and against which others may react or from which they may 
take a lead.
A  number of journalists in Australia wrote about Australian 
involvement during the Vietnam War, and of course there was a large and 
active anti-war publishing effort. By its nature little o f the latter has 
survived, while the former often belonged to a tradition o f Australian war 
writing which went back to Chester Wilmot and Kenneth Slessor in the 
Second World War, if not indeed to Bean himself— factual writing about 
the experiences and conditions o f the troops in the field of a kind 
common to war correspondents everywhere.4 After a new Australian 
government withdrew the last o f its forces in 1972, Vietnam disappeared 
quickly from the national agenda. With one or two exceptions it was not 
to receive serious attention again as a subject for nearly a decade.
The contemporary debate over Australian participation in the 
war continues to be reflected in most of the history written in the last 
decade. The universities were a focal point for anti-war activism at the 
height of the war, and some academics took a leading role in opposition 
"teach-ins" and street protests. Others, o f course, supported government 
policy, but they have been much more reticent subsequently. Indeed, it 
is almost impossible now to find anyone who defends seriously the stated 
aims for which Australia went to war in Vietnam.
In response to the fall o f Saigon in 1975, the Labor Prime 
Minister, E.G. (Gough) Whitlam, directed the Department of Foreign 
Affairs to prepare a paper on the Australian commitment, and this was 
tabled in the Parliament on 13 May.5 Much of the paper was taken up 
with an examination of the process by which Australian forces had been 
committed, with further attention given to the several increases in 
Australian troop strength undertaken between 1966-67. Arguing that 
“the decision in April 1965 to send a battalion for active service in South 
Vietnam was the crucial issue in Australia’s commitment”, the paper 
devoted most space to the events surrounding the “request” for direct 
military support from the South Vietnamese Government. In announcing 
the decision to send troops the then Prime Minister o f the Liberal 
Government, Sir Robert Menzies, had stated that his Government acted 
upon such a request, although it was never in fact produced. As it 
transpired, there had been no such request. Rather, the Government of 
Dr Phan Huy Quat had agreed to the despatch o f Australian troops after 
this had been arranged between the Australian and Am erican 
Governments and he himself had been pressured into acceptance. The 
Menzies Government saw a request as necessary in order that Australian 
action could be explained under the terms of the SEATO Treaty—which 
precluded action by member countries like Australia on the territory of
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protocol states such as South Vietnam except at the specific request of 
their governments— although in this instance SEATO was never actually 
invoked.
Critics then and subsequently were quick to seize on the issue of 
the “request”, and to use the circumstances under which it was 
produced as proof that the Australian Government acted contrary to the 
wishes o f the South Vietnamese and at the behest of the United States.6 
While there can be little doubt about the contrived nature of the request 
in 1965, this attitude ignored the fact that a succession o f South 
Vietnamese Government officials had called upon Australia for various 
forms o f non-specific military assistance in the years since 1961. A more 
complex interpretation o f the steps leading to Australian involvement 
has gradually appeared, and this emphasises both that Vietnam was not 
the central issue in Australian thinking at this time, and that the 
Australian Government acted with greater concern for Australian interests 
than earlier critics had allowed.
Australian defence and foreign policy has been characterised by 
a search for security lied to the guarantees o f a great and powerful friend. 
Until the fall o f Singapore this was provided by Britain, but the aftermath 
of the Second World W ar served to emphasise Britain’s failing imperial 
might, and while Australia never switched allegiance to the United States 
in the unthinking manner sometimes portrayed, increasingly in the 
1950s and early 1960s the Australian Government saw the preponderant 
Western role in southeast Asia as an American one. The ANZUS Treaty, 
signed in 1951, had provided non-specific assurances but in the 
changing strategic environment of the early 1960s this was felt to be 
insufficient should Australian interests be threatened directly. This 
threat was perceived as coming not from China, despite Menzies’ public 
statements about “the downward thrust o f Asian communism”, but from 
Indonesia.
Australia had viewed with concern the Indonesian incorporation 
of the former Dutch possession of West New Guinea in 1961, and 
Sukarno's policy o f “confrontation” with Malaysia, in which Australian 
troops were involved from 1964 by virtue o f existing defence ties with the 
British and Malaysian Governments, heightened alarm in Canberra. In 
a major study of Australian foreign policy at this time, historian Gregory 
Pemberton has shown the paramount importance of the relationship 
with Indonesia for any understanding of Australian Vietnam policy;7 
Australian efforts to ensure that the United States increased and 
maintained its commitment in southeast Asia were directed to containing 
Sukarno as much as they were to preventing the further expansion of 
com m unist power in Indochina. O ther w riters have taken the 
interpretation of this activist policy stance further, however, in arguing 
that the American Government would not have expanded its own 
involvement in Vietnam in 1965 but for the persistent and continuous 
badgering o f the Australian Government, which sought to provide the
Vietnam  cut H istory : The A ustra lian  Case 29
diplomatic preconditions which would make an Am erican combat 
commitment possible.8 O f course, it may be objected at once that this 
explanatory tail wags the historical dog, and that such a view  ignores 
entirely the numerous domestic pressures within the United States itself 
which led President Johnson to increase substantially the American 
combat presence. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this 
argument is that it flies in the face o f a tradition o f Australian historical 
writing, especially on the left, which sees Australian foreign policy as 
reactive and entirely at the disposal o f one or other great power.
In the context o f the war as a whole, the actual Australian 
commitment was of marginal significance. A t its height, the Australian 
Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province numbered 8300 men. Approxim ately 
50.000 served in total, o f whom 500 were killed and over 2000 wounded.9 
Against the peak troop presence of the Koreans (50,000) or Thais 
(11,500), much less the ARVN or the US, it was a tiny effort. But there 
are other ways o f assessing the Australian military contribution. Not 
only were Australians the first o f the Free W orld Military Assistance 
Forces to jo in  the US in the field, but unlike the Koreans and Thais, they 
and the New Zealanders bore the costs o f the deployment themselves. As 
a force from a stable western liberal democracy in Asia their presence 
lent credibility to Johnson’s call for “more flags” in Vietnam, while their 
undoubted military effectiveness reinforced further the value of the 
contribution.10
Australia’s military effort has been looked at from two perspectives: 
in terms o f the combat experience and, less frequently, from  a strategic 
and institutional viewpoint. Personal experience is a strong suit in 
Australian military writing, the tradition descending in an unbroken line 
from Dr Bean and the First World War, and the bulk o f the work in this 
category has recounted the war from a unit or individual perspective. A  
number o f army units produced illustrated accounts of their tours of 
duty, but only one was published commercially.11 The passage o f time 
has neutralised most o f the controversy generated by an unpopular war, 
and Vietnam  is now being incorporated into the mainstream o f the 
Australian m ilitary tradition in a number o f accounts.12 This attitude is 
reflected in some, although by no means all, o f the memoirs and personal 
recollections. Those written by regulars have tended to dwell on the 
positive features o f m ilitary service and have reserved criticism  for the 
perceived lack o f support for their efforts in Australia.13 Other accounts 
are much more critical o f the army itself, or are bitter at the ingratitude 
o f the civilian population back home, an attitude which many national 
servicemen [conscripts] first encountered only after their return from 
active service.14 The sense of hostility and even despair which these 
accounts portray is much more resonant within the small num ber of 
combat novels written by Australian authors, although most o f the latter 
were not written by combat veterans.15
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There are a number of more sophisticated treatments of Australia’s 
operational involvement, at both the unit and higher levels. The first 
Australian combat troops were committed in 1962 as part o f a training 
and advisory mission which later worked through the US Special Forces 
network and. later still, had some part in the Phoenix programme. This 
unit’s diverse and difficult tasks have been treated at great length,16 in 
a manner which combines successfully the emphasis on individual 
experience which is so important in the Australian military tradition 
with some pertinent analysis of the policy which governed the Training 
Team ’s deployment. The first Australian battalion to see action in 1965- 
1966, as part o f the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in BienHoa province, has 
also been treated at length.17 The circumstances o f this unit’s 
deployment, and the undoubted difficulties which ensued from attaching 
the battalion to a larger force which operated on different doctrinal and 
administrative assumptions, allows the author to contrast unfavourably 
American tactical shortcomings with Australian professionalism, thus 
reinforcing one o f the central tenets o f the Australian military myth. The 
same process is at work in the official account of the Special Air Service 
Regiment, a book which fulfills the additional function o f demonstrating, 
at least to the author’s satisfaction, the continuing utility o f special 
forces in the Australian army.18
A  wider perspective is rare, and there has been almost no 
institutional or systemic analysis of the army in this period. The army 
went to Vietnam immediately following a period o f considerable 
organisational upheaval resulting from the adoption and then 
abandonment o f the Peniropic division,19 and with a command and 
control system which, at least initially, was not as well suited to the 
political-military demands placed upon it as arguably it needed to be.20 
There is only one analysis of the Australian Task Force’s operations 
overall in Vietnam between 1966-72, and this is at times highly critical 
o f the perceived absence of “a coherent and effective military role on the 
ground”.21 The author’s overall contention that because the war in 
Vietnam was lost Australia’s role in Phuoc Tuy province was a failure 
implies a misunderstanding of the relationship between the operational 
and strategic levels of war, but other criticisms concerning, for example, 
the construction of the Dat Do-Phuoc Hai minefield or the failure of the 
Australians to take over the province advisory role from the Americans 
are well sustained. The tone overall is too critical, but the absence to date 
of a countervailing view is striking.22
The sociology of the forces at this time is likewise a neglected 
field, although it should be added that this is true for all o f Australia’s 
wars. The difference, however, is that only in this war were conscripts 
sent on active service outside Australian territory,23 and it is the 
conscript element o f the army, about one-third only of those who served 
in Vietnam, which has attracted scholarly attention, most notably in the 
work of Jane Ross.24 The specific weakness of this work is that it
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relegates the regular army majority to the peripheries, while the absence 
o f any w ider study o f the national service scheme as a whole robs it of 
necessary context and comparison.
Conscription itself was reintroduced in April 1964, before any 
decision had been made about deploying combat units to Vietnam and 
in the context again o f fears about an intensified Indonesian insurgency 
in Borneo. Indeed, it is not widely known that both the army and the 
Department of Labour and National Service opposed the reintroduction 
of the scheme, citing the experience in the 1950s when national 
servicemen had been required to perform only six months compulsory 
training and had had no overseas service obligation. The deployment of 
conscripts on active service in Vietnam, beginning in m id-1966, sparked 
growing opposition within Australia at a level not seen since the bitterly 
fought conscription referenda during the First World War. Curiously, 
this aspect of Australia’s Vietnam W ar has been least frequently and 
least satisfactorily dealt w ith in the h istorical literature.25 The 
Moratorium movement, as anti-conscription, anti-war activism came to 
be called, still awaits its historian, although the documentary legacy of 
the various oppositional groupings is rich and varied and a number of 
postgraduate theses have been written on aspects of the subject. 
Published work remains thin. Much of it is written by former activists 
and has a defensive tone, while other authors are at pains to demonstrate 
a tradition o f anti-war dissent and the existence o f a peace movement 
throughout our history, as if this somehow validates the movement in 
the 1960s.26 There are important legal, constitutional, political and 
moral issues involved in the imposition of national service for Vietnam, 
but only a handful o f writers seem concerned to follow them through.27
Overviews o f the Australian war have been few, and generally 
mixed in quality. The earliest contribution in this area, a series o f essays 
published in the early 1980s,28 suffered from the usual problems of 
edited works and provided an uneasy m ix of academic work with 
personal recollection. A  similar effort produced at the end o f the decade 
suffered from many o f the same faults.29 Both books bring together a 
variety o f perspectives critical o f Australian involvement, but the quality 
o f the scholarship is uneven and the strident authorial voice employed 
sits ill with attempts to provide a detached— which is not to say 
disengaged— perspective on events which occurred before a sizeable 
section o f the Australian population was bom .
The legacy of the Vietnam War, in Australia as in the United 
States, is demonstrated most clearly by the large influx o f Indochinese 
migrants and refugees since 1975, and by the continuing fight for 
recognition by Vietnam veterans. Asian immigration has long been a 
political issue in Australia, a nation which until the 1960s excluded non­
white m igrants through the provisions of the Immigration Act in the 
interests o f a white Australia policy. Despite the best attempts o f the 
racist fringe, and the occasional unwise sally by more establishment
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figures, Australian society has absorbed Indochinese migrants, as it has 
the earlier waves o f European and Middle Eastern migrants who have 
arrived since the Second World War, without significant social upheaval.30 
The problems of Vietnam veterans are both more public and more vexed. 
The Vietnam Veterans Association o f Australia was formed in 1980 as a 
result o f dissatisfaction with existing veterans’ groups, principally the 
Returned Services League, and with the bureaucracy o f the Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs. It represents no more than 5,000 members, about 
one-tenth o f those eligible, but has played a prominent role as a ginger 
group in veterans’ politics, especially overthe cluster of issues surrounding 
Agent Orange and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which is claimed by 
some to be more prevalent in this group o f veterans than in any other.31 
As in the United States, there is a clear perception that this generation 
has not been accorded the recognition and level o f public esteem enjoyed, 
in particular, by soldiers of the Second World War. In the Australian case 
at least this is to assume that the latter was typical o f the public response 
to returning service personnel throughout the twentieth century, a 
proposition which must be qualified fairly heavily. In the United States, 
the historiographical battle lines in most cases match those drawn 
politically during the war; the arguments of the 1980s in many cases 
have not advanced much beyond those of the 1960s. In Australia, on the 
other hand, the moral argument to some extent has shifted from the 
political arena of the 1960s and 1970s to the field ofvelerans’ entitlements 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Whatever advance it may represent otherwise, 
it has not helped in the clear analysis o f veterans’ issues.
As the archives begin to open in the next decade we can expect 
an increase in the number of works dealing with Australian participation 
in the war, and can hope for an improvement in the scholarly and 
evidential base of research in some o f the areas noted above. Given the 
lines along which the writing of Australian military history has developed 
in the 75 years since the First World War, it is by no means obvious that 
this will result in a broadening o f the focus o f the work which results. 1
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Policy Contradictions o f the Australian Task Force, Vietnam, 1966 
Terry Burstall
Introduction
The dispatch o f a two battalion Task Force to Phuoc Tuy Province 
South V ietnam  in 1966 was a progression from  the 1962 com m itm ent 
to South V ietnam  o f a small team o f m ilitary advisers. A s the internal 
m ilitary and political situation o f the Governm ent o f South V ietnam  
deteriorated from  1960, so United States m ilitary support increased. As 
Am erican support grew  it became increasingly important for other 
countries to be seen to be in agreem ent with United States actions and 
ob je c tiv e s  in  V ie tn a m  not on ly  v e rb a lly  b u t a lso  p h ys ica lly . 
Correspondingly the size o f the small team  o f Australian advisers was 
increased to 83 by the end o f 1964, and in April 1965 Australia 
responded w illingly to United States requests for more support by 
announcing the com mitment o f a com bat battalion to South Vietnam . In 
1966, in line with further United States troop level increases, the 
Australian force was increased to a self contained two battalion Task 
Force to be based in Phuoc Tuy Province, 60 m ile east o f Saigon.
Although the Australian Governm ent supported the United 
States’ actions in Vietnam, it was apparent from 1962 that active 
support would be curtailed by dom estic political and organizational 
realities in Australia. Political reality lay in the fact that the involvem ent 
was not based upon a bi-partisan decision o f the Australian Parliament, 
and that it did not depend on tested electoral support from  Australian 
voters.1 The organizational reality was the size and quality o f the forces 
that could be sent to Vietnam. As the Australian Arm y in 1965 only 
consisted o f four battalions it required a m ajor re-organization and up­
grading to prepare for a commitment to Vietnam. By necessity the 
Australian force had to remain extrem ely small in relation to the rapidly 
increasing United States effort.
The disparity o f size o f the two countries’ com m itm ents m eant 
that i f  Australian forces remained closely tied to United States forces 
they could only be m inor players in a much larger effort and would of 
necessity have to be under direct United S lates command. To achieve 
some autonom y o f command it was therefore considered desirable in 
1966 to m ove the Task  Force to an area where it could establish an 
Australian national presence. The Australian command could then 
make its own policy decisions, m aintain its own unit integrity and apply 
its own tactics while still being incorporated, and able to work within, 
overall United States command.
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This article will examine two policy decisions made by the 
Australian Task Force in 1966 which locked it into postures that were 
impossible to move away from in the following years of the involvement. 
The two areas to be examined are: the policies toward sections o f the 
civilian population of the province; and the creation of a large defended 
base camp. This article will argue that these decisions seriously affected: 
1) Australian and United States capacity to win the population to the side 
of the Government of Vietnam; and 2) the capacity of the Australians to 
work within United States operational concepts and strategies.
Background
Australian involvement in Vietnam was primarily an attempt to 
secure an insurance policy with the United States of America should 
Australian interests be challenged in southeast Asia. The surge of 
nationalism sweeping the world during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
impending withdrawal of British troops from “East of Suez” and the 
perceived spectre of a communist and antagonistic Indonesia aligned 
with China, meant the Australian Government willingly embraced the 
policies of the United States in southeast Asia as a means of securing 
military aid in its own time of need.
As the United States involvement in Vietnam increased from 
1960, Australia responded to requests for visible moral support. In 1962 
a small Army Training Team component of 30 men flew to Vietnam and 
was placed under United States command, officially to be used in a 
training role only. By 1964. in response to United States pressure, this 
component was increased to 83 and their role had been expanded to 
include participation in combat situations.
Due to the run down of the Australian Army at that time and the 
extra pressures placed on Australia’s expanding training base because 
of the introduction of National Service (the draft), it was impossible to 
increase the numbers o f Training Team personnel to meet United Stales 
demands. The decision was made therefore in December 1964 to offer 
instead a battalion of combat troops. At the time, this offer was 
inappropriate because the United States had no combat units in 
Vietnam and a battalion could not have been incorporated into their 
military structure. However, with the landing of the Marines at Da Nang 
in March 1965, and the subsequent arrival of other United States units, 
the Australian offer o f a battalion became a viable proposition.
The First Battalion
The First Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment was sent to 
Vietnam in May/June 1965 and became part of the United States 173rd 
Airborne Brigade based at Bien Hoa airbase. However, placing the 
battalion with the 173rd created problems for both the United States and 
Australian commanders in Vietnam. The concept and role o f the 
battalion laid down by the Australian Army and the Government in
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Canberra was restricted originally to securing m ilitary installations and 
supporting South Vietnamese or United States forces under attack. This 
role was not flexible enough for General Westmoreland (Commander, 
United States M ilitary Assistance Command Vietnam). D ifficulties arose 
in July when the Australian battalion was prohibited from participating 
in a 173rd Brigade operation by the Australian Chief o f Staff.2 The role 
o f the force was later expanded and by the end o f 1965 the Australians 
were perm itted to engage in offensive operations in the whole o f III (Three) 
Corps area.
Tension still remained, however, as the Australians were not 
impressed with the United States style o f combat operations, neither 
with respect to their methods o f continuous resupply nor with the 
apparent disregard by United States officers o f their own level o f 
casualties. By the end o f 1965 it was apparent that the circum stances 
facing the First Battalion were not the best possible for the Australian 
forces, not only from  the Austra lian  perspective but also from  
W estm oreland’s.
W estm oreland used the 173rd Brigade as his mobile reserve, 
which meant that they had to be able to move to any part o f South 
Vietnam as required. In June 1966 he was considering sending the 
173rd to Darlac Province in 11 (Two) Corps on the Cambodian border, and 
recorded: “These troops will be m oving constantly and their operations 
will be in support o f ARVN [Army o f the Republic o f Vietnam], RF/PF 
[Regional Force and Popular Force] and CIDG [Civil Irregular Defence 
Group] units."3 To be left short o f a battalion because o f Australian 
refusal to allow their forces to move to a certain area was unacceptable 
to the United States. That there were also tensions arising from the 
Australian perspective was made clear when the Australian Arm y 
Department Secretary was reported to have said: “We found ourselves in 
Bien Hoa with the United States forces on one side and the Vietnam ese 
on the other and we quickly decided that the best place to be was 
somewhere else.”4
By March 1966 it had been decided that Australia would increase 
the size o f its commitment and send to Vietnam  a self-contained Task 
Force o f two battalions to replace the First Battalion which was due to 
return home in June 1966. This was a calculated gamble because a two 
battalion Task F orce was not a balanced force according to contemporary 
m ilitary doctrine, which held that a Task Force should be at least three 
battalions, giving it the ability to have two battalions in the field and one 
operating as base defence. Having only two battalions meant that o f the 
4500 Australian troops in Vietnam at any one time, less than ha lf were 
combat troops— infantry and supporting arms— and operations would 
be limited to one battalion strength.
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Planning the move to Phuoc Tuy
Lieutenant General John Wilton, the Chief of the General Staff, 
and a party o f service personnel flew from Australia to Saigon for 
discussions with General Westmoreland on the role and placement of the 
Task Force in March 1966. Discussions on the placement had already 
taken place between General Westmoreland and the Commander of 
Australian Army Force Vietnam (COMAAFV), Brigadier O.D. Jackson, 
and agreem ent was reached on Phuoc Tuy Province.5 Jackson 
commented that, “we were to be used somewhere where we could do the 
job and it would suit our ability. This area of the north [Demilitarized 
Zone] was to be left as I understood it to the the Americans and the 
Vietnamese.”6 He went on to say:
They [the United States] had some difficulty with foreign troops 
and they weren't too sure how things would work out. I think 
Westmoreland was happy to have us in a place where we could 
do things our way and not be exposed in the early days to heavy 
casualties, which was made pretty clear to me [from Australia] 
just wasn't on.7
General Wilton had already decided tentatively upon Phuoc Tuy 
before he arrived in Vietnam in March 1966, mainly because of the deep 
water port at Vung Tau and the fact that the Australian force would be 
well away from the northern demilitarized zone.8 Westmoreland was by 
then in agreement with the move to Phuoc Tuy and wanted the 
Australians to work in the eastern portion of the Rung Sat and provide 
protection for Highway 15, running from the port of Vung Tau to Saigon. 
The Australian force was tobe part of the US II (Two) Field Force Vietnam 
which was headquartered at Long Binh in the adjoining Bien Hoa 
Province, and whose responsibility was the whole of the Vietnamese III 
(Three) Corps.9
Preparing for the Australian Arrival
In April 1966 Westmoreland sent elements of the 1st Infantry 
Division, accompanied by the Australian First Battalion, into Phuoc Tuy 
on Operation ABILENE. It was not a resounding success as only light 
contacts were made for most of the operation. The main force units of the 
Viet Cong (VC) 9 and 5 Divisions were out of the province when the 
operation was launched and only started moving back as it finished. The 
only major action of the operation was the attack on a United States unit 
on the night o f 11-12 April. The VC 800 Battalion of the 274 Regiment 
launched three attacks on a United States position in an attempt to over­
run the perimeter, but were repulsed each time with the help of heavy 
artillery barrages that pounded 1086 rounds into the area during the 
night. The casualty figures are indicative of the overall tempo of 
ABILENE. During the 16 day operation United Slates casualties were 39 
killed, 97 wounded, none missing. The action during the night of 11-12
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April resulted in 34 killed and 72 wounded, leaving casualties for the rest 
o f the force and the operation at five killed and 25 wounded. VC 
casualties for the operation were 67 KLA and five captured.10
In May Westmoreland sent the 173rd to PhuocTuy on Operation 
HARDIHOOD to clear the area prior to the Australian arrival. When the 
Australian Fifth Battalion arrived in the area the 173rd then went south 
on Operation HOLLANDLA, into the paddy area of Long My, and carried 
out their first night airborne landing. HOLLANDLA was not a good 
operation for the 173rd, for although they encountered ve iy  little 
opposition their casualties were relatively high: nine killed and 68 
wounded, mainly from booby traps, against fourVC killed, by body count, 
four possible and four captured.11 Summing up, the “Commander’s 
Analysis” noted: “It is unlikely that the VC elements in the area 
constitute a single force of greater than company strength”.12
The Australians at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Province
By 14 June 1966 the Fifth and Sixth Battalions of the Royal 
Australian Regiment, plus supporting units and Task Force Headquarters, 
had arrived at the Nui Dat base. The base was to cover a large area o f over 
two square kilometres of mainly rubber plantation and included the 
small hill, Nui Dat. Highway 2 on the western edge of the base was closed 
to the local people except at designated periods. The layout of the area 
created many defensive problems, chiefly because of the large unmanned 
gap along the western side. Brigadier Jackson, the new Task Force 
commander, thought he could fill this gap with a third battalion, but it 
was to be another 18 months before a third battalion arrived. Jackson’s 
rationale for taking such a large area was that it provided the units with 
room to fight should the base ever be attacked. Although it gave room to 
fight, the large area created enormous problems from its inception 
because of the number of troops required to secure the perimeter, 
effectively cutting down on operational capability.
With the perimeters established the Task Force was then faced 
with the formidable job of trying to build the area into a defensive 
position, as well as attempting to mount operations. One of the key 
elements of the Australian strategy was to create a buffer zone or “cordon 
sanitaire" around the base out to 4000 metres (just over two-and-a-half 
miles) , except for the southern end where the large village of Hoa Long 
was located at a distance of less than 1000 metres (about two-thirds of 
a mile) from the perimeter. This buffer zone was to be kept clear of 
civilians and to be dominated by saturation patrolling, hoping thereby 
to deny enemy forces intelligence and forming-up areas from which to 
launch an attack on the base. The rubber plantation was kept intact with 
a minimum of clearing, and no lights were allowed at night. The open 
area on the western side was covered by fire from both the high ground 
of Nui Dat and the armoured personnel carriers (APCs) area which 
straddled both sides o f the road on the southern section. Artillery was
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situated at the southern entrance and could bring fire to bear on most 
of the perimeter. The base was declared off limits to all civilians in the 
area. Local leave close to the base was prohibited; any leave was to be 
taken in the port city o f VungTau, 30 kilometres (18 miles) to the south, 
where a large Australian logistic base was set up and from which 
supplies for Nui Dat were transported by road, with a contingency plan 
for aerial resupply if required.
From the m ilitary perspective the plan was quite sound. 
Unfortunately in the Vietnamese context it was full o f contradictions, 
and placed the Australian force not only in conflict with the local 
population but also with General Westmoreland.
The Australians and the Local People
Contrary to what the Australian military historian and then 
Intelligence O fficer with 5RAR, Robert O ’Neill, has written, the 
positioning o f the Australian base did not take into consideration the 
needs of the local population.13 There was considerable dislocation of 
both the economic and social structure of the province because o f the 
establishment of the base, which in turn created considerable animosity 
toward the Australians from the beginning.
The United States and Australian forces’ major problem during 
their Vietnam intervention was the calibre o f the government they were 
there to assist. Australian Army publications had made the point in a 
study o f counter-revolutionary warfare that the first requirement for 
success was a competent civilian government.14 It would be impossible, 
under any criteria, to call the governments o f South Vietnam since 1954 
competent, especially that of m id-1966 when the “Struggle Movement” 
had President Ky more concerned with fighting his own generals than the 
VC. Because the central government was largely corrupt and incompetent, 
the governmental support required to consolidate military actions was 
not in place. Therefore the policies of creating clear areas and resettling 
population that worked for Robert Thompson in Malaya, where the 
British were the government and the army, had no validity in Vietnam. 
Thompson’s methods o f clear areas and resettlement were not viable 
options for the Australian and United States forces in Vietnam, as 
neither the governmental backup required for relief of hardship following 
resettlement, nor the political will to show that the military policies had 
some legitimate rationale existed.
When the Australians arrived in Phuoc Tuy they established the 
base camp at Nui Dat adjacent to a densely populated area. To achieve 
the aim o f the 4000 metre buffer zone required the movement of 8000 
people, almost ten per cent of the province population. Inside the 4000 
metre buffer zone (excluding Hoa Long) were two villages. Long Phuoc 
and Long Tan, with a population together of approximately 4000 people. 
In addition to this there were the many people living on small plots of land 
inside the area. All o f these small landholders were forcibly moved from
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their homes and told to relocate in the nearby towns. This movement of 
the population has been described by all m ilitary writers o f the period so 
far as a “resettlement” , a highly ambiguous usage since it implies that 
the people were helped. This was not the case in Phuoc Tuy in 1966.
The village of Hoa Long, although inside the 4000 metre area, was 
allowed to remain, but the villages o f LongTan (approximately 1000 people) 
and Long Phuoc (approximately 3000 people) were evacuated and 
subsequently destroyed. The people from Long Tan had been forced from 
their village by ARVN forces, assisted by United States troops, during 
ABILENE in April, and the people of Long Phuoc by the 173rd Brigade in 
May. The people of LongTan were forced into the towns o f Dat Do and Long 
Dien, while those from Long Phuoc were moved to Hoa Long, Long Dien, and 
some to Dat Do. This relocation, it was presumed, made the task of 
population control easier since the people were concentrated in villages 
under some semblance of ARVN control. Once moved these people were 
then forgotten by the Australian forces and received no help in the re­
establishment of their homes or modes of life.15
It would be naive to suggest that these people were not an 
Australian responsibility on the grounds that it was not the Australians 
who actually forced them from their areas. The plan for the Australian 
base was well in place before ABILENE and the displacement of the 
population o f LongTan. When the United States forces left, the people 
tried to return to their homes but were forbidden by the implementation 
o f Australian policy. Their village was then destroyed by a combination 
of artillery and neglect. With their only source o f income denied them 
they became beggars, exploited labour, or at best poor relations for those 
lucky enough to have relatives in Dat Do or Long Dien. The inhabitants 
o f Long Phuoc received worse treatment. Where the Long Tan villagers 
had time to take many o f their possessions, the Long Phuoc villagers had 
been shifted from their village during the 173rd Brigade’s operation in 
May 1966, but only so that the brigade could operate through the village. 
They were not evacuated to become refugees. The 173rd “After Action” 
report from HARDIHOOD states: “Refugees 0”. When the Australians 
continued HARDIHOOD they first closed the area and then in late June 
proceeded to destroy the village. This was a house-by-house destruction 
of substantial structures made of brick, dressed timber and tiles. 
Australian records state that 537 dwellings were destroyed. Dwellings 
were physically pulled down and all the villagers’ possessions burnt. 
These included cooking and eating utensils, bedding, clothing, school 
books, photographs, family ornaments and farming implements. The 
fields, fruit trees and gardens were defoliated, remaining off-lim its until 
September when the people were allowed back to work their ground for 
only two days a week under strict curfew conditions. There is no record 
o f how these people survived the initial move, but the Task Force Civil 
Affairs officer states that he knew that some of the people from Long 
Phuoc went into Hoa Long, and that: “There was no work for them and
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they were just hanging around Hoa Long. They weren’t starving but they 
were pretty bloody hungiy and they were dirt poor . . .  I cried tears for 
them, believe you m e.”16
As the Task Force was short o f infantry, drastic measures were 
initiated in order to keep the civilians away from the closed areas. One 
of these measures was the deliberate firing o f artillery onto local people 
who were seen going into the areas. Messages from the Task Force signal 
log (Table 1) show that there was a disregard for the safety of the civilian 
population in order to enforce policy. Although the messages cited below 
are for September 1966, there are many similar instances throughout 
the records for 1966 and 1967.
It would be possible to excuse this policy if there had been no 
need for the people to go back to their old areas, but the people had no 
option; they had to return in order to survive because no help was given 
to them. If cattle strayed they would naturally have gone back to their old 
areas. Therefore the people had to retrieve them. If they did, they ran the
Table 1 17
Serial | Date | Time | From | Messaqe
48 12 0730 AVN Two buildings under 
construction in Long Tan 
488659.489657. Arty 
[artillery] to fire some rounds.
111 13 1105 ALO 3 people at Long Phuoc 
heading north on trail 50 
metres from road. They are 
carrying baskets on poles. 
G[round] Reference] 452651. 
Arty engaged. Smoke 
followed by H[igh]E[xplosive].
113 13 1120 AI JO 3 cattle 461659 North of 
road, west of river between 
Long Tan and Long Phuoc. 
470654 people (2) working 
fields. Engaged by artillery.
114 13 1132 ALO Herd of cattle at 465653. 
Engaged by artillery.
789 25 1242 ALO Numerous people in Long 
Phuoc on main road travelling 
both east and west. Engaged 
by artillery.
923 28 1209 ALO People walking east into Long 
Phuoc YS 438639. 15 cattle 
and one man at 469654. 8 
people/cattle south of Long 
Tan 485652 moving north. 
Remarks. Arty engaged.
[ALO stands for Air Liaison Officer, which was the small army spotter plane that 
flew over the area reporting movements.]
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risk o f being killed; if they did not then it was almost certain that their 
cattle would be killed, and their last remaining possessions lost.
Although the forced relocation o f civilians and the creation of 
“free fire” zones became an accepted procedure for all Free World Forces 
in Vietnam, it was in direct contravention of policies laid down by the 
Australian Army in 1965. The Division In Battle pamphlet states:
The principles of humanity prohibit the use of any degree of 
violence not actually necessary for the purpose of the war. War 
is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian principles.
To a large extent these principles have been given concrete form 
in the law of war; but because all of these principles have not 
become legal rules, a military commander should consider 
whether a proposed course of action would be inhumane even 
though not prohibited by international law.18
“Principles of humanity" were ignored with respect to the 8000 people 
who had once resided and earned their living in the area taken over by 
the Australians, and a “degree of violence not actually necessary for the 
purpose o f the war” , was inflicted on them. The relocation and the 
subsequent abandonment of responsibility for the 8000 people alTected 
by the positioning of the Task Force, in addition to the policy o f dumping 
VC bodies in town market squares or dragging them behind APCs in sight 
of the village children, both methods supposedly meant to draw out 
further VC sympathisers, did nothing to help the Australian, United 
States or South Vietnamese cause in Phuoc Tuy. Attempts at civic 
action, such as building school rooms, a Boy Scout hall, or a new market, 
none of which the people wanted, were not enough to overcome the 
animosity caused by the destruction of homes and livelihoods. Further, 
with the implementation of later policies o f arresting ARVN draft 
dodgers, the continual “cordon-and-search” of villages, the arrest and 
handing over to South Vietnamese authorities ofVC “suspects” , who were 
then badly treated and confined sometimes for months, it is easy to 
understand why Hoa Long, situated less than 1000 metres from the front 
gate o f the Australian base, was never considered pacified. Hoa Long 
remained a village of women, children and old men and offered resistance 
for the whole period of the Australian presence. In 1971, five years after 
the Australians moved to Phuoc Tuy in May 1966, it was recorded that 
in Hoa Long:
Security is only a little better [than 1966) and far from satisfactory, 
due to the still predominant anti-GVN [Government of Vietnam) 
feeling . . . Agent reports from Hoa long indicate that there is 
some form of VC activity inside the hamlet every night.19
The policies adopted by the Australians in 1966 alienated them 
from the very people from whom they needed support if the war was ever 
to be brought to the conclusion which the United States and Australia
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desired. The VC could not survive without the help of the people, and yet 
through their first actions in Phuoc Tuy the Australian Task Force had 
alienated almost ten per cent of the population. It is certain that those 
who may have been neutral before the Australians arrived did not remain 
so after the treatment alTorded them.
Australian Military Policies
According to Brigadier Jackson, the first Task Force commander, 
Westmoreland’s orders to him were to, “take over Phuoc Tuy. Those were 
the only tactical orders I had from anyone.”20 From the evidence available 
it would seem that the General Westmoreland’s idea of “take over Phuoc 
Tuy” was very different from Brigadier Jackson’s. The latter's plan was 
to move into the area of Nui Dat, establish a large fortified camp adjacent 
to the main population centres and show the local population and the VC 
that the Australians were there to stay. The original intention was to 
establish the base and slowly expand the area of control, disrupting VC 
bases and lines o f communications and eventually cutting off the VC 
from the population in short “pacification".
The problem with this concept was that it was not United States 
policy at that time. It is not an aim o f this article to attempt to analyze 
which policy would have been the more appropriate or successful in 
relation to the Vietnam conflict. Rather, since the Australians were part 
o f an American Field Force the wishes of the senior American commander 
in the theatre would have to have been taken into account. General 
Westmoreland’s policy in 1966 was for United Stales and Free World 
Forces to be “manoeuvre battalions” , which were to engage and kill 
enemy “main force” units while the ARVN together with United States 
advisors carried out the pacification and nation-building roles. He did 
not envisage that Free World Forces would be involved in pacification: 
“COMUSMACVs [General Westmoreland] instructions to his commanders 
were to ‘undertake operations which will find, fix and destroy Viet Cong 
(VC) forces by sustained and aggressive actions'.”21
This difference in interpretation of role is apparent when one 
considers, first, that the Australians established their base adjacent to 
the populated centres, but had no authority in those areas, since they 
were the responsibility of the Vietnamese province chief and his United 
Slates advisers, and second, that Australian forces could not mount 
operations which penetrated the populated areas without the permission 
of the province chief.
Whatever Westmoreland’s interpretation of the role, it is doubtful 
that the Australian Government would have been prepared to accept the 
political costs which a more offensive strategy and possibly higher 
casualties would have entailed. Consideration must also be given to the 
operational reality that the Australians did not have the capacity to work 
to Westmoreland’s concept because of the lack of both front line troops 
and available equipment. Because the perimeter of the base covered 
such a large area, a full battalion was required to man it, but even this
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was not really adequate at that time because there was little barbed wire 
available and no weapon pits had been dug. Spare parts tor APCs and 
personal weapons for troops were at a minimum, and when some patrols 
went out there were not enough machine guns remaining within the 
perimeter for adequate base defence. In addition relations between the 
Royal Australian Air Force and the Army were strained and command 
problems took several months to be resolved, all o f which added to base 
defence inadequacies.
Rather than being used to mount extensive offensive operations 
against main force VC units, the first four months of the Australian 
force’s time were taken up by a continual battle against the elements 
during the wet season, a battle aggravated by supply shortages and 
inter-service rivalries. Despite this, the patrols and close operations were 
almost continuous with one battalion out while the other manned the 
base. The battalion manning the base was not confined to a static role 
but had fighting patrols and ambushes constantly on the move. The 
building of the base progressed virtually by hand labour, meaning that 
troops received no rest between operations. Brigadier Jackson, the Task 
Force Commander, wrote in August that “the pace of operations is 
beginning to tell and there are indications that the infantry are becoming 
very fatigued both physically and mentally . .. Recreational facilities are 
inadequate".22
The continual patrolling, the “cordon-and-search” of villages, 
and the operations into suspected enemy base areas continued for the 
rest o f the year. However, this was only local activity, as the Australians 
went no further than 30 kilometres (18 miles) from the base. Although 
VC base areas and lines of communications were disrupted, only small 
groups of enemy were encountered, except for two clashes that were 
enemy initiated. During December the Task Force was called upon by II 
Field Force Vietnam to participate in Operation DUCK as security for 
part o f Highway 15, while the 9th Infantiy Division moved from the port 
of VungTau to Long Thanh (Bear Cat). In view of the fact that the security 
of Highway 15 was one o f the specific roles Westmoreland had envisaged 
for the Australians it seems strange that Brigadier Jackson should 
describe operations to secure it as “flashes in the pan”.23 He recorded 
later that “our ability to conduct offensive operations against the VC in 
December was severely limited by road security operations.”2'1
There were only two major actions involving the Australian force 
during 1966, and both were enemy initiated. The first was in July during 
Operation HOBART, when the Australian Sixth Battalion encountered 
elements o f the local force D445 Battalion, which attacked and almost 
over-ran one of the Australian companies, “hugging" to avoid the artillery 
fire. The VC unit engaged the Australian company for over an hour 
despite the heavy artillery barrage brought down amongst them. VC 
losses for the action were six killed by body count, while the Australians 
lost two dead and 12 wounded. Several other small clashes occurred
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during the five day operation and the final casualties were nine VC by 
body count, with Australian casualties at three dead and 19 wounded.
The other major action occurred in August when a company 
patrol o f Sixth Battalion walked into a major VC ambush in a rubber 
plantation near the deserted village ofLongTan, only 2,500 metres (less 
than two miles) from the Task Force base. Nui Dat base had been 
mortared in the early hours o f 17 August and B Company, Sixth 
Battalion, had been sent out at first light to investigate. D Company was 
sent to relieve them on the following day. On meeting and relieving B 
company. D company moved into the Long Tan rubber plantation and 30 
minutes later, as they moved toward the eastern side o f the plantation, 
the ambush was initiated. One Australian platoon (30 men) was cut off, 
but the ensuing constant movement of the rest o f the company over a 
wide area o f the plantation while trying to relieve this platoon proved one 
of the factors that saved the Australians. Others may have been the 
weather and sustained supporting fire; visibility was cut to 100 metres 
by fierce rain storms and artillery pounded into the enemy positions. D 
company was finally relieved after a tense four hour battle, when an 
Australian relief force of APC mounted infantry firing heavy machine 
guns moved into the plantation in the dark.
An official body count o f 245 VC has been recorded, but Socialist 
Republic o f Vietnam authorities refute this count and say around 150 
were killed, and those mainly due to artillery.25 The Australian losses 
were 18 killed and 26 wounded. Vietnamese sources say that the action 
was initiated both to stop the Australian policy of destruction in the 
province and to show support for the people of the displaced villages of 
Long Phuoc and Long Tan.26
The battle brought home to the Australians that the war was 
more than a counter-insurgency conflict. Major re-organization was 
initiated, from senior command down to re-assessing the ammunition 
“states" for infantry riflemen. Ammunition “states” had previously been 
60 rounds of rifle ammunition per rifleman and 200 rounds per machine 
gun, inadequate levels of supply in circumstances such as the extensive 
contact at Long Tan; this fact alone gives an indication o f the Australian 
knowledge and perception of the situation in Vietnam. The major impact 
of Long Tan was the realization that battalion operations would, from 
then on, have to function in tighter formations, meaning that operations 
o f battalion size would cover even smaller areas than previously and 
cou Id moreover never move ou tside art illery range. Comma nd of APC s was 
given “unequivocally” to the infantiy commander and a “ready reaction 
company” was always to be on hand in the Task Force area, tying u p even 
more troops in static situations. For the rest of the year the Australians 
continued to work slowly outwards from the base at Nui Dat, but did not 
make contact with other than small local force units.
The year 1966 ended with the Australians committing themselves 
to the development of a larger base camp which required a greater 
number o f troops to man, so cutting down on operational efficiency. Not
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surprisingly the operations undertaken by the Australians following this 
expansionary move were not of the kind Westmoreland had envisaged; 
Australians were not confronting main force units in their base areas 
and sanctuaries, but conducting pacification operations within their 
own Tactical Area o f Responsibilty (TAOR). In February 1967 
Westmoreland visited the Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy and 
confronted the Australian commanders about what he considered the 
poor results achieved by the force:
I then departed for the Australian Task Force where I called on 
Brigadier Graham, the new commander, for the first time. The 
Australians are very inactive and I learned they are about to 
rotate their two battalions which means they will be virtually 
ineffective for over a month. Out of a 4,600 man force they are 
able to put only six companies into the field. They have a large 
base to defend which requires two companies [at least]. I 
expressed to Brigadier Graham my disappointment and 
subsequently in talking to the Australian Ambassador, to General 
Mackay upon his departure, and to General Vincent upon his 
arrival, I expressed my concern that very little combat power was 
being generated by the 4,600 man force. Furthermore, I suggested 
that they might want to change their unit rotation policy which 
I thought would allow them to increase their combat power with 
the same total number of troops and at the same time have them 
in a fighting posture for twelve months. The Australians were a 
little shocked at my comments but I explained in all fairness to 
the command and to their reputation, this observation should be 
known.27
Several months later this difference in interpretation of role between the 
American and Australian commands was noted again.
Military operations are not evaluated though it should be noted 
that the Australians have been extremely effective in securing an 
area through intensive day and night operations within their 
TAOR [Tactical Area Of Responsibility] . . . However, the primary 
mission of the Australian Force is to carry out offensive operations 
against the enemy, rather than engage in territorial pacification 
missions.28
Despite these criticisms from the senior command of which they 
were a part, the Australians remained within the confines of Phuoc Tuy 
until January 1968. There were only two major actions in 1967, and 
again these were enemy initiated.
Conclusions
When Australia committed forces to South Vietnam in 1962 the 
military aim was motivated by the self-interested political hope of 
securing a United States presence in southeast Asia. During the period 
of the involvement the rationale remained the same. South Vietnam and
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its people were only important to Australia as appendages o f the United 
States. Policy decisions o f the Australian Army were tied more to national 
political need than overall strategic thought and were ad hoc in nature. 
The Australians had to make decisions in haste in order to keep pace 
with the rapid American escalation. The true nature of the war could not 
be addressed because this was contrary to the supposed rationale for 
being involved. Australian soldiers and the public were told that the 
people o f South Vietnam wanted to be protected from the forces o f the 
revolutionary movement; this in fact was far from the case. Many families 
in the south had members fighting with, or supporting, the Viet Cong, 
especially in the countryside where there was little loyalty to the 
government in Saigon. Therefore the policy decisions which reflected the 
belief that the people wanted and appreciated the allied presence were 
doomed to failure because in practice they were not based upon a 
realistic analysis o f the situation.
The decisions taken on the location and size of the base at Nui Dat 
are examples o f this faulty analysis. The Nui Dal base locked the 
Australian force into a position from which it was impossible to move in 
the following years o f involvement. The support o f a large proportion of 
the province’s population was lost in 1966 and was never won back. The 
forced m ovement of 8000 people and the destruction o f their homes and 
livelihoods without any attempt at compensation by the Australians or 
the Government of South Vietnam permanently alienated a large 
proportion o f the province population. The support o f the people for their 
own government and its allies was essential if the conflict was ever to 
achieve the conclusion desired by that government, the United States 
and Australia alike, yet the first actions of the Australians in Phuoc Tuy 
had the opposite effect. Later actions, such as the dumping of bodies in 
the market squares, the prohibitions on land use and the arresting and 
handing over to the South Vietnamese of ARVN draft dodgers, increased 
the animosity toward the Australian presence.
The size and complexity o f the base and the waste of manpower 
its defence entailed were givens that later Task Force commanders had 
no option but to accept. The base restricted the mobility o f combat forces 
and the overall combat ability o f the Australian effort by tying up men 
and equipment in static defence roles. The cost o f the Australian effort 
could have been cut in half and better results achieved in line with 
COM USM ACVs policies by placing the battalions and supporting arms 
in the base complex o f the Logistic Support Base at Vung Tau. The 
battalions would then have been free to move on operat ions into any part 
o f the eastern section o f III Corps without having to be concerned for the 
security o f an exposed rear area. They would have been able to fit more 
easily into General Westmoreland’s concept of “manoeuvre battalions” 
and perhaps have played a distinctive role in II Field Force combat 
operations that were mounting in intensity during 1966.
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Veterans in Australia: the Search for Integration 
Jane Ross
Australia and the war
Vietnam  was not what its veterans wanted it to have been. It was 
unsuccessful— more so than most o f them seem to admit— and it was 
unpopular— though not so unpopular in Australia as most o f them now 
believe after view ing the war through Am erican mass media.
The Vietnam war continued the theme of dependency in Australia’s 
foreign policy,1 but with a different cultural outcome. A fter the First 
World War, which impacted so hugely on Australians at a personal level2 
(because o f the number o f men who fought in Europe and the Middle 
East), the m ilitary experiences were used to form the basis of an 
independent, national identity myth, known variously as the myth or 
tradition o f Anzac or the myth o f the diggers.3 The Second W orld W ar saw 
the country’s dependence shift from  Britain to the United States, but still 
the national identity remained robustly intact.
A fter Vietnam, however, different cultural processes were at 
work. Because Vietnam  was not comparable to our earlier wars it did not 
fit im mediately into the military tradition; more importantly, the 
enormous impact on our culture o f Am erican media and the rapid 
adaptation o f Am erican ideas by our veterans meant that Australian 
representations o f the war were largely based on American memories 
and interpretations.4 W e can see this most clearly in the two issues 
which have played a central role in defining “the” Australian veteran: 
Agent Orange, and the problem of homecoming and the need for a 
welcome home march.
The 50.000 or so veterans deal with their memories o f the war in 
many different ways.5 For some, the full-time veterans, it is the defining 
element o f their identity. Some are damaged beyond cure either 
physically or mentally, while others lead productive lives untroubled by 
their experiences. For some, the war is with them constantly, while 
others left it behind when they boarded the plane or ship for their return 
to Australia.
It is difficult to say to what extent “the veterans” do indeed form 
any sort o f coherent group; and it is also difficult even as late as the end 
o f 1990 to see whether the experiences of Vietnam have stabilised into 
coherent cultural forms. It does seem, however, that both the Vietnam 
veterans as a whole and their memories are being absorbed progressively 
into the mainstream  community o f returned servicemen and into its 
official ideology, the Anzac tradition. In this sense, the war is at last being 
Australianised.
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The Vietnam war has proven difficult to integrate because the 
war impinged very little on so many Australians, and never made very 
much sense. It is hard to remember why we, as a nation, did so casually, 
thoughtlessly and irresponsibly condemn so many young men to the 
possibility of death or irretrievable damage. There was opposition to the 
war in Australia, but the experience of serving in the Australian forces 
was not a radicalising one. There was never any organised opposition 
within the army, and the soldiers prided themselves on their 
professionalism which meant that they consciously did not concern 
themselves with the politics or morality of their country’s commitment 
to the American cause. There were no organised “veterans against the 
war” either, and even the Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia 
(W A A ), which is oppositional on many matters, is rousingly conservative 
when it comes to the big questions about the war.® The soldiers were, in 
fact, veiy much representatives of mainstream Australia.
The opposition to the war—and it did grow over the course of the 
war—had two strands. The more radical branch was opposed to the war 
itself, or to Australia’s part in it. The other branch had deep historical 
antecedents; Australia was acutely divided during the First World War 
over the question of conscription (which was finally rejected, leaving the 
Australians in that war the only wholly volunteer force), and this aspect 
of the commitment to Vietnam was the one which raised the most doubts 
in the general community.
However, despite opposition from some sections of the community, 
many were in favour of compulsory m ililaiy service and many of those 
conscripted were not particularly opposed to doing their two years. Once 
they were in, and had been trained, then a tour of Vietnam seemed the 
obvious next step. The army claimed at various times that only those 
conscripts who volunteered for service in Vietnam were actually posted 
there, and it does seem as though there would have been no shortage of 
those willing to go.
The Agent Orange issue in Australia 7
The stoiy of Agent Orange will be familiar to readers in the United 
States who have followed the course of the dispute in their country. 
Indeed, without the actions of American veterans it seems doubtful 
whether it would ever have become an issue in Australia, and the 
Australian case has been very derivative of the American one. Until it 
became an issue in the United States, no Australian claims for chemical 
damage had been filed: even since then, there have been only a handful.
The chemical issue only came to the fore in Australia in the late 
1970s. The Australian Government at first stupidly denied that any 
Australian soldiers had ever been exposed. The claim was speedily 
retracted, being patently false, but the Government then insisted that 
established veterans’ channels could handle the problem, if indeed there 
was one. But the W A A  refused to accept this, continued to lobby, and 
instead of using the established channels such as the lobbying power of
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the Returned Services League (RSL), relied on media pressure and its 
own direct contacts with politicians and bureaucrats.
The W A A ’s efforts met with mixed success. When it demanded 
a judicial rather than scientific enquiry the Government referred the 
matter to the Senate Standing Committee on Science and the Environment 
which produced Pesticides and the Health o f Australian Vietnam Veterans, 
1982, and promised a comprehensive study into the health of veterans 
and their offspring. This study— the so-called morbidity survey— 
unfortunately never eventuated. The other studies which were completed 
were not accepted as valid by the W A A  (presumably because they all 
used sample survey techniques rather than investigating the entire 
population of veterans) and it continued to push for a Royal Commission, 
the only body felt to have sufficiently wide powers of enquiry and criteria 
of assessment, and which would remain independent of government 
opinion and/or policy.
The Royal Commission was established under Justice Philip 
Evatt in 1983; the report in nine volumes was finally presented in July 
1985, after hearing evidence from many veterans and experts. The 
release o f the report did little, at least immediately, to defuse the issue. 
The Commission functioned, in effect, as a trial of Agent Orange. The 
counsel Tor" the chemicals was briefed by various chemical companies 
such as Monsanto; the case “against", and therefore “lor" the veterans, 
was argued by the W A A . The case against Agent Orange was found to 
be not proven; that is, the chemicals were presumed innocent unless 
proven guilty, and the Royal Commissioner announced his verdict in 
extravagant language:
So Agent Orange is Not Guilty and the chemical agents used to 
defoliate battle zones in Vietnam and to protect Australians from 
malaria are not to blame.
No one lost.
This is not a matter for regret but for rejoicing. Veterans and their 
wives are no more at risk of having abnormal offspring than 
anyone else. Veterans have not been poisoned. The number with 
general health problems is small, probably much smaller than 
amongst their peers in the community. The few that have 
psychological stress disorders can seek help freely and without 
shame and above all with hope of early relief and in the sure 
knowledge that no poisoning of their minds has occurred.
This is good news and it is the Commission’s fervent hope that 
it will be shouted from the roof-tops.8
The Commissioner’s hopes that this would be the end of the matter were 
short-lived. Many veterans—and other observers—were concerned with 
certain aspects of the Commission, even if they did not necessarily 
dispute the overall tenor of the findings. The W AA  was angry with the 
Commission. They had urged that it be formed, and had been confident 
that the findings would confirm their worst fears. Instead, they found
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themselves In the position of being the prosecutors, with the onus of proof 
lying on them to show three things and thus prove Agent Orange guilty.
They needed to show: first, that there were in fact health 
problems; second, that those suffering from these problems had been 
exposed in some way to herbicides; and third, that it was this exposure 
which had caused the individual’s problems. The Commission found 
that while the first, the existence of health problems, had been 
demonstrated, it denied both sufficient exposure to and connection 
between herbicides and ill-health. Rather it attributed health problems 
to widespread Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and to increased 
alcohol and cigarette use, and it hinted at a possible carcinogenic effect 
of the anti-malarial drug Daosone: "Any Vietnam veteran suffering from 
cancer who may have taken daosone should have his claim treated as 
showing that a reasonable hypothesis exists connecting his incapacity 
with his war service.”9
It did allow also that some cancers could be attributed to 
chemical exposure, with the following cautious statement:
(The Commission) regards the suggestion of Soft Tissue Sarcoma 
and Lymphoma (non-Hodgkins) induction by exposure loTCDD 
in 2,4,5-T (in Agent Orange) as unlikely but not fanciful. A 
Determining Authority might well be reasonably satisfied that a 
reasonable hypothesis linking incapacity following such 
inductions with service in Vietnam exists.10
The W A A ’s case was weak in many respects, and certainly not 
equal to the task of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the chemicals 
were guilty. This is at present an impossible task, given that scientists 
themselves are in dispute. And it is not to say that the chemicals were 
guilty, nor that the chemicals are innocent—because this is not proven 
either—but merely that an open finding would have been the more 
correct one. The Commissioner has continued to defend his approach, 
emphasising that his findings have enabled many veterans to think 
positive and “get on with their lives”, free from concerns about their 
future health and that of their children.
The failure of the W A A 's  case reinforced their view that they 
could never be allowed to succeed because of the social, economic and 
political ramifications of any findings against widely-used chemicals. 
We can question why some veterans seem to be intent on proving the 
guilt of Agent Orange almost to the point of obsession, when the 
Commission’s findings mean that most claims will be allowed by the 
repatriation system on grounds other than the toxicity of chemicals. The 
answer would seem to be that being able to blame a chemical, or some 
specific agent rather than "just the war” is important to their self-esteem, 
and the diagnosis of PTSD seems to bear with it a stigma of personal 
inadequacy.
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Reports in the Australian press in March-May of 1990 claim that 
recent events in the US have given “fresh hope” to veterans in Australia. 
This refers both to the 1987 judgement in Illinois which awarded 
damages against Monsanto, and cast doubt on one of the pro-Agent 
Orange experts, Dr. Suskind, and also to favourable reports prepared by 
the Independent Agent Orange Task Force which link Agent Orange to 
various cancers and other diseases. Justice Evatt for his part is 
described as being “firm on Agent Orange”,11 even though the press seem 
to consider that the Commission’s findings have been thrown into doubt. 
Similarly, a case heard on appeal in the Repatriation System in 1990 was 
hailed by the W A A  as a “landmark” because it awarded a widow’s 
pension on the basis that a soft-tissue sarcoma (schwannoma) could 
reasonably be linked to chemical exposure in Vietnam.12 As workers in 
the area are quick to point out, however, this is only one case which may 
itself be appealed to a higher level; and soft-tissue sarcomas (a very rare 
form of cancer) were mentioned by the Royal Commission as being a 
reasonable claim anyway.
Even findings which do not provide overall support for the 
W A A ’s case are reported in a misleading way, for example, in the 
treatment o f reports by the CDC claiming that US troops who served in 
Vietnam have not developed physical problems different from those of 
veterans who served elsewhere in the world at the same time, except that 
they were at increased risk of non-Hodgkins lymphoma. Under the 
heading “Compo [compensation] hopes for Vietnam veterans”, an article 
in the Sydney Morning Herald opens by claiming that:
Compensation amounting to millions of dollars could flow to a 
number of Vietnam veterans and widows of veterans following 
publication in America of findings into the effects of exposure lo 
the defoliant Agent Orange.13
Like many of the arguments about Vietnam, the Agent Orange 
controversy was initiated in the US but then prosecuted with considerable 
vigour and sincerity by the veterans who formed the W A A , and yet even 
ten years later we still await a definitive answer. The Commission may 
have achieved its objective of reassuring veterans about their health, at 
least partially, but there is no guarantee that this will be an enduring 
achievement. The final verdict on Agent Orange is still to come.
The Health o f Veterans I—Physical Health
The Agent Orange campaign was based on the assumption that 
veterans of the Vietnam war, and their children, suffered ill-health as a 
result of exposure to chemicals during their Vietnam service. But as the 
Royal Commission concluded, there is, so far, no evidence of large-scale 
health problems among Vietnam veterans. One can conclude from this, 
optimistically, as did the Royal Commission that there are, in fact, no 
special health problems; or, one can leave it as an open question.
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Large numbers o f veterans have taken advantage o f the 
Repatriation system of pensions for disabilities. But most o f these are, 
so far, for minor disabilities and the amount o f pension involved is very 
small (see Table 1). As the veterans age, however, one would expect them 
to move to higher pension levels.
The W A A  and other believers in the chemical issue have supplied 
anecdotal evidence of both physical and mental ill-heallh among veterans, 
and o f a high incidence of birth abnormalities among their children 
conceived after service in Vietnam. The sorts of symptoms which have 
been reported by those believing they have suffered from chemical 
damage cover a wide range. The W A A  published what they called an 
“Agent Orange Questionnaire o f possible allergic symptoms" in their 
journal Debrief o f October 1982, providing a ready made check-list o f 
symptoms. Without attributing specific agency it seems more than 
coincidental that following the publication of this list there was an 
increase in the number of patients presenting to the Repatriation 
Hospitals with just these symptoms. Every system in the body was 
represented in the list, under headings of skin, ENT, eyes, respiratory, 
cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, gastro-urinary, muscular, and nervous 
system. The list is so comprehensive it covers almost every “symptom" 
that any person, sick or well, could possibly exhibit.
None of these claims about widespread and unusual ill-health 
has been substantiated in any large-scale studies.
Table 1
Rated o f D isability Pensions fo r Vietnam Veterans at June 1989
Number of veterans % of general rate 
pension received
Cumulative % 
of total
$ per week
2564 10 30 7.46
1762 15-20 51 14.92
1075 25-30 64 22.38
803 35-40 73 29.84
574 45-50 80 37.30
498 60 86 44.76
281 65-70 89 52.22
333 75-80 93 59.68
122 85-90 95 67.14
448 100 100 74.60
8460
36 intermediate rate 136.25 
678 TPI (totally & permanently) 197.90
9174
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Nevertheless the W A A  persuaded the Government to undertake 
a series o f studies of veterans’ health, and as a result the Australian 
Veterans Health Studies (AVHS) group was set up. It carried out the Case 
Control Study o f Congenital Anomalies and Vietnam Service'4 (popularly 
known as the “Birth Defects Study”), completed in 1983, which found 
that “there is no evidence that Army service in Vietnam relates to the risk 
of fathering a child with an anomaly". No subsequent research has 
invalidated this conclusion, and as the Royal Commission observed, the 
sad fact is that a normal incidence o f birth defects among the children 
o f Vietnam veterans would lead us to expect between three per cent and 
ten per cent o f them to suffer some malformation.
One study undertaken since the Royal Commission has claimed 
to show a high incidence of various birth defects, as well as of marital 
instability. However, the sample used was very unrepresentative o f the 
Army, selecting atypical patterns o f engagement (whether regular or 
conscript) and rank; additionally each respondent was asked to choose 
his own control. The figures on marital breakdown in fact showed a lower 
than expected rate. Overall the results of the study are at best qualitative 
rather than quantitative.15
The second study carried out by the AVHS was a pilot morbidity 
study, designed to be the precursor to a major study of the health of 
veterans. The pilot study showed, basically that there was no discernible 
pattern o f ill-health among veterans. In spite o f the Royal Commission’s 
strong support for its implementation, the Government refused to give 
funding for the larger project, and it was finally abandoned.
The third study was, however, completed. Known as The 
Mortality Report,'6 it compared the death-rates of veteran and non­
veteran National Servicemen until 1982. The report is a mine of 
information on the career of the conscript, on both the selection 
processes which carried him to Vietnam and the structure and function 
of units in Vietnam. The overall conclusions on mortality (as opposed to 
morbidity, i.e. ill-health) were: first, that veterans ofVietnam had slightly 
higher death rates than did non-veterans, mainly because o f increased 
alcohol-related sickness; but that both groups o f National Servicemen 
had lower mortality rates than civilians o f the same age group. This was 
not a new finding. American studies had demonstrated that both Second 
World W ar and Korean veterans exhibited the “Healthy Soldier Syndrome”. 
Given the very good health and fitness o f the National Servicemen who 
were selected into the Army, and the more marked fitness o f those who 
were sent to Vietnam, we would expect them to be healthier than the 
average citizen years later, and therefore to have lower mortality rates— 
unless o f course their service in Vietnam had caused some widespread 
deterioration in their health. The study did not conclude that Vietnam 
service had produced no effects on the health of soldiers. But it did 
conclude that these effects seemed to be related to easy access to, and 
increased consumption of, those two widely used and harmful drugs of
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addiction, nicotine and alcohol. Beer was cheap, available and by far the 
most common relaxant among Australian forces in Vietnam; cigarettes 
were supplied in both army ration packs and in RSL and Red Cross 
“comfort parcels” . These two drugs have been accepted by the Repatriation 
system as being implicated in many pensionable disabilities now suffered 
by veterans o f all wars.
The Health o f Veterans II— Mental Health
As with physical health, there has been almost no research in 
Australia on the mental health o f veterans, though there have been 
studies- o f veterans undergoing psychiatric treatment. The Royal 
Commission seemed to find it acceptable to use figures from the USA to 
estimate the probable levels of stress-induced mental ill-health 
(summarised as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, known earlier as 
Vietnam Veterans Syndrome). Yet, one could argue against this on the 
grounds that both the war and the home front were different for 
Australian soldiers compared to the US forces. According to evidence 
accepted by the Royal Commission: 23.5 per cent of veterans would be 
expected to be complaining of symptoms (mostly of anxiety and 
depression); 12.2 percent would have sufficient symptoms to warrant a 
diagnosis; 5.9 per cent would have chronic conditions; and 3.2 per cent 
would be incapacitated. Most o f these men would, however, be suffering 
from these symptoms even without having had Vietnam service, as the 
base male population percentages were respectively 20 percent, 9.9 per 
cent, 4.9 per cent, and 2.4 per cent. (These figures given by the Royal 
Commission are based on a mental health survey carried out on a 
random sample o f adults in a suburb of Sydney—which perhaps would 
not be completely representative of the general population.)
The Commissioner concluded:
There is a Vietnam veterans' syndrome, broadly corresponding 
to PTSD. At this time about 25% of Vietnam veterans will have 
psychological symptoms requiring treatment, and this number 
may be expected to peak in 1988-89 and then gradually but 
steadily decline.17
These figures are in line with the Vietnam Veterans’ Counselling Service 
(W C S ) estimates that perhaps 20 per cent of all veterans are in need of 
some form o f counselling. The confusion over the possible levels of 
mental ill-health among veterans is understandable. First, measures of 
mental health in the general population are not noted for their reliability. 
There is little agreement on how to define menial health or how to 
measure it. Lay people, for instance, would probably be rather sceptical 
about the figures cited above showing 20 per cent of the male population 
to be suffering from “symptoms”; but we should remember that only a 
much smaller number seek treatment, or find these symptoms disabling. 
Second, most o f the studies specifically on veterans’ mental ill-health are
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qualitative rather than quantitative. Certainly veterans may show high 
levels of rage and violence, of guilt and distress because of combat 
experiences, but this is only evident among the population of those 
seeking counselling, or of those who are already psychiatric in-patients. 
These studies do not tell us anything about the other veterans, those who 
have not sought help. It is assumed that they, like most people, are more 
or less adjusted: or more or less maladjusted, depending on whether one 
sees the glass as half-full or half-empty.
All groups if examined would present patterns of physical and 
mental illness; the question is: do Vietnam veterans have a unique 
pattern which would lead us to believe that the problems were caused by 
their war service?To disentangle this, we need well-constructed, relatively 
large-scale research with adequate controls. Australia has been backward 
in funding research o f this type, compared at least to the United States, 
and there is currently very little data on which to make judgements.
This has not inhibited organisations such as the W A A , but it is 
hard to see them making headway against the findings of the Royal 
Commission unless some new and high quality research appears which 
incontrovertibly relates chemicals and veterans’ ill health to their 
experiences as soldiers in Vietnam. A  research group at Sydney 
University has begun a survey study of veterans' physical and mental 
health using a large sample and control group, but the results of this will 
not be known for some time, and the ultimate answers to questions about 
the health and mortality of Vietnam veterans lie somewhere in the future.
Veterans' Services— the Repat system 18
The Repatriation system was established in Australia during the 
First World War. In fact the commonly used term “Repat” is misleading, 
as the series o f legislative acts are more concerned with social security 
than with the return of soldiers to their home country. “Repat” includes 
disability and service pensions, health services, home loans, workforce 
retraining, etc. The system has undergone changes over the years, and 
was most recently revamped in 1986 when the various acts were 
consolidated into the Veterans Entitlement Act. The system is 
administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). At times the 
DVA has been accused of being unsympathetic and obstructionist 
towards veterans, which is not surprising given that the Department and 
veterans are frequently in an adversarial situation, with the veterans 
trying to show cause for the Department to release funds, and the 
Department guarding the public monies against what it sees as unfounded 
claims.
The DVA has been particularly criticised by the W A A  for 
allegedly having a bad attitude towards Vietnam veterans. The W A A  
sees the Department as being somewhat like the RSL—dominated by an 
older generation who regard veterans of the two World Wars as being the 
real returned servicemen, and who see the younger Vietnam veterans as
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having suffered insufficiently in their “conflict” to merit the fu 11 generosity 
o f “the repat”.
For some veterans, their contact with the repat system is the 
most salient aspect o f being a veteran. Unfortunately the system is a 
legalistic maze, with determination of the veteran’s eligibility and 
entitlements sometimes taking years o f com pleting applications, 
assessments, and enduring appeals. To qualify for a disability pension 
applicants or their dependants need to show that injury, or disease, or 
death has been, in general terms, “war caused”. The exact definition of 
what “war caused” means has been subject to change in recent years. 
Once entitlement to a disability pension has been accepted, the degree 
of incapacity is then assessed as being somewhere between a minimum 
10 per cent and 100 per cent, and a compensatory pension is paid 
accordingly. A  large number o f Vietnam veterans— more than 10,000—  
receive some disability pensions; most of them only receive a small 
amount, indicating that their disability has been assessed, at least for 
the present, as being only minor (See Table 1).
For an individual, having his disability accepted as being war- 
caused is not a final step. The level o f pension can be varied over his 
lifetime and the determining process is very far from static, even when 
the legislation remains the same. This is because of the system o f appeals 
through which the veteran and the DVA can proceed before a final 
judgement is given.
The Determining Process
The veteran must first approach the Repatriation Commission 
with a claim, and may be immediately successful in having it recognised 
at an acceptable level. I f not, he can then appeal, sequentially, to the 
Veterans’ Review Board, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the 
Federal Court, and, finally, the High Court. Sometimes the success or 
otherwise o f the veteran’s claim will depend on who is sitting on a Board 
on a particular day. Changes of interpretation make their way slowly 
through the whole system, and can have an impact eventually on a large 
number of claimants. Legal and medical fashions also change. What is 
considered one year to be a reasonable claim can be disallowed the next; 
what the veteran has to do is present a case which, in the light of current 
medical and legal opinion, is based on a “reasonable hypothesis” . Prior 
to legislative changes in 1985, the DVA had to disprove the veteran’s 
hypothesis that his disability was war-caused, and so almost all 
veterans’ claims were successful: but since a Federal Court ruling of 
1987 argued that veterans must present a “reasonable hypothesis” , the 
veterans now need to make stronger cases. In the words of the Court:
To be reasonable, a hypothesis must possess some degree of 
acceptability or credibility—it must not be obviously fanciful, 
impossible, incredible or not tenable or too remote or too
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tenuous... At the same time, however, a hypothesis may be
reasonable without having been proved . . .  to be correct as a
matter of fact.19
This need not be the end of the story, for in a typical contested case the 
experts from both sides can produce what to them are “plausible 
hypotheses” on which the determining authority must rule. Some 
hypotheses are rejected as not being reasonable and others are accepted, 
even though they may be dealing with contending arguments in an area 
which is far from being scientifically or medically settled.
That this need for a “plausible hypothesis” is relevant to Agent 
Orange claims is obvious; but the actual rulings have been somewhat 
unexpected. In practice the repat system has followed the findings o f the 
Evatt Royal Commission and disallows claims based on exposure to 
defoliants and insecticides, thus ruling that there are no plausible 
hypotheses relating any disabilities to chemical exposure. The W A A , 
understandably, continues to fight against this ruling, and there are 
several cases currently in the process o f being heard. The other side of 
the coin, however, is that by following the Royal Commission findings 
almost all claims based on stress as the war-caused catalyst o f disabilities 
will be allowed, as will those in which smoking and / or alcohol consumption 
are implicated and where these behaviours are found to be caused or 
aggravated by war service (as generally seems to be the case).
In spite o f the seeming comprehensiveness of the repat benefits, 
the Vietnam veteran community has continued to lobby for special 
services. The W A A  achieved a significant victory in 1982 with the 
establishment o f the Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service (W C S ). 
Modelled on its US counterpart, the service provides a 24 hour, shop­
front counselling network for veterans and their families. It has records 
on over 5000 clients, and reports over 23,000 contacts per year. 
Counsellors estimate that the 10 per cent o f all Vietnam veterans that 
they have seen to date represents perhaps half the total number who are 
in need o f some counselling. Some o f those who contact the W C S  have 
only m inor problems, but a large number have been diagnosed as having 
PTSD. The service seems to have fulfilled a need, and has the support o f 
all veteran groups, although some would like to see the service broadened 
to include veterans o f all wars. The W C S  is very much a child o f its 
times. It epitomises the anti-psychiatry, non-drug therapeutic fashions 
o f the 1980s; and its success confirms the limits o f the highly 
bureaucratised, establishment medical care which is provided through 
the repat system.
Speaking for the Veterans 20
After the final, low-key withdrawal o f Australian combat troops 
from Vietnam, the whole episode was publicly forgotten. The men who 
had fought and returned, and the bereaved families of those who had not
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returned, were left to sort out things as best they could. At that time— 
in the early 1970s— there was no particular concept of “the Vietnam 
veteran” in Australia. In a newspaper report on the 1970 Anzac Day 
march, the word “veteran” was still presented in quotation marks. It was 
only in the following years, as the issue of veterans and especially Agent 
Orange came to the fore, that this Americanism was widely adopted 
along with many other concepts and u sages from our trans-Pacific allies.
In the early years after the war, there seems to have been no 
feeling that the soldiers returned from Vietnam constituted a special 
case. They were eligible to join the RSL, the “natural” spokesman for all 
returned servicemen; the repatriation system was in place; there was 
little unemployment; they were fit young men who had only done twelve 
month’s active service in what was a minor conflict anyway.
To trace the reasons why other groups besides the RSL, 
especially the W A A , came into being in the late 1970s, it is necessary 
to consider: first, the nature o f the RSL; and secondly, the impact o f the 
Agent Orange issue.
When the large numbers of Australian servicemen returned from 
overseas at the end of the First World War, there was competition as to 
who would legitimately speak for these “returned men”. The winner was 
the RSL (the initials o f its abbreviated title o f Relum ed Servicemen’s 
League— now de-”sexed”, as it were, to Returned Service’s League), an 
organisation which has flourished and enjoys direct government access 
at the highest levels. The RSL has unfortunately strayed beyond its brief 
to promote the welfare of ex-service personnel, and its various state 
organisations are vocal in support o f familiar conservative causes, such 
as the preservation of our current national flag, o f white Anglo-Celtic 
dominance in our culture and racial mix, and of the traditional role of 
women.
The RSL is only one among many veterans groups, but is by far 
the largest and most visible. Nevertheless it does not enjoy universal 
acceptance among the veteran community. Even at its height in the 
1920s, the League’s membership has been around 265,000, or some 30 
per cent of those eligible to join. The RSL claims that Vietnam veterans 
are joining at the same rate as veterans of previous wars, and that 
around 15,000 are currently members.
Each generation has fought its own war, at roughly 20 year 
intervals. Each generation has found some problem with acceptance by 
their elders, and no later soldiers in Australia have attained the status 
of those who returned from the First World War, and particularly those 
who landed at Anzac Cove in 1915 and served on the Gallipoli Peninsula. 
Each group will eventually have its turn as leaders of the veteran 
community, as the old soldiers die, but those of the Vietnam generation 
have particular problems in taking their place.
V eiy  large numbers of Australians, all o f them volunteers, served 
overseas in the First World War and then founded the RSL. Even greater
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numbers served in the armed forces in the Second W orld W ar (over 
660,000). Small contingents went to Korea, Malaya and Borneo. Just 
over 50,000 served in Vietnam, over half o f them volunteers but with a 
significant number o f conscripts. The Vietnam generation of soldiers was 
thus a comparatively small group, going to a war which was not 
universally popular, many of them conscripted (though not necessarily 
very reluctant), and, perhaps most significantly, they did not come home 
as victors. They did not all find it easy to see themselves as true heirs 
o f the Anzacs, nor did they find it easy to move into the RSL.
The issue which brought their relationship with the RSL to a head, 
however, was that o f Agent Orange.
The Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia (originally the 
Vietnam Veterans’ Action Association) had its beginnings in the concern 
o f veterans that their health and welfare needs were not being met by the 
DVA and that the RSL was ignoring their plight. The W A A  were 
operating on two levels: they implemented a program ofcrisis counselling 
and intervention, the forerunner to the W C S ; and they lobbied hard and 
publicly for the investigation o f their claims that Australian soldiers in 
Vietnam had been exposed to a variety of chemicals, and that this 
exposure had caused widespread health problems. The RSL did not share 
the W A A 's  concerns. Its attitude, overall, has been that “all veterans 
have a few problems, the blokes who’ve been to Vietnam didn’t have as 
tough a time anyway”; and that, “the established channels can handle 
it anyway”. These attitudes, as well as some personality clashes, led to 
bitter relations between the RSL and the W A A .
The W A A  accused the RSL o f “betraying” the Vietnam veterans 
by siding with the DVA and apologists in the government who initially 
denied that Australian troops had been exposed at all to any chemicals 
(this initial foolish statement was soon retracted). “Betrayal” is o f course 
a key m otif in the whole Vietnam picture:21 the troops were betrayed by 
the politicians; they were betrayed by protesters in the streets; by 
unionists; and by the Saigon regime who white-anted their best efforts, 
and then lost the war. Some Australians even see the Americans as 
having betrayed them by making a half-hearted attempt at victory. This 
pattern o f betrayal continues a well known theme in Australian military 
history in which Australia is depicted as a jun ior ally, better at war than 
the senior partner, but doomed to fail overall because of the senior 
partner’s faintheartedness or stupidity.
The W A A  in its early years thus continued the story of Vietnam. 
There was a deep and keenly felt cynicism directed against all authority 
figures and politicians, both those who sent the troops to Vietnam and 
those who opposed participation in the conflict; and for many veterans 
there was hostility to anyone who had not shared their experiences, 
especially those connected with the anti-war movement or who did not 
share their views about the problems of veterans. This sense o f isolation, 
almost o f paranoia, seems to be one of the factors which kept the
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voluntary leadership o f the W A A  organisation so motivated. The other 
more positive factor is a very strong and sincere desire to help other 
veterans.
The W A A  does not represent all veterans, any more than does 
the RSL. A  variety of veterans groups meets a variety of needs both for 
veterans in general and those of Vietnam in particular. As well as the 
unit associations, there are welfare groups self-styled as “non-political” 
in order to contrast themselves with the W A A . Indeed some veterans 
actively dislike the W A A . It is seen as “political” , as being in conflict with 
authority, whereas many veterans want a harmonious integration into 
the dominant RSL/Anzac Day culture. Some resent the W A A ’s portrayal 
o f the veteran as sick or needy with children damaged by chemicals. For 
many veterans, their identity is not dominated by their war service, and 
if they jo in  any veterans group they do so for some comradeship and 
community activity rather than as a total commitment.
Like most self-help groups, the W A A  suffers from chronic 
shortages of funds and experienced and willing personnel, particularly 
for mounting and sustaining legal action. Nevertheless, it has been quite 
successful in recruiting and maintaining membership (it claimed around 
15,000 at its peak, though 5,000 seems typical), and most active in 
providing help to veterans when they need it most. Without the W A A , 
particularly without the energy and dedication of its leaders such as Phil 
Thompson, it seems very unlikely that either the W C S  or the Royal 
Commission would have been established.
The future of Vietnam Veteran groups
The Royal Commission has been and gone, although some 
groups are still fighting its findings. The long-term future of the Agent 
Orange dispute is unclear, and this dispute has been for long the driving 
force behind the main separate Vietnam veterans action group, the 
W A A . If Agent Orange ceases for whatever reason to be an issue— either 
because chemically-induced damage is accepted as a cause of disability, 
or because this is finally ruled out—then it is hard to see what special 
role there will be for Vietnam veterans groups. It appears that membership 
in the W A A  declined considerably after the Royal Commission ended, 
and after the resolution o f many outstanding issues by the success o f the 
Welcome Home March in October 1987.
It is likely, it seems, that there will be a gradual merging of the 
various groups, particularly as the W A A  mellows. Many veterans are 
members of more than one group, and in future years the relatively 
young Vietnam veterans will in all likelihood take over the RSL. Whether 
they then change its nature, or become in their turn integrated into its 
conservative political culture, will no doubt be a point of contention.
Some institutional pressures are already forcing the organisations 
to work more closely together. For instance, the Vietnam War Veterans 
Trust, which was set up to disburse the money received from the class
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action against Agent Orange in the USA, has representatives from the 
RSL, from the W A A , and from other veterans groups.
So too with the committee to establish a special Australian 
Vietnam Forces National Memorial. The W A A  has been the most active 
supporter of this project, and is raising much of the funds, but the 
Australian Government has also donated some $200,000 and the 
committee to choose the monument’s design (from entries in a competition) 
has a wide range o f membership.22
The W A A ’s immediate future probably lies in providing 
personalised counsel and support to veterans and their families. In this 
it will be almost an arm of the W C S , and may even become redundant, 
being more like the camaraderie groups such as the RSL and the 
Vietnam Legion of Veterans.
In assessing the effectiveness o f the W A A  as an organisation, the 
most striking thing has been its success at defining the image o f “the 
veteran” through the media. From the time o f its formation in 1980, the 
W A A  depicted the experience of returning from the war as an 
overwhelmingly negative one. During the 1980s, almost the only 
discussions o f Vietnam in the media were in terms of “the veteran and 
his problems", problems which have been seen as caused by either 
exposure to toxic chemicals and/or the unpopularity o f the war. The 
images of the war which linger in the public mind— insofar as they do 
linger at all— are probably drawn more from American than Australian 
experiences. The popular culture of the US— its movies, pop music, and 
television—have been as important in depicting the nature of the war 
and o f the veteran experience as USA political leaders were in defining 
the nature of the Vietnam “problem” years earlier.
Welcome Home 23
The return home of the Vietnam veteran has been portrayed in 
many American films and literary works. The indifference o f the method 
has been universally condemned as an insensitive and alienating 
approach to the repatriation of a soldier fresh from combat or at least 
from service in a war zone: take him from his unit; load him on a plane: 
land him somewhere in the US; and then send him home; once there he 
is given no parades; no ceremonies; and no peer support during his 
readjustment period, which may be relatively short (particularly if he 
remains in the service), or may be a never-ending process.
This picture has been accepted completely as portraying the 
Australian experience also, but this was not the case for a large number 
of servicemen. True. Australian soldiers were sometimes, even often, 
dumped at an airport in the middle of the night and left to make their own 
way home, but others were treated like war heroes at least briefly. 
Whether or not this brief welcome home ceremony was sufficient either 
as comfort, reward, or merely served as a gesture of transition, is indeed 
arguable, but it is important that the veterans’ experiences are recorded
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accurately before we can begin to argue about what would be desirable 
treatment. One hopes that the Vietnam experiences in both the US and 
Australia would lead to the services adopting as routine the practices of 
extensive debriefing and group support after any active duty, but neither 
set o f institutions has shown in the past that they are prone to learn 
expeditiously from soldiers’ experiences.
The Australian army prided itself on the morale and group 
cohesion of its units,2,1 and the infantry units were rotated on a unit basis 
rather than individually. They served for 12 months in Vietnam, but 
before this had sometimes gone through months or even years of training 
as a unit. Since all individual soldiers normally served 12 months in 
Vietnam also, this would mean—in theory—that all soldiers went to 
Vietnam together in their unit and returned with it 12 months later. 
Unfortunately this did not work out quite so well in practice, and 
generalising statements that Australian personnel rotation was on a unit 
basis need to be treated with some caution. The mainmodification to the 
group rotation theory came about through the operation of National 
Service (as the draft was called in Australia). Those who were “called up” 
were obliged to serve in the army for two years (later reduced to 18 
months), and were inducted into the army in four intakes per year, at 
three month intervals. When their two years service was completed, of 
course, they were discharged from the army and had no more immediate 
obligations.
Because the intakes were staggered, so too were the discharges, 
and some soldiers served only a few months in Vietnam before they 
returned to Australia. These “nashos” , as they were known, accounted 
for most o f the turnover in the units, but there were also the unavoidable 
departures occasioned by death, injury, disease, or on compassionate 
grounds. So , in practice, significant numbers of soldiers even from 
combat units did not return home with their units. Many, however, seem 
to have returned in groups, o f varying small sizes, with others who had ' 
undergone basic training at the same time, and those who trained 
together always forged strong bonds. (The small size of the Australian 
army meant that there were only three recruit training battalions, and 
drafts who had completed their basic training tended to go to the same 
units.) Other soldiers, from combat and non-combat units alike, returned 
home as they had arrived in Vietnam: more or less alone. It is not possible 
to say exactly how many were in each of these categories.
Some soldiers returned quickly, lifted out of their unit and then 
onto a charter flight, while some came as medevacs in Air Force Hercules. 
Arguably, the lucky ones took the slower boat trip home, with a chance 
to begin to adjust to leaving the war zone while still with their support 
providing unit. But no matter how they returned, readjustment was a 
difficult time for almost all soldiers— as no doubt it has always been, no 
matter how heroic the return. The easiest readjustment was, no doubt, 
for the career soldiers who remained in the army community, many of
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whom would choose to return to Vietnam for a second tour. For them 
there was relatively little contact with the civilian community. There 
seems to have been little questioning within the services about Australia’s 
role in Vietnam, adding to the continuity of high morale.
Many veterans seem to have only dim memories about the return 
home, discharge from the army, and readjustment period. For those 
whose families provided a warm welcome there seems to have been 
relatively little trauma, but most veterans have tales to tell o f being 
greeted with “haven’t seen you for awhile—where’ve you been?” This 
apparent lack of knowledge, and, worse, o f interest, about where they 
had been or what they had been doing, was the most typical remembered 
reaction, although there were also cases of hostility directed at the 
returning soldiers, especially in the later years of the war.
Public opinion polls and the results of two federal elections 
showed that the Australian electorate was not, at least initially, particularly 
opposed to the war. On the contraiy, the reception given to those troops 
who did march on their return home, shows that there was abundant 
warmth and welcome in the community towards the soldiers. It is an 
interesting aspect of the collective veteran memory of Vietnam that these 
earliest “welcome home" marches seem to have been so comprehensively 
forgotten. The truth is that all of the battalions marched in capital cities 
when they returned to their home bases— sixteen marches in all— 
accompanied by other troops who had returned at or near that time. 
Most of these marches took place in Sydney and Brisbane, but there were 
some in Adelaide and Townsville (a provincial town in north Queensland 
which has an army base nearby). From the first march, in June 1966 in 
Sydney, until the last one, in December 1971 in Townsville, the troops 
were cheered and clapped by thousands—even hundred of thousands— 
of onlookers. Looking back, the remarkable thing is how little the spirit 
of public welcome for the soldiers seemed to be affected by the growing 
anti-war feeling. The final march was just before Christmas 1971, in 
Townsville:
Thousands of Townsville people turned on a rousing heroes’ 
welcome. Cheering drowned the sound of marching feet for three 
city blocks as Townsville made the most of the last major parade 
by troops from Vietnam. The marchers were swamped with 
streamers and ticker-tape thrown from balconies and roadside 
vantage points. The crowd which packed the Flinders Street 
footpaths to capacity has been described as the largest ever to 
turn out and welcome troops returning from the war zone.25
The End of the War
The parade in Townsville almost marked the end of the war for 
Australia, but significantly, it did not mean the end o f the war in general, 
nor was it an occasion for rejoicing or for the sort of victory celebrations 
that had heralded Armistice Day at the end of the First World War, or
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Victory in the Pacific Day in 1945. There was, o f course, no victoiy to 
celebrate.
Australia’s end to its commitment was aptly termed a “withdrawal". 
But some soldiers and others in the wider community retained the idea 
that Australian forces were somehow victorious in at least their own 
province o f PhuocTuy. The argument goes that Australia’s war in Phuoc 
Tuy resulted in the substantial destruction o f the Viet Cong forces there; 
that the province at the time o f the withdrawal of the Task Force was 
“secure” ; and it is added, generally, that had Australia, as a nation and 
a military presence, been sufficiently large and committed to waging war 
all over the south of Vietnam, then the final result would have been quite 
different. We, it is claimed, would have won.20
It is important to appreciate this view of the war, in order to 
understand the attitude of Vietnam veterans in Australia. Not all of 
them, by any means, make these claims to partial let alone total potential 
victory; but a significant number do, and are to be found at all levels of 
the Army and o f veterans’ organisations. Many of the more modest make 
the defensible claim that the Australian forces performed very well in 
Vietnam, and in this were true heirs of Anzac. This claim too is important 
for an understanding o f the position of Vietnam veterans. American 
forces were perceived as not only beaten, in that they abandoned the war, 
but Australian soldiers also tend to be very patronising about the combat 
performance of American soldiers; seeing them as having been “beaten" 
in many instances at the tactical level. They tend to ignore the great 
differences between the sheer scale o f their efforts and the American 
commitment, and also the extent to which they relied on the Americans 
for logistic and operational support. Nevertheless, there has been none 
of the postwar criticism of the armed forces in Australia that occurred in 
the United States, let alone any suggestion that the Australian forces in 
Vietnam “disintegrated”.
The sight of the tanks rolling into the Presidential Palace during 
the “fall” o f Saigon in 1975 dispelled the illusion of victory for some o f the 
committed; others still maintain that “we won”. But the events o f 1975 
were the climax to a war which had ground on through so many lives for 
so many years. After the ownership of the south was finally resolved, and 
the Vietnam question was buried, there began a quiet period for Vietnam 
veterans. No longer were they participants in any sort of conflict, military 
or political; theirs was very much a forgotten war, but at least for 
veterans in Australia it was not as discredited as in the USA, nor had 
their part in it been subjected to so much criticism.
The decade after Vietnam was one of considerable social change 
in Australia, and the issue of Vietnam and of its veterans was not on the 
agenda. Some o f the issues which did come to the fore, however, such as 
those involving the re-definitions of masculinity and femininity, and the 
place of multiculturalism and of non-Anglo-Celtic migrants (particularly 
those of Asian extraction) in Australia, did bear directly on the experiences
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of the veterans. Were they being made to feel that fighting against Asian 
communists, for other Asians, was somehow an important contribution? 
Was the whole Anzac myth now somehow out-of-place? (The 75th 
Anniversary o f Gallipoli in April 1990 revitalised interest in the whole 
Anzac mythology. The intense media flirtation was nothing if not in 
marked contrast to the near disdain o f the previous decade or more.)
The myth o f Anzac comes from an older Australia, a simpler and 
more homogeneous country, where masculine virtues were supreme 
and unchallenged and the British or American empires were glorious to 
be dependent upon. Anzac Day, the main ritual celebration of the myth, 
is not a place for subtleties (though it no doubt means different things 
to different people), nor for the celebration o f pluralism and differences. 
Vietnam, with all its ambiguities, does not fit easily into the sequence of 
Australian wars, for even though it was typical in being an alliance war 
with Australia participating to ensure the future protection o f a great and 
powerful friend, this time we were not on the winning side, and some 
even argued that we were not on the right side.
All that most veterans wanted was to be able to feel like the 
veterans o f previous wars, but there seems to have been a doubt that they 
were fully worthy. Some o f them were sneered at by older soldiers in RSL 
clubs— ”you blokes never had it tough like we did”— and others obviously 
had doubts themselves about whether they truly deserved to be ranked 
with the Anzacs. These doubts may, however, have been largely o f their 
own making, as the public seems to have welcomed them on Anzac 
marches and their numbers there were a welcome addition to the 
declining ranks o f the veterans of the earlier world wars. From the 
earliest years o f the war, soldiers who had returned from Vietnam took 
part in Anzac marches. In 1967, the Sydney Morning Herald reported:
. . .  in the continuing story of the Anzac tradition, soldiers who
had returned from the conflict in Vietnam marched down Martin
Place with veterans of Korea, Malaya and Borneo and members
of the 3rd and 6th Battalions RAR.27
According to the report the young onlookers were the ones leading the 
cheers amongst the 100,000 who lined the streets. In the immediately 
following years, the Sydney Morning Herald always made special 
mention o f the Vietnam veterans in Anzac marches, culminating in 1972 
when they were given the honour o f leading the march in Sydney. This 
was the high point o f their participation, as far as media reporting was 
concerned. In 1973 and 1974 they were still mentioned, but in the years 
after this the celebration of Anzac Day itself underwent change. It 
became more o f a focus for dissenting activities, and was reported as 
such in the major cities. Groups such as Women Against Rape in W ar (a 
particular favourite amongst soldiers as the butt of jokes). Gay Ex- 
Servicemen’s Associations, and ethnic communities with various and
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competing war histories and agendas of their own, began to demand the 
right to participate in the march. The RSL fought hard to retain the 
ownership o f Anzac and to disallow these minorities central participation.
During this time the Vietnam veterans were largely unheard of, 
until the Agent Orange issue was aired at an Anzac Day march in Sydney 
in 1980. About 100 veterans marched with small pieces o f orange paper 
on their jackets, but the organisers were eager to emphasise that they 
were not radicals:
• This is not a political protest. The crepe paper signifies our 
concern over the issue. We are the conservative element in 
Australia. We are members of RSL clubs. We served our country 
and we would like our country to serve us.28
This statement could well be taken as the theme of the 1987 Welcome 
Home March.
The success of the welcome home marches in the USA, particularly 
that in Washington D.C. in 1986, was contagious. A  committee was set 
up in Sydney in 1986, supported by a variety of veterans groups, the 
state branch of the RSL (not the national body), and some Sydney local 
government representatives. The power o f the Vietnam war to divide, 
still, was seen in some o f the exchanges reported as occuring in the 
chambers o f the Sydney City Council. A  veteran on the Council accused 
those opposed to the march of being part o f the “gay communist faction” , 
while a councillor who had been an anti-conscription activist countered 
that “there has never been an attempt at repatriation for those who chose 
the path which history has shown was the morally right path” .29 This idea 
was repeated frequently on an Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC) TV programme. Hindsight, broadcast in May 1990, which marked 
the 20th anniversary of the anti-war Moratorium marches.
In the days preceding the march, the media was full o f contrary 
opinions about what the march, and indeed the war itself, was all about. 
While some saw it as a reconciliation and were willing to let bygones-be- 
bygones, others were keen to argue their case yet again. Conservative 
writers in the national daily newspaper, the Australian, explained why 
“It was right for us to be there” , and blamed “Left-liberal anti-South 
Vietnam, pro-Hanoi forces" who were “traitors to their own troops. They 
are the ones who should apologise to our veterans and to the Vietnamese 
who marched with them”.30 (Many Australians resented the activities of 
one university group who had collected money to send to the Viet Cong 
for medical supplies— it still rankled years later.)
The main Welcome Home March was held on the morning of 
Saturday 4 October 1987 in Sydney, followed by an afternoon and 
evening of congregation and further ceremony, including a concert. 
Other local and much sm aller m arches and celebrations were 
subsequently held all over Australia.
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Many veterans in the Sydney march took delight in ignoring the 
Labor Party Prime Minister, R.J. L. (Bob) Hawke, as he took the salute 
on the steps o f the Sydney Town Hall, because the Labor Party had 
(according to the march organiser) “so strongly opposed the forces” 
presence in Vietnam". (This in fact was not strictly true. Though the 
Labor Party did eventually propose withdrawing Australian troops, by 
the time it came to government, in December 1972, the only troops 
remaining were the advisers, the major troop withdrawals having taken 
place under a Liberal Government, but many veterans m isremember the 
sequence of events.)
The media treated the 1987 Welcome Home March in much the 
same way as they had treated the war and its veterans in the past, with 
glib and often inaccurate analysis, and using images based on the “sick 
veteran" as portrayed by the W A A  in their submissions to the Royal 
Commission and through their journal Debrief and elsewhere. The same 
image occurs throughout much Australian Vietnam literature, film, and 
television.31 Just before Anzac Day 1987 the Sydney Morning Herald 
reported that:
For Australians who served in Vietnam the stench of a “dirty war" 
has been hard to shake. They have always trailed at the end of 
Army contingents in the Anzac Day parade—as if an 
afterthought.32
A  few days later the same paper in an editorial wrongly stated: “For the 
first time, Vietnam veterans led the Anzac Day march in Sydney" (as we 
have seen, they led it in 1972). The same editorial emphasised the 
potential o f the Welcome Home March as a ritual signifying the 
reintegration of veterans into the community; but it warned against 
believing that the parade was in itself enough. It needed to mark a new 
beginning, to be a sign that we had all “begun to gain a sense of historical 
perspective on the profound conflicts which the Vietnam W ar aroused".33
W hether this in fact has happened is debatable, but the march 
was a great success for the veterans involved, probably almost half o f 
those who had served in Vietnam (the march was estimated at 22,000), 
including veterans o f the ARVN marching under the old Saigon flag. The 
brilliant spring weather saw huge, friendly crowds lining the streets, 
cheering the veterans and leaving little doubt as to whether they were 
welcome home or not. There were none o f the feared “incidents" from 
former anti-war groups, and most of the signs and crowd comments (not 
to mention the commentary on the nationally-broadcast televised version 
of (he event34) were distinctly “pro-war”. The reunions will provide warm 
memories for years to come, and it seems that the march did provide 
some sort o f finale to the war for many of the veterans.
But as with every facet o f the Vietnam war, there was not 
complete consensus about the march. Outsiders viewed it from various
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perspectives, som e seeing the com m unity acceptance o f the veterans as 
being p roof that “it was right for us to be there” . Even w ith in  the veteran 
community, there were those who ignored it, as being irrelevant to their 
present lives, and there were those who saw it as little m ore than “a 
recruiting drive for the RSL” .
Th is w as very much a m inority criticism  o f the march, but it does 
raise the very im portant question o f how far integration o f the war and 
veterans results in their incorporation into a national m yth which is 
rather m ilitaristic. M ichael C lark has described this process in the 
United States, saying that the cu ltural apparatus which had so 
successfully channelled the m em ories o f the V ietnam  w ar to fit the 
patterns o f other, m ore acceptable w ar experiences, has finally offered 
“with a trium phant flourish . . . the spectacle o f its m ost successful 
creation, the veteran who will fight the next war.35
Is this what “being an Anzac” really m eans? Is this what the 
veterans would want? Is it the price o f acceptance?
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Table 2:
Breakdown o f Vietnam Caaualtiea.
Served in Vietnam 49 211
Killed in action 327
Killed accidentally 25
Died of wounds 71
Missing 4
Non-battle casualty deaths 74
Total Deaths 501
Wounded in action 2609
Injured/ill in action 331
Non Battle Casualties—injured/ill 731
Total Non-Fatal Casualties 3131
Source: Department of Defence.
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“Generally speaking I would not begin to comment on the 
Am erican Hospitals or nursing, our group was so small compared with 
their huge cum ulus” ,1 writes Nell Espie, one o f the forty-three officers o f 
the Royal Australian Arm y Nursing Corps (RAANC) who served in South 
Vietnam between 1967 and 1971.2 The “vast cumulus”, by contrast, 
comprised more than five thousand members o f the Arm y Nurse Corps, 
the RAANC’s United States counterpart, who nursed in South Vietnam 
between 1962 and 1973.3
Not only was the Australian group much smaller than the 
American, it was considerably more homogeneous. Its size and nature 
brought both advantages and disadvantages, then and in later years. 
“Who cares for the caregiver?” looks at the backgrounds o f the Australian 
nurses, at their experiences in South Vietnam, and at some of the 
conclusions which they have since drawn from those experiences. It 
focuses in particular upon twelve nurses who completed questionnaires 
for me betw een  1986 and 1990.4 They can be taken as being 
representative o f the larger group.
“I was surprised to learn a number of them [American nursing 
officers working at the 36th Evacuation Hospital, Vung Tau] were 
recently out o f Nursing College and that some were married”, recalls one 
o f the Australian nurses, Jan McCarthy, whose tour o f duty in South 
Vietnam lasted from May 1968 to May 1969. “At this time if you were 
married in our system you had to resign so this was quite a surprise.”5 
She and her RAANC colleagues who went to South Vietnam  were all 
single (although the regulation preventing married women from remaining 
in the corps was changed in 1970), all women (the RAANC's first male 
officer was only appointed in 1972), and all officers. (The US Arm y Nurse 
Corps sent both male and female nursing officers to South Vietnam.) 
Although female other ranks were enlisted in the RAANC at this time, 
they were not sent to South Vietnam. Male other ranks at this stage were 
enlisted in the Royal Australian Arm y Medical Corps (RAAMC), not the 
RAANC, although this was based upon an “understanding” rather than 
a written policy.6
The RAANC nurses who served in South Vietnam were all white. 
Eleven o f the twelve in my sample were Australian-born. Furthermore 
the same eleven all described their parents as Australian. In 1971, only 
79.78 per cent o f  the Australian population in general had been bom  in 
Australia.7 The twelfth nurse was New Zealand-bom  o f New Zealand 
parents. She and six o f the Australian-bom  nurses had been bom  in
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rural areas. The twelve nurses in general came from larger than average 
families. The average number o f children (including the nurses) in each 
of their families was 3.8. The highest average number o f live births for 
married women bom  in Australia between 1898 and 1928, during which 
time one assumes that most o f their mothers were bom , was only 3 .1.8 
The twelve nurses’ fathers included an army officer, a public servant, a 
railway guard, a psychiatric nurse, a works overseer, several farmers, an 
accountant, and a company representative; most of their mothers had 
been engaged in home duties. The twelve nurses were educated at 
government or Catholic schools (six are Catholics, five Protestants), 
except for one who attended a Church of England school, in most cases 
completing between two and four o f a possible six years of secondary 
schooling. Two worked as shop assistants, one as a telephonist, one as 
a secretary (and later as an other rank (the Australian nomenclature for 
enlisted personnel] in the RAANC), and another on her fam ily’s farm, 
before beginning their nursing training, which the others commenced 
soon after leaving school.
W hy did they become nurses? “I really cant [sic] remember, I 
think some o f my school friends were doing it. It was a way to get to the 
city. I did not want to marry the boy next door and have kids” , writes 
Elizabeth Healey. Economic factors certainly influenced some. “I had 
always had an interest in a health-related profession. [In] 1963 (my first 
year of tertiary study) University fees were still being levied and unless 
a student was wealthy or awarded a university scholarship— the entry 
to University was prohibitative [sic] to the average student. Nursing was 
a ‘secure’ alternative profession” , recalls Diane Badcock, who had 
completed the full six years o f secondary schooling. “I had really wanted 
to do Medicine but had to leave school early (family situation) so I then 
opted for nursing and have never regretted my decision” , writes Pam 
Barlow. Growing up during the Second W orld War, during which 
Australian army nurses had a high public profile, also inspired some. In 
reply to a question asking: “What factors influenced your decision to 
become a nurse?” , Jan McCarthy writes: “Not sure. Always wanted to do 
nursing for as long as I can remember. Perhaps [it was the influence of 
the ] war years and living in an army town [Seymour, Victoria]— [I] often 
saw members o f RAANC in town [and it] may have influenced m e”.
Her answer also helps to explain why she and some of the other 
nurses had decided to jo in  the army. Nell Espie, one o f the older nurses 
to serve in South Vietnam, who had joined the RAANC in June 1951 and 
served in Japan and Korea during the Korean War, for example, had also 
been influenced by Second World W ar nurses. “Contact with Returned 
Sisters during post basic nurse training. Advertisement for nurses to 
serve in Korea”, are the reasons she gives for join ing the army. Only two 
of the twelve joined the army specifically because o f the Vietnam War. “I 
was very keen to nurse in S.V.N.[South Viet Nam]", writes Diane 
Badcock. “W ith my familial contacts & prior knowledge o f the services,
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I had no apprehension in applying to jo in  the R.A.A.N.C.” Her father, 
uncle, brother, and cousin had all served in the army at various times. 
Ten o f the other nurses came from families in which numerous members 
had belonged to the armed services, particularly during the two world 
wars; several had brothers who also served in the Vietnam War. All 
probably had some sympathy with the following view espoused by Trish 
Ferguson: “I had this belief then (as I still have) that each o f us should 
do some time in the services.” Most o f the forty-three nurses originally 
surveyed were Army, rather than just Vietnam, nurses. The m inimum 
period which any o f the forty-three had spent as officers in the RAANC 
before going to South Vietnam was seven months, the maximum was 
nineteen years and one m onth. and the average was approximately three 
years and one month.9 Sixty per cent o f their US Army Nurse Corps 
counterparts, however, had had less than six months’ Army experience 
before going to South V ietnam .10 Eight o f the twelve nurses in my sample 
were in their twenties when they went to South Vietnam (the three 
youngest were twenty-three), the remaining four being thirty-five (a 
matron), forty-two, forty-four, and forty-five (another matron).
“W e did not lose any Nurses in Vietnam and we were located in 
one area” , writes Jan McCarthy. “The US Arm y Nurse Corps were much 
larger and were located throughout the country in some instances 
further forward o f their hospitals, nursing in MUST [Medical Unit Self 
Transportable] units I understand they lost some nurses when units 
were rocketed by the Viet Cong.”11 Eight members, in all, o f the US Arm y 
Nurse Corps, died in South Vietnam: two in a helicopter crash near 
Saigon on 18 Februaiy 1966, four in an aeroplane crash near Qui Nhon 
on 30 November 1967, one from disease on 8 July 1968, and another 
from shrapnel wounds which she received during a rocket attack at the 
312th Evacuation Hospital at Chu Lai on 8 June 1969.12
Four m em bers o f the RAANC jo in ed  8 A u stra lian  Field 
Ambulance at VungTau, the site o f 1 Australian Logistic Support Group, 
in May 1967 (nurses having been requested by the Australian Director 
General o f Medical Services), then joined 1 Australian Field Hospital 
when it was raised there in 1968. A fter these nurses completed their 
tours of duty the nursing strength was increased to six. By 1969 there 
were nine RAANC offices on the staff. In that particular year there were 
more than 900 US Arm y Nurse Corps officers in South Vietnam, the 
highest at any stage during the w ar.13 W hen 1 Australian Field Hospital 
was closed in 1971, there were twelve nurses on its staff, including one 
matron, four captains, and seven lieutenants. Two of these nurses were 
members o f the Royal New Zealand Nursing Corps (RNZNC). In total, seven 
RNZNC nurses worked with the RAANC at VungTau. Twenty-nine o f the 
RAANC officers completed their twelve month tours of duty; the others, 
who remained in South Vietnam for periods ranging between three and 
ten months, returned to Australia for health reasons or because o f the 
hospital’s closure.14
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No one really attempted to prepare the nurses for what was to 
come. “We received no professional brief before leaving Australia— the 
only briefing from the senior nursing officer in the COMD [Command]. 
was on what to take”,15 states Leslie McGurgan, in a belated “b r ie r  
written and presented in 1990. Perhaps, in some ways, no one could 
prepare them. Describing her flight to Saigon in April 1969, Nell Espie, 
also a veteran of the Korean War, says that “this occasion seemed 
different somehow to the previous experiences [of travelling with troops 
going on active serv ice ]... The Vietnam W ar was different, or seemed so 
even then to m e”.16 The nurses’ sense of dislocation, o f being thrust from 
one world to another very different one, must have been underlined by 
their constant changing of clothes on the way. “We left Australia in 
summer uniform, but had to change into civilian dress before landing in 
Singapore and later back into uniform to arrive in Saigon",17 Nell Espie 
recalls.
The first four nurses, in particular, found themselves working in 
basic conditions. Heat, sand, and a lack o f running water all caused 
problems in the field ambulance’s huts, which were situated in sand 
dunes near the beach. One o f the original nurses, Terrie Ross (formerly 
Lieutenant Roche) remembers that, “Supplies and equipment were only 
just adequate— however justified perhaps by the fact [that] Fd Am b was 
doing a Hospital job ”. Conditions gradually improved, and by the time 
that Nell Espie took over as matron in April 1969 she found a “well 
established” hospital. “The wards, I.C.U. [Intensive Care Unit], operating 
theatre and some departments were airconditioned— the mess quarters 
and offices were not.” Supplies and equipment also improved. “In 
Vietnam [they were] initially not very good under Australian system of 
supply it became a lot more efficient using the American system", 
comments Jan McCarthy. When necessaiy, theAustralians also frequently 
borrowed from the Americans. “One weekend we had to borrow blood 
from the Americans, when we had used 500 bottles!— not including 
ordinary fluid replacements”, recalls Trish Ferguson.
“Orderlies at first were quite resentful [towards the nurses] but 
after [a] short time [became] co-operative”, Terrie Ross recalls. The 
nurses were responsible for running the wards, and for training the 
orderlies [similar to US corpsmen], but were not granted control o f the 
latter. “The Sisters did not know one day from the next which medics 
would be allocated for ward duties”, Leslie McGurgan reports. “This in 
turn restricted their ability to train their charges and provide some 
continuity not only in training but also in the nursing care of their 
patients.” There were other anomalies caused by the division o f labour 
by gender, one o f the most notable being that relating to salaries. “The 
corporal in the operating theatre was paid more than the nursing officer, 
who was a captain, in charge o f the operating theatre",18 Leslie 
McGurgan also notes. Despite such problems, the doctors, nurses, and 
orderlies developed a professional relationship which Diane Badcock,
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who as Lieutenant Lawrence worked at 1 Australian Field Hospital from 
February 1969 to February 1970, describes as “nothing short o f a 
miracle”.
The 110-bed 1 Australian Field Hospital was considerably smaller 
than the 600-bed 36th Evacuation Hospital, the main American hospital 
with which RAANC nurses had contact in South Vietnam and which was 
situated on the airfield at VungTau until about 1970.19 Jan McCarthy, 
who made a number of professional visits to the 36th Evacuation 
Hospital, was grateful to belong to the smaller hospital. “The operating 
theatre had 13 operating tables compared with our two in one theatre” , 
she recalls. “It was large and I felt I wouldn’t like to work in this area with 
13 operating teams going at the one time.”20 There were, however, some 
disadvantages in working in a hospital with a very small staff. There was 
no backup for the nurses. When the need arose, the hospital’s handful 
of nurses simply kept on nursing. Leslie McGurgan records, for example, 
that: “An outbreak of malaria in 1968/69 took the 100 bed hospital to 
259 with no extra staff.”21 The RAANC nurses were usually rostered to 
work twelve hours a day (with some shifts being split), six days a week, 
but often worked for much longer hours. Pam Barlow, who as Lieutenant 
Matthews worked in South Vietnam from May 1968 to May 1969, notes 
that hours o f work “could be anything up to 16 hours—you lost count 
after awhile."Leslie McGurgan also records that “during the Tet offensive 
in 1968/69 the OTT [operating theatre and triage] worked around the 
clock for several days.”22 Beryl Hogarth, who worked at the hospital from 
August 1970toApril 1971, remembers working at times for “over 14 days 
without a break”.
Both Australian and American nurses were called upon to 
undertake ve iy  heavy and stressful nursing in South Vietnam. “Compared 
with previous wars, in SVN [South Viet Nam] we had a much higher 
proportion o f ve iy  severe blast injuries compared to gun shot wounds: 
and due to the rapid evacuation and triage system these casualties 
became a very heavy nursing commitment— in previous wars these 
patients, they would never have reached a hospital bed”, explains one 
Australian nurse. The Australian hospital treated some American 
servicemen (but they were usually soon moved to American hospitals), 
along with South Vietnamese servicemen and civilians. North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong prisoners-of-war, but most of its patients were Australian 
and New Zealand servicemen. The most common surgical and intensive 
care unit nursing, as described by Trish Ferguson, involved: “Mine 
Explosions— traumatic amputations. Massive and enormous amounts 
o f debridem ents. Shock lung, m alarial lung, cerebral m alaria. 
Laparotomies & Thoracotomies from being peppered by shrapnel”. The 
stress o f such nursing was exacerbated by the fact that the nurses’ 
professional qualifications did not always match their appointments. 
The Australian nurses, however, were probably not pushed to the extent 
that some o f their American counterparts were. “Professionally they did
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more advanced procedures than we attempted such as IV [intravenous] 
therapy, intubation of patients, and insertion o f chest drainage", Jan 
McCarthy says o f US Army Nurse Corps officers. “At this time in our 
system Doctors coverted [sic] these aspects. I think they [the American 
nurses] were trained in IV therapy aspects but were often placed in 
situations for which they weren’t trained.”23 The very speedy evacuation 
of patients to Australia meant that the nurses “did not have the 
satisfaction of seeing the results of [their] labours” .24
There was “No debrief following medivacs [sic] (indeed there was 
no time for any professional training at all)” .25 How then did the nurses 
cope, or attempt to cope, with such stressful nursing? The main way was 
by relying upon one another. “We were a closely knit group with 
traditions and a corps background. I got the impression the US Nurse 
Corps did not have this closeness amongst its officers and they felt 
somewhat alone” , Jan McCarthy writes. “We relieved our stress levels by 
discussing our patients injuries, KLAs etc amongst ourselves and we felt 
we gave each other support. I don’t know how the Americans reacted but 
I believe their stress levels were greater than ours throughout their tours 
of Vietnam.”26
The nurses’ accommodation at VungTau was “Primitive, rivalled 
WWI but liveable— night duty was a problem— trying to sleep with the 
heat” . During the d iy  season, lack of water was a problem. Trish 
Ferguson recalls that “often only one 2-minute shower [was] allowed 
daily— [due to] water shortage when water lines [were] blown up” . The 
deep trench latrines were, in Pam Barlow’s words, “quite revolting” . 
During the day the Australian nurses wore grey ward dresses (which 
some were fond of because they symbolized Australian Army nursing 
traditions), unlike the white dresses worn by American and New Zealand 
nurses; on night duty, they wore jungle greens. Elizabeth Healey, who 
as Lieutenant Hall served in South Vietnam between June 1969 and 
June 1970, considers that the uniform was: “Totally inappropriate... Too 
hot and difficult to maintain in SVN. Due to lack of starch and the wet. 
Still wearing veils!!?? We coped with great difficulty— spent hours on 
uniform no starch— had it sent from home to SVN or bought it on the 
‘black market’”. Most of the nurses found the American food to be, in 
Maggie Hopcraft’s words, “an acquired taste”. The “Paper Pulp and 
Cranberry Jam ”, as the turkey and cranberry sauce was dubbed, was, 
in the words of another Australian nurse, “Hideous stuff!!".
“As the matron I was responsible to provide adequate nursing 
coverage [with] only 25% of staff to be allowed out o f the unit at one time. 
With only 7 sisters later nine it allowed for little activity” , recalls one of 
the hospital's matrons, Nell Espie. In order to let the nurses have as 
much recreation as possible, she usually remained at the hospital 
herself. When they could, the nurses swam at the local beach, held 
barbecues, saw films in theatres at the American and Australian bases, 
visited the local town about two miles away, and went to parties, at which
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some had their only contact with the American nurses. Elizabeth Healey 
says o f the American nurses whom she met at such parties, “I thought 
they were older than us overall, more ‘sophisticated-’ in sexual behaviour”. 
Sometimes the nurses attended concerts at the Peter Badcoe Club in the 
compound. Diane Badcock, however, says, “I only went to one. I felt they 
were male audience orientated/objective & females in the audience were 
not at all expected to be present”. Some o f the nurses sought out more 
work in their spare time. “It may be interesting to note that in our o ff duty 
time many o f us adopted an orphanage in Vung Tau Village— together 
with others like engineers, carpenters. Medics, Pharmacists & Doctors 
etc.” , writes Pam Barlow. “We helped in many ways to make life a little 
easier for these beautiful children who had lost their families due to war.” 
The nurses were allowed five days’ rest and recuperation leave, which 
some spent in Penang, and three days’ rest “in country” , that is, in South 
Vietnam. Nell Espie describes her time in Penang as “a life saver” .
“There was no debrief on our return to Australia", reflects Leslie 
McGurgan. What happened to the nurses after they returned home? 
How, if at all, have their Vietnam experiences affected their lives? What 
conclusions have they drawn from those experiences? Three nurses left 
the army immediately; two, the current Director of Nursing Services—  
Army (DNS-A, or Matron-in-Chief), Colonel J.C.A. McCarthy, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel L.M. McGurgan, were still in the Army as of July 
1990, and the other thirty-eight remained in the army for further periods 
ranging between one month and seventeen years and ten months, and 
averaging three years and eleven months. Most o f the RAANC nurses who 
served in South Vietnam held short term commissions in the army, 
which lasted for two years and could be renewed for further two year 
periods. Excluding Colonel McCarthy (who as of July 1990 has been a 
RAANC officer for twenty-three years and ten months) and Lieutenant 
Colonel McGurgan (twenty-one years and four months), the Vietnam 
nurses served as officers in the RAANC for total periods (including their 
Vietnam service) ranging from one year and six months to twenty-eight 
years and eight months, averaging seven years and ten months.27
Some married after they returned to Australia, but the exact 
figures are difficult to ascertain. Seven of the twelve who completed 
questionnaires did so. At least three of these women left the Arm y at 
about the time o f their marriages. Three of the seven, perhaps not 
surprisingly, married army officers, one of whom had served as an army 
pharmacist in South Vietnam, another married a photojoumalist who 
had also worked there. Six of the married women have had children, two 
having three, the others two each.
Unlike their predecessors from the First World War, many of 
whom could not face nursing again after that war, many o f the Vietnam 
nurses have continued nursing in one form or another. All o f the twelve 
nurses in my sample have since nursed, either in the army (in five cases), 
or in civilian hospitals, for considerable periods. One, who has nursed
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in neurology and neurosurgery fields, completed a post-basic intensive 
care unit course, worked in ICU (Intensive Care Units) at different 
hospitals, and has been a clinical instructor in a post-basic ICU course 
at a school o f nursing, since her return from South Vietnam, says of her 
army experience in general that: “It may have affected my move towards 
ICU but I’m not sure. I was always trauma inclined anyway” . Some, like 
many of their American counterparts, have found civilian nursing 
frustrating after their wartime experiences. “Ever since Vietnam, I have 
been frustrated in civilian nursing by the enormous inadequacies of the 
system, & the enormous attention paid to non-issues” , writes Trish 
Ferguson. “[I] Have pursued numerous avenues (i.e. certificates in 
nursing, degree in Psych. & Sociology, different nursing experiences.)—  
to no avail.— this during the ’70s when I did not acknowledge I had been 
in Vietnam”.
“It hasn’t been until now that I have realised how much Vietnam 
in particular has moulded my life” , writes Pam Barlow, who believes that 
she matured a great deal during her time in South Vietnam. “You can’t 
experience what we did and not be more aware o f the Quality o f Life. 
There were some of the Army nurses who were affected both medically 
& socially.” Little is known of the nurses’ health while they were overseas. 
“Health o f nurses— no records”, Leslie McGurgan states bluntly. Several 
nurses, as mentioned earlier, returned to Australia for health reasons 
before their tours o f duty were due to end. One o f the forty-three nurses 
died from illness, thought at the time not to be war-related (although this 
has recently been questioned) in November 1971, after her discharge 
from the army. Many of the Australian nurses claim to be grateful for 
having had the opportunity o f serving in South Vietnam, and consider 
themselves to be better people for the experience. One, for example, 
believes herself to be “a more tolerant, more com passionate & 
understanding person because o f it”. They have, however, paid a high 
price for such personal development. Like some o f their American 
counterparts,28 some of the Australian nurses have exhibited symptoms 
o f Post-Trauma Stress Disorder (PTSD). The nurse who made the above 
comment, for example, has had almost daily migraine headaches and 
has awoken constantly at night, since her service in Vietnam. Restlessness 
and a low tolerance o f frustration, especially in regard to civilian nursing, 
are also frequently hinted at in nurses’ comments. Whether they view 
this positively or negatively, some of the nurses also see themselves as 
isolated, both from civilian nurses, and, pehapsmore interestingly, from 
returned nurses from other conflicts. “I feel we have had something 
special in our lives that sets us apart from non-Army nurses”, writes one 
nurse. “We feel as returned sisters from S.V.N. very isolated and 
consequently an isolated group—very distinct from previous wars & 
those sisters”, writes another.
Strong feelings of sisterhood have sustained many of the Australian 
nurses in the postwar years. One says of her time in South Vietnam:
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“This year cemented and made friendships which are peculiar and 
special to only those nurses who served in that theatre of war—these 
friendships continue after 20 yrs & I cannot see them diminishing". Even 
one o f the nurses who has not remained in touch with her former 
colleagues comments, “I have lost touch with the girls I worked with but 
I often think of them". The RAANC nurses who served in South Vietnam 
have had to rely upon one another for support, both at the time of their 
wartime service and in subsequent years. Twenty years after going to 
South Vietnam, Leslie McGurgan, writing of the need for debriefing after 
medical and surgical emergencies, says that “we did not ‘care* for the care 
givers, only the patients".29
1 Autograph Letter Signed, Nell Espie to Jan Bassett, no date [June 1990].
2 It should be noted that a number of other Australian nurses, for example, 
members of the Royal Australian Air Force Nursing Service, also served in South 
Vietnam.
3 Elizabeth A. Shields (ed). Highlights in the History o f the Army Nurse Corps, U.S. 
Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1981, especially pp. 49-63.
4 The twelve nurses, to whom I am deeply indebted, are Margaret Fay Ahem (later 
Hopcraft), Nellie Jane Espie, Patricia Kay Ferguson (Gibbons), Elizabeth Ann 
Hall (Healey), Beryl Maiy Elizabeth Ilogarth, Diane Elizabeth Lawrence (Badcock), 
Pamela Ann Matthews (Barlow), Janice Christina Ann McCarthy, Terrie 
Elizabeth Roche (Ross), Shirley Joan Southwell, Janet Elizabeth Studholme, 
and Ann Christine Wright (Lee). Unless otherwise stated, quotations (some of 
which I have not attributed specifically for reasons of privacy) from these nurses 
are taken from their questionnaire answers, which are now in my possession.
5 J.C.A. McCarthy. “SVN Recollections’*, unpublished notes, 1990, copy in my 
possession.
6 Information in this paragraph is taken from a letter from Lieutenant C. 
Gerrard, Directorate Nursing Services—Army (DNS-A), Canberra, 27 May 1989; 
telephone conversation, Nell Espie and Jan Bassett, 5 July 1990; Shields (ed). 
Highlights..., op. cit.: Dan Freedman & Jacqueline Rhoads (eds). Nurses in 
Vietnam: The Forgotten Veterans, Texas Monthly Press, Austin, 1987; and 
Kathryn Marshall. In the Combat Zone: An Oral History of American Women in 
Vietnam, Little, Brown and Company, Boston and Toronto, 1987, esp. pp. 4-7.
7 This percentage is derived from a table in WrayVamplew (ed). Australians: Historical 
Statistics, Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, Sydney, 1987, pp. 8-9.
8 See Vamplew (ed). Ibid., p. 55.
9 It should be noted that the women could not do their nursing training in the 
RAANC.
10 Derived from information from DNS-A, Canberra, “Nominal Roll, RAANC ARA 
officers, 1951-1978”, and DNS-A, Canberra, “RAANC Officers posted to SVN”.
11 Sara J. McVicker. “Invisible Veterans: The Women Who Served in Vietnam”, Journal 
of Psychosocial Nursing, 23:10, October 1985, pp. 13-19, quote from p. 14.
12 McCarthy. “SVN Recollections”.
13 Information taken from Shields (ed). Highlights, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
14 Ibid., p. 62.
15 Information from DNS-A, Canberra, “RAANC Officers posted to SVN”; and L. 
M. McGurgan. “A Brief on the RAANC Involvement in SVN”, paper presented at
Who Care<* fo r  the Caregiver? 83
DNS-A Conference, Portsea, Victoria, 1990, pp. 1-12. Leslie McGurgan, as 
Lieutenant L. M. Smith, served in South Vietnam with the RAANC from 29 April 
1970 to 30 April 1971. She now holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
16 McGurgan. Ibid., p. 9.
17 ALS, Nell Espie to Jan Bassett, no date [June 1990).
18 Ibid
19 Ibid.
20 McGurgan. “A Brief\ op. ciL, p. 6.
21 ibid., p. 10.
22 Some RAANC nurses had contact with the 24th Evacuation Hospital. A brief 
nursing exchange programme involving 1 Australian Field Hospital and the 24th 
Evacuation Hospital was begun in late 1971.
23 McCarthy. “SVN Recollections**, op. cit.
24 McGurgan. “A Brief", op. cit., p. 8.
25 McGurgan. “A Brief*4, op. cit., p.7.
26 Ibid., p. 4.
27 Ibid., p. 5.
28 McCarthy. “SVN Recollections**, op. cit.
29 McGurgan. “A Brief**, op. cit., p. 4.
30 Ibid., p. 10.
31 McCarthy. “SVN Recollections’*, op. cit.
32 McGurgan. “A Brief", op. cit., p.9.
33 Ibid.
34 These figures are derived from information from DNS-A. Canberra, “Nominal 
roll, RAANC ARA Officers, 1951-1978**; nurses’ questionnaires; and telephone 
conversation, Jan Bassett and Lieutenant-Colonel C. Gerrard, DNS-A, Canberra, 
18 July 1990.
35 McGurgan. “A BrieF, op. cit., p. 10.
36 On the American nurses see, for example, Claudia J. Dewane. “Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder in Medical Personnel in Vietnam**, Hospital and Community 
Psychiatry, 35:12, December 1984, pp. 1232-1234; and Robert H. Stretch, 
James D. Vail, & Joseph P. Maloney. “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among 
Army Nurse Corps Vietnam Veterans’*, Journal o f Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 53:5, 1985, pp. 704-708.
37 McGurgan. “A BrieF, op. cit., p. 11.
International Factors Influencing Australian Governments' 
Responses To The Indochinese Refugee Problem
James E. Coughlan
Introduction
The year 1975 was an important year for Australia: the economy 
had plunged into a severe recession, with high unemployment and 
interest rates, the worst since the 1930s depression: the Government 
was rocked by ministerial involvement in a major illegal international 
loans scandal: and a variety of other significant political disruptions, 
which culminated in the most serious constitutional crisis in Australian 
political history— the dismissal by the Governor-General, Queen 
Elizabeth’s representative in Australia, o f the elected Labor Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam. There was one significant international event 
in 1975 which would have major political and social ramifications for 
Australia over the following decades: the revolutionary changes in the 
Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese Governments.
The communist victories in the three countries which used to 
comprise French Indochina triggered two types o f large-scale population 
movements: the forced deurbanization o f Cambodia and government 
population relocation programmes in Vietnam on one hand, and the 
exodus of over two million Indochinese asylum seekers on the other. 
Although the magnitude o f the exodus of Indochinese asylum seekers 
over the past decade and a half is smaller than some of the other 
contemporary refugee crises, its direct effect on the international 
community has been substantial, largely due to the influence o f the 
United States Government. For Australia, the decision to admit almost 
150,000 Indochinese refugees and immigrants in the decade and a half 
since early 1975 has had a significant direct and indirect impact on the 
social fabric o f Australian society.
The aim of this article is to discuss some of the international 
factors which have contributed to Australia’s Indochinese refugee policy 
formulation since early 1975, with only passing attention given to 
domestic considerations. The article also seeks to show that the 
overwhelming determinant of Australia’s Indochinese refugee policy has 
not been domestic or humanitarian considerations, but rather the 
political desires of the Australian Government and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (the Australian equivalent of the US Department 
of State) to improve Australia’s relations with Asia, especially with the 
Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
The Indochinese Refugee Problem 85
Thailand. Thus, like the United States o f America. Australia’s recent 
refugee policy has been more of a foreign policy tool than an implement 
of Government humanitarian concern.
The following section will provide a short background to Australia’s 
overall refugee policy, which will be followed by a discussion of the 
international factors which have contributed to Indochinese refugee 
policy formulation in the three Australian governments since the beginning 
of 1975. The final section presents a brief discussion and conclusion of 
the issues raised.
Background
Australia is a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status o f Refugees, and thus accepts the definition of the term refugee 
encompassed in these United Nations instruments. However, in more 
recent times Australia, as well as other countries involved in Indochinese 
refugee resettlement and the southeast and east Asian countries, has 
narrowed its interpretation of the term refugee. At the same time, 
Australia is incorporating more stringent procedures in the determination 
of refugee status. This modus operandi has been adopted not only in 
order to separate the genuine political refugees from the economic 
migrants amongst the asylum seekers, but more importantly to justify 
publicly the rejection, and possible mandatory repatriation, of asylum 
seekers who, the Government determines, are non-refugees.
Australia’s response to specific refugee situations takes into 
account such factors as the magnitude of the specific refugee problem, 
the region in which the problem occurs and the strength and nature of 
Australia’s relationship with that region, with particular importance 
placed on the relationships with the country of origin and country o f first 
asylum of the asylum seekers. As with the USA, Australia’s refugee policy 
was until recently based upon ad hoc responses to specific refugee 
crises. After a considerable amount of domestic and international 
pressure in 1978 the Liberal Government of Prime Minister, Malcolm 
Fraser, introduced a regular refugee component into Australia’s annual 
immigration programme. The formulation o f a formalized refugee policy 
in the late 1970s was due to a number of factors, the most important of 
which was the growing number of refugee crises around the world and 
the increasing pressure placed on Australia by various governments and 
organisations to resettle refugees.
Australia is in a similar position, with regard to the Indochinese 
asylum seekers, to the other Asian countries, and unlike other Western 
countries, in that it is both a country of first asylum, that is a country 
where asylum seekers initially seek refuge, and a third country, that is 
a country of refugee resettlement. Australia commenced resettling 
Indochinese refugees in 1975, when slightly more than one thousand 
were resettled, though a substantial resettlement programme was not in
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place until 1978, when over seven thousand were accepted. In late April 
1976, almost a year after the communist take-over o f Saigon, the first 
boat carrying Vietnamese asylum seekers arrived on Australia’s northern 
shores, heralding what would be the arrival o f over fifty boats o f first 
asylum Vietnamese boat people during the following five years. In 
addition, since late 1989 three boats carrying Cambodian boat people 
have successfully landed on Australian shores. The unannounced 
arrival o f Indochinese boat people on Australia’s northern shores has 
been a significant factor in the creation of Australia’s policy towards the 
Indochinese refugees.
As a final background issue, at the beginning of 1975, as part of 
the Colombo Plan of which Australia is a member, there were over five 
hundred Indochinese students sponsored by the Australian Government 
attending educational institutions in Australia. The majority of these 
students were from South Vietnam, but also included 19 students from 
North Vietnam and six high school students nominated by the Pathet 
Lao faction in Laos. The Labor Government under the Prime Minister, 
Gough Whitlam, had established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam 
in 1973, and had actively worked to improve relations between Australia 
and North Vietnam. Following the changes o f government in the three 
Indochinese countries in 1975 Australia continued to provide a small 
amount of developmental and humanitarian aid to Laos, although 
similar aid and cultural exchanges between Australia and the Socialist 
Republic o f Vietnam were suspended in early 1979 following Vietnam ’s 
intervention in Cambodia, influenced by the perception that Vietnam 
was both profiting from and forcibly expelling Vietnamese boat people. 
However, since 1983 Australia has been involved in providing bilateral 
and multilateral humanitarian aid to Vietnam, and there have been a 
small number of cultural exchanges. Australian businesses have also 
been active in assisting Vietnam.
The Whitlam Government’s Neglect: 1975
At the beginning of 1975Australia maintained diplomatic relations 
with the four nation states of Indochina and was providing developmental 
aid to these countries. The diversification o f Australia’s relations with 
Asia, following the election of the Whitlam Government in late 1972, was 
part o f W hitlam ’s belief that Australian foreign policy should not be 
restricted due to ideological and military considerations, but should also 
include cultural and economic facets, and that Australia should seek to 
expand its relations within the Asian region.
As part o f the desire to restructure Australia’s foreign relations, 
an important initiative of the Whitlam Government was the formal 
abolition o f the White Australia Policy and the adoption of a policy of 
multiculturalism initiated by the Minister for Immigration, MrAl Grassby. 
The W hite Australia Policy was the common name given to the 
Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 which sought to restrict non Anglo-
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Celtic immigrants from entering Australia. The historical background to 
this Act is similar to that of comparable regulations enacted in Canada 
and the USA during the latter part o f the nineteenth century. There were 
some provisions within the Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 which 
permitted some Asian people to immigrate to Australia, though then- 
numbers were very small.
Since the end o f the Second World W ar there had been a growing 
awareness on the part o f some Australians that Australia’s restrictions 
on non Anglo-Celtic immigration were presenting a negative image of 
Australia internationally and hampering Australia’s effectiveness in 
international forums. Upon its election the Whitlam Government moved 
rapidly to formally abolish the White Australia Policy, which resulted in 
a marginal increase in the proportion of Asian-born immigrants settling 
in Australia during the early years of government. However, the first 
significant test for the non-discriminatory nature of Australia’s new 
immigration policy was to come with the first Indochinese refugee crisis 
o f early 1975.
In the spring of 1975 Whitlam perceived that Australia was not 
in a position to accept Indochinese refugees, and was in essence 
unwilling to grant entry to Cambodian and even Vietnamese nationals 
with Australian connections. This perception arose due to a number of 
factors. The Labor Party in Australia at the time was more ideologically 
aligned with the North Vietnamese Government, as well as the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge and the 
Pathet Lao factions, than the American-backed regimes in Indochina. At 
the same time, some o f those involved in the labour movement expressed 
concern at the possibility o f having a large number o f Vietnamese 
workers in Australia, which could threaten the level o f wages of Australian 
workers, and thus the welfare o f Australian society. The Government 
was concerned at a possible electoral backlash from both conservative 
forces in society and its own supporters if Indochinese evacuees and 
refugees were settled permanently in Australia.
During April 1975 the Australian Labor Government did not plan 
to follow the US example o f extracting Cambodian and Vietnamese 
nationals who had connections with Australia or who were perceived as 
being at risk after the communist victories. The Whitlam Government, 
and especially some of its senior ministers, appeared concerned with two 
issues at this time: the desire not to offend North Vietnam by seeming 
to meddle in the internal affairs of South Vietnam through accepting 
Vietnamese nationals fleeing the advancing communist forces: and 
concern at permitting the entry of a large number of conservative South 
Vietnamese who it was felt might seek to disrupt Australia’s relations 
with North Vietnam. By the time the communist forces had entered 
Saigon less than a hundred Vietnamese nationals had arrived in 
Australia from Vietnam under special consideration. Up to the end of 
April 1975 the Whitlam Government’s inaction in getting the remaining
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families of Vietnamese already in Australia out o f South Vietnam, prior 
to the communist take over, brought it substantial criticism from the 
opposition political parties, humanitarian organisations, some academics 
and the general community.
A fter the com munist forces entered Saigon the W hitlam  
Government experienced a substantial amount of condemnation, both 
domestically and internationally, directed at its lack of response in 
bringing out South Vietnamese nationals with Australian connections. 
The Whitlam  Government had incorrectly interpreted the general feeling 
o f the population towards the situation o f the Vietnamese in Australia, 
and underestimated the international criticisms it would be subject to. 
Australia soon came under pressure from the United States and the 
ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore, to participate in 
resettling some of the 130,000 American-assisted evacuees and refugees 
who had fled Cambodia and Vietnam. As a result of this pressure, two 
immigration officials were sent to Guam, Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Singapore to interview evacuees and refugees for entry to Australia. At 
the end o f this exercise in m id-1975 just over one thousand Vietnamese 
were selected for entry into Australia. This token response was not 
received enthusiastically both domestically and internationally, and was 
viewed by some Asian countries as an indication that the White Australia 
Policy was not dead and buried as the Whitlam Government had 
announced, while in certain domestic quarters it added to the growing 
public discontent with the Whitlam Government. However, the domestic 
political situation within Australia was about to change and by the end 
of 1975 the Whitlam Government had been sacked by the Governor- 
General, Sir John Kerr, and a new conservative (Liberal) Government 
under Malcolm Fraser had been elected.
In summary, the position of the Whitlam Government towards 
the Indochinese evacuees and refugees in early 1975 was that it did not 
wish to offend and damage relations with, the newly victorious government 
of North Vietnam. However, after a significant amount of domestic and 
international pressure, mainly from the ASEAN countries and the United 
States, the Government acquiesced and accepted a token number of 
Indochinese evacuees and refugees. The policy towards the Indochinese 
refugees during 1975 was initially determined by some powerful members 
o f the Whitlam Government, who largely ignored the requests o f domestic 
and international pressure groups. The views of some other Government 
members who thought that Australia should do something to assist the 
evacuees and refugees were largely ignored.
The Fraser Government’s Initiatives: 1976— 1983
The first concerted attempt to develop a refugee policy within the 
framework of overall immigration policy came in 1977 under the Fraser 
Government at the instigation of the then Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs, Michael MacKellar. In the formulation of an Indochinese
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refugee policy the task at hand was to balance various domestic and 
international considerations, while at the same time attempting to 
project to the international community, especially the Asian region, the 
image of Australia as a responsible member of the Asian-Pacific 
community. The Fraser Government, like the Whitlam Government 
before it, recognised the importance of developing more substantial 
relations with Australia’s Asian neighbours.
During the late 1970s an important feature of the development 
of refugee policy within the overall immigration programme was the 
formal structural incorporation of the then Department of Foreign 
Affairs, now the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, into refugee 
policy formulation. Though the Department of Foreign Affairs had had 
input into Australia’s ad hoc refugee policy determination previously, 
there was no particular section within the Department which had 
responsibility for this matter. As an aside, it is important to note that 
since the onset of the Indochinese refugee phenomenon the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade has consistently recommended a higher 
intake of Indochinese refugees than the Department o f Immigration, 
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade believed that if Australia resettled a large number of Indochinese 
refugees, then it followed that Australia would be perceived as being a 
responsible member of the Asian region, and this perception in turn 
could be used as a tool by Australia to improve its regional relations with 
the Asian countries, especially the ASEAN countries, and, probably most 
importantly, Indonesia. As a result o f the perceived importance o f the 
Indochinese refugees in Australia’s bilateral and multilateral relations, 
a “refugee section” was established in the Department of Foreign Affairs 
in early 1981.
In addition to raising Australia’s status and prestige within the 
Asian region, another matter which also prompted the Australian 
Government to take a more active role in the Indochinese refugee issue 
was the arrival o f just over two thousand Vietnamese boat people in 51 
boats on Australia’s northern shores during 1976-1981, the largest 
proportion arriving between 1978-1979. The arrival o f these refugees 
sparked a heated debate in Australia, and in some quarters old fears of 
an Asian invasion of Australia resurfaced. The Government was concerned 
with these unannounced arrivals for two reasons: fear o f the domestic 
political backlash if increasing numbers of boat people were to arrive 
unannounced in Australia, and the problem posed by genuine refugees 
who would have to be resettled by Australia, although they would not 
have been selected via normal migration procedures. The latter issue 
was of concern to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs as 
Australia normally accepts the majority of its immigrants before they 
enter Australia: in selecting refugees outside of Australia immigration 
officials had the ability to select refugees who, they thought, would be 
able to integrate successfully into Australian society. This power of
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selection was not available in the case of genuine refugees who landed 
in Australia without prior selection, and thus the element o f controlled 
selection was absent.
As a result of the unannounced arrival ofVietnamese boat people 
on Australia’s northern shores, the Government made special advances 
to the Indonesian Government in an effort to persuade the Indonesians 
to hold any Vietnamese boat people who wanted to travel on to Australia. 
If this request was met, Australia promised to take a greater number of 
Vietnamese boat people from Indonesian camps. Similar advances were 
made to the Malaysian Government, and in m id-1978 the Australian 
Government approached the US Government and requested their 
assistance in persuading the Indonesian and Malaysian Governments to 
slop boats ofVietnamese refugees planning to go to Australia, in return 
for Australia taking more refugees from Indonesian and Malaysian 
refugee camps. This action would thus help the United States resettle 
Indochinese refugees, while at the same time reducing the number of 
refugees in Indonesia and Malaysia, but most importantly it would 
permit Australian immigration officials the opportunity to select the 
refugees Australia wanted to resettle. In early 1979 when the Indonesian 
Government offered two islands as possible sites for an Indochinese 
refugee processing centre, the Australian Government was immediately 
supportive of this proposal and offered to meet part o f the cost of 
establishing such a centre.
The Australian position in 1978-80 was essentially to tiy  to stop 
Vietnamese boat people from coming directly to Australia by accepting 
a large proportion of its Indochinese refugee intake from the countries 
from where the Vietnamese boat people would most likely attempt to 
continue their journey to Australia, viz. Indonesia and Malaysia. During 
the late 1970s and early 1980s when the refugee camp populations in 
Indonesia and Malaysia were declining, and those in Hong Kong and 
Thailand increasing, Australia continued to take the majority o f its 
refugees from Indonesia and Malaysia, with most of the intake from the 
other Asian countries consisting only of those refugees who had immediate 
family members in Australia who were in a position to sponsor them out 
of the refugee camps.
During the late 1970s, despite what it perceived as its adequate 
response to the growing Indochinese refugee crisis, the Fraser Government 
came under increasing international pressure from the first asylum 
ASEAN countries, as well as the USA and the office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to resettle more of the growing 
number o f Indochinese asylum seekers arriving in Asian first asylum 
countries. On the domestic scene, the growing media coverage of the 
plight of the Vietnamese boat people and the horrific images of emaciated 
Cambodians entering Thailand raised public consciousness and 
sympathy, thus permitting the Government, now also under increasing 
domestic pressure, to raise more readily its intake quota of Indochinese 
refugees.
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Also in the late 1970s the Vietnamese boat people situation 
changed markedly with the arrival o f a number oflarge freighters in Asia 
with thousands o f Vietnamese asylum seekers aboard. It soon became 
apparent that the maj ority of people on these freighters had paid the local 
equivalent of thousands of dollars to leave Vietnam, and that their 
departure from Vietnam had been arranged with the assistance of 
corrupt Vietnamese Government officials. With the growing number of 
Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving on the shores of Asian countries the 
Australian Government, mirroring the US Government, announced in 
early 1982 that it would examine each asylum seeker’s claim for refugee 
status on a case-by-case basis, rather than giving refugee status to all 
Indochinese asylum seekers. Shortly after the arrival of the large 
freighters in southeast Asia a new term began to be bandied around— 
the “economic refugee”. At this time for many resettlement countries it 
became fairly clear that a sizable proportion of Indochinese asylum 
seekers, especially amongst the Vietnamese boat people, had fled their 
countries for economic rather than political reasons, and thus were at 
best economic, rather than political, refugees.
Also in 1982 the Australian Government took the first immigrants 
from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP) which was 
initiated in 1979 following negotiations between the Government of the 
Socialist Republic ofVietnam and the UNHCR. Unlike in the United States, 
all Vietnamese leaving Vietnam under this programme, which in Australia 
is now termed the “Vietnamese Family Migration Programme”, entered 
Australia as immigrants and not as refugees. The almost three year delay 
between the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
UNHCR and the Vietnamese Government, and the first arrival in Australia 
of emigrants from Vietnam under the ODP was due to the finalisation of 
procedural matters. However, it should be noted that between 1976 and 
1982 several hundred Vietnamese nationals were able to emigrate from 
Vietnam to Australia under normal migration channels, although it 
should be noted also that the majority of these people had been given 
entry visas to Australia prior to 30 April 1975.
During the late 1970s under the Fraser Government, Australia’s 
principal goals with respect to the Indochinese asylum seekers were: 
firstly to improve Australia’s image internationally, especially with the 
ASEAN countries: and secondly, to act to prevent adverse domestic 
opinion which arose each time Vietnamese boat people arrived 
unannounced on Australian shores. When reports began to emerge in 
the late 1970s that boats carrying Vietnamese refugees had been pushed 
off from the shores of some of the ASEAN countries, the Australian 
Government did not publicly condemn these actions as strongly as did 
other Western governments, and indicated that the problem was with 
the Vietnamese Government, and that the international community 
should be more understanding of the difficult position of the developing 
ASEAN countries. Such action on the part of the Fraser Government was
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to indicate its condemnation of the Vietnamese Government and support 
o f ASEAN’s position on the boat people, which would assist in improving 
Australia’s relations with the nations o f the region. The adoption o f this 
position was to ensure also that Vietnamese boat people would be 
prevented from arriving in Australia unannounced, and would ensure 
that the Fraser Government acquired both domestic and international 
benefit. The Fraser Government took account of both domestic and 
international factors in determining its Indochinese refugee policies, 
while at the same time approaching the issue with some semblance of 
humanitarianism.
The Hawke Government's Disengagement: 1983-1990
By the m id-1980s the world’s attention had drifted away from the 
plight o f the Vietnamese boat people and the Cambodian refugees along 
the Thailand-Cambodia border. The world’s media had not bothered 
about the situation of the Lao and Hmong refugees in Thailand. 
America’s war in Laos has been labelled a “secret war” and thus very few 
people in the W est knew about the existence of Laos or America’s military 
involvement there in the early 1960s. At the same time, the principal 
Indochinese refugee resettlement countries of Australia, Canada, France 
and theU SAbeganto experience what hasbecome known as compassion 
fatigue, their desire to resettle enthusiastically, an apparently never 
ending stream of Indochinese asylum seekers, especially Vietnamese 
boat people, waned significantly. This decreased enthusiasm may be 
measured by a gradual decline in each country’s Indochinese refugee 
quota or ceiling. Australia was not an exception to the gradual 
disengagement of resettling Indochinese refugees. However, through its 
then Minister for Foreign Affairs, and now Governor-General, Bill 
Hayden, Australia strongly sought a diplomatic solution to the conflict 
in Cambodia, which was perceived as an important first step in the 
resolution of the Indochinese refugee problem. Indeed, from the late 
1970s to the mid 1980s the situation o f the Indochinese refugees had 
moved from a crisis to a problem that refused to go away.
In its desire to play a leading active role in seeking a settlement 
to the Cambodian problem, and in an effort to obtain substantial 
regional support for its initiatives, Australia accepted fewer Indochinese 
refugees, but the proportional decrease in the Australian intake was not 
as high as that of the other principal resettlement countries. A  policy of 
gradual disengagement was implemented in order to use the Indochinese 
refugee issue in discussions on the Cambodian situation with the ASEAN 
countries. In an effort to be in a favourable position to take the initiative 
in the resolution o f the Cambodian problem the newly elected Labor 
Government, under Prime Minister Robert Hawke, decided in 1983, 
under a recommendation o f the Department of Foreign Affairs, to resettle 
a greater proportion of Indochinese refugees from Thailand, where the 
majority o f the Indochinese refugees were to be found.
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Another of the Hawke Government’s principal foreign policy 
objectives was to substantially improve relations with Vietnam, while at 
the same time strengthening relations with the other Asian countries. 
Both o f these objectives were achieved over the following seven years, 
though it is important to note that Australia’s initiatives towards both 
improving relations with Vietnam and seeking a solution to the Cambodian 
conflict, somewhat damaged relations with the ASEAN countries, 
especially during 1984-1986. Another damaging issue was what has 
come to be called the Asian Immigration Debate, or, the Blainey Debate, 
so-called after the Melbourne University historian. Professor Geoffrey 
Blainey, who initiated the debate in March 1984.
The very emotional, public Asian Immigration Debate was 
essentially about the perceived high level o f Asian immigration to 
Australia. During most of the 1980s about 35-40 per cent o f Australia’s 
annual immigrant intake was comprised of Asian-bom  immigrants, a 
level which some Australians perceived as being too high. One of the 
international repercussions of this debate, which was widely reported in 
the Asian media, was that Australia was again being perceived as a racist 
country, and the notion of the officially defunct White Australia Policy 
was mentioned occasionally in the Asian media. The debate on the level 
o f Asian immigration has waxed and waned since 1984, though the 
damage done to Australia’s image in Asia was perceived to be substantial 
enough to warrant action. One initiative taken was to maintain the 
intake o f Indochinese refugees at a reasonable level, while concurrently 
not changing immigration policy in effect to decrease the overall level of 
Asian immigration to Australia. Such action was perceived by the 
Government as demonstrating to Asian countries that Australia was not 
racist, and was still willing to resettle Indochinese refugees at a fairly 
constant level at a time when other resettlement countries were reducing 
their intake o f Indochinese refugees. This action together with Australia’s 
reaching a consensus with the ASEAN countries on the Cambodia 
conflict assisted in Australia regaining its influence in the ASEAN region, 
indicating as they did that its initiatives on the Cambodian conflict were 
for the benefit of the Asian region and demonstrating that Australia was 
not a racist country.
Partly as a result of the Asian Immigration Debate and other 
domestic factors a non Government committee was convened in late 
1987 to report to the Government on future directions for Australia’s 
immigration policies. The Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration 
Policies, which was chaired by Dr Stephen Fitzgerald, Australia’s first 
ambassador to the People’s Republic o f China and an internationally 
renowned Sinologist, reported to the Government in m id-1988. One of 
the reports recommendations was that Australia should gradually 
d isengage its e lf from  Indoch inese refugee resettlem en t. Th is  
recommendation appears to have derived from a negative image of 
Indochinese, especially Vietnamese, refugees in Australia and agrow ing
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opposition to ongoing Indochinese refugee resettlement within the 
Department o f Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs. 
However, the Hawke Government was quick to indicate that it would not 
follow this recommendation, a decision which was taken in response to 
substantial pressure from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
During the late 1980s Australia began working very closely with 
the ASEAN countries on a solution to the Cambodia conflict. Associated 
with a resolution o f this conflict was the Indochinese asylum seekers 
issue. By early 1989 Australia had essentially reached a consensus with 
the ASEAN countries both on the method of resolving the Cambodian 
conflict and the problem of the Indochinese asylum seekers. During 
1989-1990 Australia continued to liaise closely with the ASEAN countries 
on the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. At the July 1989 Geneva 
conference on Indochinese asylum seekers Australia, with the ASEAN 
countries, voted “for" the mandatory repatriation of Vietnamese asylum 
seekers, opposing the Governments of the United States, the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam. During subsequent international meetings on the 
issue of the Indochinese asylum seekers, Australia and the ASEAN 
countries continued to oppose the United States on the issue of 
mandatory repatriation o f Vietnamese asylum seekers.
An important outcome o f the July 1989 Geneva conference was 
that Australia committed itself to resettling 11,000 long-term Vietnamese 
boat people during 1989-1992. This initiative came from the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, not the Department o f Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs. While this decision obviously pleased 
the ASEAN countries, as well as Hong Kong, not all sections of the 
Vietnamese community, and some of those involved with resettling 
Indochinese refugees, are pleased with this decision. Currently most of 
those providing services to the Indochinese communities have severely 
over-burdened work loads, and the prospect o f settling 11,000 long-term 
refugees, the majority of whom have been in camps for over five years and 
do not have relatives in Australia, is daunting.
In late 1989 a new problem appeared on the horizon o f Australia’s 
Indochinese refugee programme; a boat load of Cambodian asylum 
seekers landed on Australian shores, and by m id-1990 two additional 
boatloads had arrived. Australia was quick to dispatch envoys to 
Indonesia in an attempt to persuade the Indonesian Government to hold 
any Cambodian boat people who sought asylum in Australia. With an 
increasing number o f Cambodian and Vietnamese boat people arriving 
on Indonesian shores, many o f whom have been pushed off from 
Malaysia, and a decreasing number of refugees being resettled in third 
countries, there is little incentive for the Indonesian Government to hold 
Indochinese boat people headed for Australia, as it has done in the past. 
At present, there are also strong indications that Australia will stop 
accepting refugees from Laos (as of September 1990). Australia's decision 
to resettle 11,000 long-term Vietnamese boat people during 1989-1992 
may end up causing more problems than it solves for the Government.
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Since the Hawke Government came to office in 1983 Australia’s 
policy on the Indochinese asylum seekers has been very closely associated 
with the desire to find a solution to the Cambodian conflict and improve 
relations with Asia, especially the newly industrialising ASEAN countries. 
Despite growing domestic opposition to resettling more Indochinese 
refugees, both on the part of the public and from with in some Government 
departments, Australia’s annual intake o f Indochinese refugees has 
remained around 6-7,000 persons per annum for most o f the life o f the 
Hawke Governm ent. During th is tim e, in ternational po litica l 
considerations have been the paramount driving force behind Australia’s 
Indochinese refugee policy, with domestic and humanitarian factors 
being seemingly less important over time.
Discussion and Conclusion
The changes in Australia’s Indochinese refugee policy since early 
1975 have been influenced by a variety o f international and domestic 
political considerations. On the domestic side such factors as community 
attitudes to the acceptance of the Indochinese refugees, the general 
economic situation and various public debates relating to immigration 
in general, and since 1984 Asian immigration in particular, have been 
of concern. Internationally, Australia’s response to the Indochinese 
refugee problem has been based on developments in the three Indochinese 
countries, the refugee situation in the Asian countries of first asylum, 
the attitudes of the other principal Indochinese refugee resettlement 
countries, especially Canada and the USA and the subsequent pressure 
placed on the Australian Government by the Governments of the US and 
the ASEAN countries. Since the mid-1980s the perceived damage done 
to Australia’s reputation in Asia as result o f the widely reported Asian 
immigration debates in the Asian media has also been a factor for 
consideration. Thus the determination of Australia’s Indochinese refugee 
policy has had to take into account a complex, and at times contradictory, 
set o f international and domestic considerations, often with the strength 
of the international factors out-weighing the politically sensitive and 
potentially damaging domestic considerations. Indeed, it may be said 
that there were times when the Australian Government’s Indochinese 
refugee policy was in direct confrontation with domestic political 
considerations. At the same time, Australia’s policy towards the 
Indochinese refugees, especially the Vietnamese boat people, has been 
diametrically opposed to Australia’s refugee philosophy and other 
aspects of the government’s overall immigration policies.
Australia’s apparent reluctance to take Cambodian, Hmong and 
Lao refugees extended from a belief that the majority o f these refugees 
were o f rural or unskilled backgrounds, and thus would find it nearly 
impossible to integrate into industrial and post-industrial Australian 
society. Those refugees from Cambodia and Laos who would have been 
suited for resettlement in Australia, that is the educated and the skilled, 
were perceived as probably having a knowledge of French rather than
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English, and thus would be more suitable for resettlement in Canada or 
France. There was a perception also that the majority of the Vietnamese 
boat people were from the urban localities in southern Vietnam, and 
thus would be able to integrate readily into Australian society. It was also 
the opinion of some policy makers that refugees from Cambodia and 
Laos would be willing to return to their homelands once the economic 
and political situations in these countries stabilised. Not only was this 
position all too vague, but it also exhibited a lack o f understanding of the 
complex socio-historical situations in these two countries, especially 
with respect to Laos.
The country of origin of the refugees to be selected was the 
subject o f discussions, as well as strong disagreements, between the 
Department o f Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs and 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The acceptance o f many of 
the Cambodian refugees in the early to m id-1980s appears to be a victory 
for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as the Department of 
Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs perceived that the 
Cambodians, as well as the Lao, were largely uninlegratable due to their 
poor level o f human capital. From an economic perspective these 
perceptions were to be proven wrong, as data from the 1986 Australian 
Census o f Population and Housing indicated that Lao-Australians were 
the most economically successful of the Indochinese refugee communities, 
with the Cambodian-Australians only marginally less successful than 
the Vietnamese-Australians.
The decision to select Indochinese refugees from specific first 
asylum countries was determined by a complex set o f economic, 
geopolitical and historical factors, foreign governmental pressure and 
perceptions of which refugees would most readily integrate into Australian 
society. Under international pressure in the mid-1970s, primarily from 
the UNHCR and the US Government, Australia accepted the majority of 
its Indochinese refugees from Thailand. With the commencement o f the 
major exodus of Vietnamese boat people in 1978 Australia started taking 
a large number o f refugees from Malaysia, again mainly due to 
international pressure and Australia’s historical Commonwealth and 
military links with Malaysia. After a number of Vietnamese boats arrived 
on Australian shores in 1978-79 a significant proportion of the Indochinese 
refugee intake came from Indonesia. In the early 1980s, as international 
pressure mounted to assist the resettlement of the growing number of 
Cambodian refugees, Australia again redirected part o f its attention to 
Thailand, though Indonesia and Malaysia remained the main source of 
Indochinese refugees. These three countries were to continue through 
the 1980s asbeing the main source o f Indochinese refugees for Australia. 
From the beginning o f 1990 about 37 per cent of the Indochinese 
refugees resettled in Australia came from Malaysia, 30 per cent from 
Thailand (of which about one-third were Vietnamese), 16 per cent from 
Indonesia, six per cent from Hong Kong and four per cent from the 
Philippines.
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In the early 1980s Australia came under some criticism  for only 
taking the cream o f the refugees and rejecting the elderly and uneducated. 
Indeed this practice had been going on since the late 1970s, and for a 
short period during 1978-79 some Australian immigration officers 
working in Malaysia deliberately split families in order to select young 
single females for entry to Australia. A fter increasing criticism  of 
Australia’s acceptance procedures from some first asylum governments 
and Australian community groups actively involved in the resettlement 
of Indochinese refugees, the Government decided that a small proportion 
of the refugees to be resettled would be difficult to settle cases. However, 
the majority o f these difficult to settle cases had fam ily members in 
Australia who were able to assist with their resettlement.
In conclusion, the main driving force behind Australia ’s policy 
towards the Indochinese refugees over the past decade and a half has 
been international political considerations, especially based on the 
relations between the Australian Government and the ASEAN countries. 
However, the main factor limiting the level o f Australia’s response to the 
Indochinese refugee problem was domestic political considerations, 
especially the potential domestic political backlash if too many refugees 
were accepted. Only in a few instances have genuine humanitarian 
considerations come into play. This is highlighted even more when one 
considers the recent decision to accept 11,000 Vietnamese long-stayers 
from Asian refugee camps, at a time when domestic resettlement 
resources can ju st cope with those resettled in Australia, and when 
Australian unemployment is increasing and unemployment within the 
V ietnam ese-bom  community is in the order o f 30-35 per cent.
'The Funny Place': Australian Literature and the W ar in Vietnam. 
Peter Pierce
Men who fought in the Australian and American forces in the 
Vietnam W ar were never persuaded for long of a good reason why they 
were there. Most, however, soon found others who experienced enough 
to tell them where they were. In Nasho (1984),1 a novel by the Australian 
conscript Michael Frazer (who did not see service in Vietnam), it is 
quickly explained to the protagonist. Turner, a journalist with the 
supposed Army Information Corps, that,
It’s not called the funny place because Bob Hope does a concert 
there eveiy year. It’s really a strange war. It’s a politicians' war, 
not a soldiers’ war. If the Americans declared war on the 
Antarctic penguins, Australia would have a battalion there.
The explanation of the why, o f the causes o f Australian and 
American involvement in the war, is nihilistic and despairing. This is a 
war that soldiers must fight but whose objectives are in no way under 
their control. Australians felt such impotence the more strongly, as the 
last sentence of Frazer’s extract suggests, because American diplomatic 
and military initiatives apparently dictated and circumscribed their 
freedom of action.
For some Australian novelists, several o f whom— including John 
Rowe, Rhys Pollard, William Nagle and ‘David Alexander’ (Lex McAulay) 
— had seen active service, the causes o f the war may have been the 
righteously proclaimed ones o f anti-communism and o f the defence of 
(South) Vietnamese national self-determination. All of them certainly 
believed with a sardonicism which strayed towards bitterness that these 
ideological aims were fatally compromised by the strategic dependence 
of Australian troops upon an inferior American military command 
structure, by the unreliability o f the South Vietnamese allies, by the 
difficulty o f distinguishing friend from foe in the field and by the 
increasing hostility to the war on the home front. Australian novelists of 
the Vietnam W ar have tended to be unofficial if  not unwitting spokesmen 
o f the views o f servicemen. In consequence they have depicted anti-war 
protestors unsympathetically. For a character in Pollard’s The Cream 
Machine (1972)2 they are “smug bastards”. In Nagle's novel The Odd Angry 
Shot (1975)3 they are “long-haired bastards”. Such attitudes were not 
peculiar to Australia, nor was the sense o f the abandonment o f troops 
in Vietnam by authorities at home. Thus these serving men would be 
assisted in the characterisation o f themselves, in Jeffrey W alsh’s analysis,4 
as the latest o f a series o f lost generations of soldiers.
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Abandoned, it might seem, by the society and culture from which 
they had come, and therefore to a degree estranged from the Arr'ac 
military tradition that had been a long agreed piety o f Australian lile,5 
Australian soldiers (as they spoke in memoirs, or were spoken for in 
fiction) made confused, prejudiced, partial efforts to discover what place 
it was that they had come to in Vietnam. This “funny place", o f whose 
existence there had been scant political, let alone public awareness 
when members o f an Australian Army Training Team first went there in 
1962,6 has figured fitfully but significantly in Australian literature o ''er 
the last two decades. The most important of its representations have 
been, in neither chronological nor hierarchical order: first, as the site of 
a war which although initially it appeared likely to replicate the jungle 
conflicts in which Australia had taken part in the Pacific during the 
Second World War, from early on refused to do so. Vietnam proved to be 
morally as well as militarily recalcitrant and ambiguous— a lost cause, 
for all the recent refurbishing o f the historical record both by Australian 
politicians and by Vietnam veterans: groups who are in most other 
respects mutually antagonistic.
Second, Vietnam and the Vietnamese, however imperfectly 
understood by combatants or commentators, became the latest filter of 
the mingled fear and desire that has characterised Australian xenophobia, 
especially towards Asians, for a century and a half. This attitude has 
been evident since Chinese immigration to the New South W ales and 
Victorian goldfields in the 1850s. While focussed again on the Japanese 
in the 1930s and 1940s, it has been in most decades a generalised 
apprehensiveness towards “Asians” , especially when they could be 
called communists as well. The significant shift o f bearing that occurred 
in some writing about the Vietnam W ar was that while the Viet Cong, the 
NVA and their civilian sympathisers joined the pantheon of enemies of 
Australia whom the culture has needed and thus identified,7 some o f the 
people of this scantly known Asian country were anxiously sought out 
as potential mentor figures for Australians.
Less often than in post-Vietnam War literature written in America, 
has “Vietnam” become for the characters imagined by Australian 
authors (as distinct, perhaps, from elements of the veteran population) 
a vague, all-encompassing, exculpatory metaphor for the subsequent 
mess made o f their civilian lives. In Australian literature that treats, even 
tangentially, o f the Vietnam War, there have yet been few returned 
servicemen (as Australian “veterans” were long styled before the American 
term began to be adopted in the late 1970s) among its protagonists. A  
sociopath called Graham turns up in David Williamson’s play Jugglers 
Three (1972);8 “The Yanks had their grass and heroin, but we saw it 
through on Fosters”; Michael Hackett, a payroll robber and murderer 
(significantly seeking revenge against his plutocrat father) in C.J. 
Caim cross’ novel The Unforgiven (1977).9 By analogy, the plight o f the 
psychologically and physically damaged veterans was examined through
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the reception o f a Gallipoli veteran when he comes back to a country town 
in Australia in the film  Break o f Day (1976).
Frequently Vietnam was depicted by indirect means in the 
Australian poetry and fiction that has been written since the m id-1960s. 
A  score o f novels, including Christopher Koch’s Across the Sea Wall 
(1965)10 and The Year o f Living Dangerously (1978);11 Richard Beilby’s 
The Bitter Lotus (1978);12 Robert Drewe’s A Cry in the Jungle Bar (1979);13 
Bruce Grant’s Cherry Bloom (1980);14 Blanche D ’Alpuget’s Monkeys in 
the Dark 11980)15 and Turtle Beach (1981);16 Ian Moffitt’s The Retreat o f 
Radiance (1982),17 were set in Asian countries other than Vietnam. 
Australian protagonists o f Sri Lanka, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, were more peaceful, but no less mystifying, than that o f their 
counterparts in the war fiction.
Beginning in the 1970s, a second wave ofliterature o f the Great 
War, one that particularly focussed upon the Gallipoli landings o f 1915, 
appeared in Australia. The divisions on the homefront during that war, 
notably over the issue of conscription for overseas service (referenda on 
this issue were defeated narrowly in 1916 and 1917), the moral 
ambivalence o f “the war to end war” (a conflict whose war aims, as A.J.P. 
Taylor has suggested, had to be invented after the fact), the fissures 
which the war made in Australian society and its presumed, and mythic 
role in putting an end to national innocence, could all be made to appear 
as premonitions of Vietnam.
The Vietnam W ar also figures in Australian literature as a 
speedily forgotten place, beneficiary of an Australian propensity towards 
historical amnesia (though Gore Vidal has ironically saluted his country 
as “Amnesia the Beautiful”) .18 Finally, “the funny place” is a site o f 
various, though not essentially contesting Australian myths, none of 
which is new. All had earlier been shaped from the experience o f other 
wars in which Australians had fought. Notable among them were the 
myth o f a hostile homefront, the myth of incompetent allies (an old story 
this, that apparently stands endless retelling in bar-rooms and in books: 
witness British Butchers and Bunglers o f World War One (1988),19 a 
“study” o f generalship by the expatriate Australian John Laffin), the 
myth o f “the legend o f Anzac upheld”— that phrase being the plaintively, 
defensively revealing sub-title o f Lex McAulay’s account o f The Battle o f 
Long Tan (1986).20
Arm y training films and still black and white photographs of 
Australian troops in Vietnam which were made and taken during the 
1960s— admittedly in the early years of Australian involvement and 
therefore imbued with the expectation that victory would be the inevitable 
result o f the job  being done—concentrate on the beneficient interaction 
o f the m ilitary with Vietnamese civilians. The kindly dentist is a 
ubiquitous presence. In addition these visual images often offer, 
consciously or not, a stereotypical profile and posture o f the Australian 
Digger. Moving through a jungle landscape, leading with their clean­
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shaven, craggy jaws, the Diggers are pictured so as nostalgically to recall 
the generation of their fathers who fought against the Japanese. The 
different enemy, the novel social and topographical contours of Vietnam, 
are wished away as the visual images return us to that Second World W ar 
whose occasion seemed blessedly unambiguous. That such throwbacks, 
fighters from an older war, could not continue to press on straightforwardly 
through the jungle to victory in Vietnam was one of the ugliest shocks 
that “the funny place” delivered. It ought not to have been, but lessons 
from Korea and the Malayan Emergency had not been well learned.
Some authors refused to concede that Vietnam might confound 
the glorious traditions of Au stralian soldiership, or saw betrayal o f Anzac 
traditions from without as essential to the national military experience 
in Vietnam. Notable among them was Lex McAulay, who did three tours 
o f duty in Vietnam, and who wrote his novel When the Buffalo Fight (1980) ,21 
set in 1966, a more sanguine time for America and its alies in the war, 
under the pseudonym ‘David Alexander’. The book’s title comes from 
what ‘Alexander’ describes, in terms that Edward Said would savour, as 
“an old Asian saying” : “when the buffalo fight, the small animals are 
trampled” .
McAulay endeavours to portray the ostensible enemy, the Viet 
Cong, as worthy opponents of the Australians, although he reduces then- 
ideological position to cartoon: “Hoa has laid down his life for the 
Revolution”, one cadre declares. The Vietnamese peasantry are nameless 
and innocent victims of the war, but the veritable losers that the novel 
depicts are the Australian servicemen and their families at home. The 
latter are preyed upon by night-slinking “creatures", that is, anti-war 
protestors. Serving men suffer from the ministrations o f opportunistic 
Australian politicians, the military ineptitude o f the Americans and the 
“indolent” , “somnolent", “lounging” soldiers of the ARVN. As he locates 
enemies o f Australian life and military honour all around, writes from a 
position o f frustrated, raging embattlement. McAulay as ‘Alexander’ (the 
pseudonym drawn perhaps from a general who might have been ruthless 
enough to w in the war) is true to the melodramatic temper o f the national 
literature, especially when its precious, reassuring moral and mythic 
verities are jeopardised. Australian war literature in particular highlights 
a need for enemies, for conflict that will guarantee enlistment in history, 
together with a contradictory desire to be left in an unthreatened world 
o f dream, or delusion.
Writing his battle history o f Long Tan, McAulay even-handedly 
dedicated it to “the young men of both sides who fought that day". 
Trenchantly, he gave as his sub-title “The Legend o f Anzac Upheld” . 
Some o f the admittedly few Australian novelists who’d come previously 
to write o f the war in Vietnam were more uncertain o f the place that it 
held in Australian military traditions. In The Cream Machine, Pollard’s 
narrator seems uncertain of whether his stance towards such traditions 
is or should be ironic:
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Looking along the row of slouch hats and rifles 1 grope for the 
supposed similarity between us and the traditional national 
image: where are all the tall bronzed Anzacs? the once-famed 
Diggers who stormed the ragged impossibility of Anzac Cove or 
died jeeringly in the mud beneath Mont St Quentin? Where is the 
morale and endurance of Tobruk or the Kokoda Trail, the dash 
and inevitability of Kapyong? Perhaps it lies in the unconscripted 
element?
That is, in this conclusion, where it always used to be: in volunteer 
and regular armed forces. Certainly the young soldier is not contemptuous 
o f “the tall bronzed” figures of Anzac legend. But where can they be found 
in Vietnam? What proper names will that war add to the Australian 
military honour roll?
Pollard's novel fils a pattern of story that C.D.B. Bryan, a US 
veteran of Vietnam turned novelist, described as peculiar to this war: 
“The Generic V ietnam  W ar N arrative”22 Bryan sum m arises the 
predictable, devastating succession o f incidents that such narratives 
treat, whether they are cast as novels or as memoirs: “There is the first 
pa tro l... There is the atrocity scene, to demonstrate that My Lai was not 
an isolated incident ... There are dope scenes ... There is R  and R  in 
Saigon with Susie the bar-girl”. Bryan concludes that the generic 
narrative o f the war “charts the gradual deterioration o f order, the 
disintegration o f idealism, the breakdown o f character, the alienation 
from those at home, and finally, the loss o f all sensibility save the will to 
survive”. It’s a somewhat unsympathetic aesthetic complaint made 
earlier the same year by Michiko Kakutani in the New York Review of 
Books : “In novel after novel, a variation o f the following true to life 
sequence occurs . . .”.23
While he has traced a pattern that fits Australian as well as 
American Vietnam W ar narratives, Bryan is blind to his own intuition of 
how characters and their authors suffer entrapment. They can find no 
optimistic way in moral terms, or metaphorical way in literary terms out 
of these narratives, hence back to the relative and supposed simplicities 
of stories of the Second World War. Not for nothing is John Wayne— 
celluloid hero of many theatres of that conflict— a presiding, if sardonically 
regarded presence in “Generic Vietnam W ar Narrative”.
The Cream Machine conforms to the pattern that Bryan sketches. 
Commencing with the narrator’s departure from Australia, it introduces 
his comrades-in-arms; has intimations o f the domestic life which he has 
left behind: continues with the ritual induction of the young man to war. 
He is posted to battalion, meets its men, hears its legends, learns the 
necessary acronyms. Some Australian novels o f Vietnam, in common 
with many from America, come with glossaries. The first patrol, the first 
corpse, the first matter of conscience routinely follow. In The Cream 
Machine, the latter involves the arrest o f an old Vietnamese woman.
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while in the testimony of one of the “Australian Voices” which are 
gathered in Stuart Rintoul’s collection o f oral testimonies, almost all by 
grieving and damaged veterans. Ashes o f Vietnam ( 1987)24 it would be an 
accidental atrocity. The narrative design of Pollard’s novel is substantially 
repeated in W illiam  Nagle’s The Odd Angry Shot, which opens with 
embarcation for Vietnam and proceeds speedily with the conventional 
sequence o f first things: Vietnamese corpses, an Australian casualty, the 
purchase o f “Saigon tea” . The indispensable moment in such sequences 
is the first sight o f a combat victim, whose body is the talisman that 
unlocks the right to report.
But what is there to report? No clear-cut ideological victory to 
complement the military one that never happened was available in 
Vietnam as it had seemed sometimes to be from the Second World War. 
Seemed, at least, in the accounts o f their war by the fathers of Vietnam 
veterans, stories that are often derisively included, particularly in fiction 
by Americans. In that earlier conflict, the Japanese enemies portrayed 
in Australian fiction had occasioned no remorse of conscience. They were 
characterised as “apes with pants on” and “little, grinning, mustard- 
coloured Japanese” in Norman Bartlett’s Island Victory (1955),25 while 
for Ron Fisher, hero of ‘David Forrest’s ’ The Las t Blue Sea (1959),26 “From 
the dark ages they came”. The “nigels” , “nogs” , “slope heads” routinely 
despised in The Odd Angry Shot indicate at least the characters’ fealty to 
that Australian tradition of racial contempt and fear. Much other 
evidence is, however, contradictory and complicating.
For many Australian poets of the war, the true enemy was not 
Vietnamese at all. W hen Vietnamese people appeared they were almost 
always civilians, arrayed as the victims of Australian and American 
atrocities. Poets sought empathy with them. David Campbell, forinstance, 
made a stagey entrance into the heart and mind of a peasant whose 
buffalo has been shot by Americans. The poem ’s focus at once shifted to 
blame the perpetrators, whose brutal, childish voices are overheard. 
Such a polemical positioning of himself against the war must have been 
more difficult for Campbell, who had served with distinction in the Royal 
Australian A ir Force during the Second World War, than for the many 
well-intentioned, incapable protest poets whose work (along with that of 
established, skilled, and usually older poets) was gathered in such 
places as the anthology We Took Their Orders and Are Dead (1971),27 
edited by Shirley Cass and Michael Wilding. In the history o f Australian 
poetry o f and since the Vietnam period, Campbell’s case was uncommon, 
for few other careers were as notably affected in Australia, especially by 
comparison with the changes wrought in the work of Am erican poets 
such as Denise Levertov and Robert Bly.
Australian poetry of the Vietnam War, then, is marked by 
strident anti-Americanism and its corollary: a lament for Australian 
dependence. While poets often rushed to empathise with the Vietnamese, 
it was the people, rather than individuals, who were the targets o f their
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embrace. The desired relationship in some Australian novels was 
revealingly different. In The Wine o f God’s Anger (1968),28 a portentously 
titled book by the competent journeym an Kenneth Cook, the protagonist 
who has volunteered to save the world from communism believes at first 
that his enemy is this alien ideology. In the climactic battle against the 
Viet Cong in the novel, he kills “the gentle little chance acquaintance 
who’d looked after me when I was drunk ... I had killed a m an I knew”. 
The theoretical enemy is belatedly recognised as the veritable friend. 
Even for this confused young man, who goes AW OL in Bangkok in the 
aftermath o f the battle, another ideology— that o f American imperialism 
is well on its way to being perceived as the true enemy o f Australia.
More numerous than the Australian novels which treat directly 
o f the war in Vietnam, o f which still no more than a dozen have been 
published, are those set in other Asian countries and written over the 
past quarter o f a centuiy. In these books, Vietnam receives at best a 
passing mention. Its implicit and— for want of a less ambiguous word—  
moral presence is signalled by the desire o f numbers o f the protagonists 
o f these novels to seek out Asian mentors as teachers, perhaps as 
friends, although not often as lovers. Earnest endeavours by Australian 
governments since the 1960s to promote trade with Asian countries and 
by entrepreneurs to create what Paul Fussell has called tourist “bubbles”29 
there m ay have contributed to this shift o f interest beyond the national 
borders. More profoundly affecting such a choice of subject and setting 
is in part the assuagement of guilt over the Australian military penetration 
o f and involvement in Vietnam. Now, instead ofthat violent, metaphorically 
sexual assault upon that country, Australian novelists have often 
brought their characters humbly, almost sacrificially to places all over 
Asia in search o f chastening enlightenment. This literature has, to an 
extent, been put to the covert work of discharging a burden o f guilt that 
the writers have assumed concerning Australia’s role in the Vietnam 
War. It may also come to be seen as another o f the contemporary artistic 
expressions o f a cultural death wish in Australia.
Vietnam provided no heroes for Australian legend-mills though 
this is not surprising in a country whose martial triumphs have almost 
always been represented in corporate terms. For a number o f Australian 
novelists and historians, the traditions of Anzac were treacherously 
tarnished on the homefront during Vietnam, and have only retrospectively 
and wishfully been refurbished. In compensation, perhaps, assiduous 
work at legend-making from other, older sources went on in Australian 
fiction, drama, history and film during the 1970s. The historical fortunes 
o f eccentrics and outcasts were remembered and revised. Figures such 
as the bushranger Martin Cash and the politician King O’Malley featured 
in polemical musicals by Michael Boddy and Bob Ellis. The bush 
balladist cum Boer W ar soldier ‘Breaker’ Morant, executed by the British 
for shooting Boer prisoners, was the protagonist o f Kenneth Ross’s play 
o f 1978 and later o f a film. Historian Manning Clark went In Search o f
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Henry Lawson (1978).30 These characters had been celebrated and then 
punished for being just such social renegades as the serving men in 
Vietnam had no opportunity to be and— on their return home— few chose 
to become.
From the same period, poetry and fiction and the unflagging 
industry o f m ilitary history in Australia refought the Great War. Surrogate 
for Vietnam, it was represented as a crucial moral and historical 
watershed in the national life. Novels by Roger McDonald, 1915 (1979),31 
David Malouf, Fly Away Peter (1982)32 and Geoff Page, Benton’s 
Conviction ( 1985)33 as well as poetiy  by Les A. Murray (“The Conscript” , 
“Visiting Anzac in the Year o f Metrication”) and Chris Wallace-Crabbe 
(“The Shapes o f Gallipoli”) insist with a troubling unanimity on a division 
between the innocent, rurally-oriented (at least in terms of its proclaimed 
values), ante-bellum Australia o f 1914 and the post-war society whose 
idealism had been misplaced, although its history had properly begun. 
The Great W ar was a domestically divisive conflict, as Vietnam  was. 
Compulsory m ilitary service overseas was perhaps as important a factor 
in opposition to the latter war as were objections to American hegemony. 
Vietnam was a foreign war, as all Australia’s wars have been: this is a 
country that has known no border disputes, no hereditary enemies, no 
invasion and which has never initiated a conflict. Australians at first 
rushed willingly to volunteer for the Great W ar and most supported it 
stridently for a time. The strong initial public endorsement o f the 
country’s involvement in Vietnam had begun to wane by the end o f the 
1960s. The parallels that can be drawn and imagined between the two 
conflicts suggest how writers who made a nostalgic return to the Great 
W ar implicitly argued that the innocence lost then, the dependence on 
greater powers willingly embraced, prepared at the remove o f two 
generations for Vietnam.
Australian forces were involved inVietnam from  1962 until 1972, 
that is for considerably longer than in any other war where Australians 
fought. Yet that m ilitary engagem ent was scantly registered in 
contemporary imaginative literature besides the ephemeral protest 
poetry and the handful o f novels already discussed. Nor has there been 
much analytical commentary on why this was so.34 O f those authors 
whose first book was a Vietnam book, whether they served there or not, 
few have managed to develop a writing career. Nagle shifted to collaborating 
in film scripts, notably o f the Vietnam movie Fire Base Gloria (1989). Out 
of the army because o f the controversy caused by his Vietnam  novel 
Count Your Dead (1968),35 John Rowe has written several thrillers of 
impending apocalypse. It’s war between India and China in The Warlords 
( 1978)36 and goodbye to the Aswan Dam in The Jewish Solution (1979).37 
O f Frazer, Pollard, Carroll, little more has been heard. ‘A lexander’ 
became McAulay again to jo in  the most sizeable band o f Australian prose 
writers o f the war: memoirists, authors o f battalion histories and 
accounts o f particular battles. These writers choose what m ay seem to
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them to be an undisputed terrain, one which is authorised by their 
personal experiences.
If Vietnam was at various times a place where Australians 
thought they never were or never had been (in the years from 1962 until 
regular forces other than the Training Team  were committed; then for 
much o f the decade after the Australian withdrawal in 1972), it has 
recently been given polemical and mythical co-ordinates. Vietnam has 
become the site o f and the vehicle for a betrayal story that can be told in 
several ways. Early remarked and perhaps longest resented is the 
supposed lack of support or sympathy back in Australia for the lots of 
individual soldiers, as distinct from the abstract causes in whose name 
the war was prosecuted. Vietnam has become the site o f and the vehicle 
for a betrayal story that can be told in several ways. Back in Sydney, 
Harry and the narrator of Nagle’s The Odd Angry Shot reflect upon the 
indifference with which they’ve been received:
Pitch your condescending change to the organ grinder's monkey 
dressed in his green. Well, green once. (The girl beside me at the 
bar is making gesturesas if to advertise the fact that I stink.) And 
I will lick up the droplets of your pitying safely and clutch them 
to my inept self, and sniff the dogs-arse of your offerings, and let 
the wash of your pious love hang about my ears as the lace 
curtain of my military halo.
“So here we are”, they echo one another. The last spoken words o f the 
novel are echoed as well: “Fuckin’ terrific” . Earlier, one of their compatriots. 
Bung, has wondered “if we’ll stink when we get out ofth is place” . His fear 
is that a m an could still smell o f Vietnam “for years to come, even when 
he’s out of this arsehole country” . The comment loses some o f its 
ingenuousness, and takes on a macabre aspect given the subsequent 
reckoning of physical consequences of exposure to Agent Orange and 
other traumas o f service in Vietnam.
“Embarrassed” is the word that a group o f Vietnam veterans from 
Frazer’s novel Nasho, gathered at an Anzac Day march, find for their 
feelings once back in Australia. Initial impressions had often been of 
outrage. “Shitwitted protestors”, placard-carrying “mother-fuckers” (an 
American epithet imported into Australia during the Vietnam War) 
interrupted the welcome for T. Spriggs, as he recollected in Desperate 
Praise (1982),38 edited by John Coe. In particular he remembered an 
Australian woman as the enemy: “this poxy excuse for a female, 
screech ing  and carry ing  a p lacard  say ing CHILD  K ILLE R S ” . 
“Homecoming” is the title and subject o f a poem that tries to make 
sombre peace out o f this process. Bruce Dawe’s threnody tells with grave 
tenderness o f the return of the bodies o f slain men to their Australian 
homes, “to cities in whose wide web o f suburbs” in which “the spider web 
grief swings in his bitter geometry.” Dawe laments, “they’re bringing 
them home, now, too late, too early.”39
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The betrayal o f fighting men by venal, self-serving politicians is 
a venerable theme o f war literature, as old as Horace, if brutally 
reinforced in this century through the experiences o f many wars. The 
incompetence o f generals on one’s own side has been a commonplace 
since the battles o f the Western Front in the Great War, when Siegfried 
Sassoon’s “The General” did for both Harry and Jack “with his plan of 
attack” . Vietnam confirmed these predictable betrayals, but as never 
before Australian writers turned the blame for the defeat in process 
(which they saw as America’s defeat anyway, rather than their own) 
towards the allies o f the Australian armed forces. The events o f the 
Vietnam W ar became a means of bitter protest against a renewal of 
Australian dependency upon a great power, which since the beginning 
of the war in the Pacific in 1941, had been the USA rather than Britain. 
Supposed reportage in Australian fiction o f Vietnam: accounts o f “the 
bloody big-time, interfering, busy-body bloody Yanks” as one Australian 
castigates them in Rowe’s Count Your Dead, o f their carelessness on 
patrol, their prodigality with soldiers’ lives, are polemically driven. They 
are a mordant, sometimes near hysterical variation o f the complaint of 
the slighted colleague, who is really a dependant. The South Vietnamese 
allies fare even worse, being despised (as typically they are in Am erican 
literature ofthe Vietnam War as well) for treachery, cowardice, corruption. 
Old Asian stereotypes were confirmed for Australians,40 at least from the 
witness o f their prose writings o f the war. Sadly, still another foreign war 
became a buttress for Australian parochial prejudices, as well as an 
occasion for the reassertion of the martial spirit that was presumed to 
enshrine the best o f national traditions. The “funny place” which 
Vietnam became in the slang o f Australian serving men could be 
accommodated to allow the parade o f abiding national anxieties and 
insecurities. The literature has not yet been written in Australia that 
comprehends this failure of courage and o f introspection. 1
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Dismembering the Anzac legend: Australian Popular Culture and 
the Vietnam W ar
Jeff Doyle
The longevity and continuity o f a particular strand o f its popular 
mythology m ark a culture’s deepest concerns, reflecting the repeated 
and continuing attempts to formulate that culture’s responses to, and 
its interpretations and evaluations of. particular social and political 
crises. Development o f new narratives, or substantial modifications to 
existing myths, signal areas o f active ideological concern where crises or 
ruptures within the cultural structures and their valuation may be 
occurring. The representation o f Australian involvement in Vietnam, 
and its often uneasy conflation with aspects o f the Anzac legend and its 
surrounding myths, provide ju st such locations o f rupture in Australian 
culture.
For both Australia and the US, the Vietnam war has challenged 
the dominating popular imagery of their fighting men. Considerable 
gestures towards recuperation, revaluation and rehabilitation o f the 
m ilitary culture in the United States have been made, especially 
throughout the 1980s. In the 1990s it seems likely that in the light o f the 
build up to, prosecution and, subsequent completion o f the Gulf War, 
some will determine that these processes of cultural re-investment in 
the Am erican military ethos have once again achieved for m ilitary 
standards the “highs" associated with the icons o f pre-Vietnam soldiery. 
The same re-investment o f the m ilitary ethos within the culture, or to put 
it another way with a similar effect, o f the culture’s re-investment in the 
m ilitary ethos, has not been true of Australia until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Precisely how the GulfW ar manifests its imagery w ithin the, 
albeit more constrained, perceived recuperation o f Australia’s m ilitarism  
is as yet more difficult to determine than in the US example. In the 
American case, Vietnam has loomed large, as the negative example, the 
pattern which the G u lfW arw as not to simulate. This appeal to Vietnam, 
despite the initial stated determination to exclude it from any reference, 
has become almost as numerous a correlative appendage to the Gulf 
presentation as that other iconographic marker— the appeal to Saddam 
Hussein’s Hitlerian likeness— an appeal harking back to m em ory o f an 
enemy by his very evil nature, and one inviting a more straightforward 
justification o f the noble cause. References to Vietnam may prove for the 
Australian case a more divisive aide memoir. Evidence o f changing 
attitudes w ithin Australia to the military ethos before the G u lf W ar 
began implies a perceived recuperation in Australia’s m ilitary ethos, a
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recuperation in which Australia ’s V ietnam  involvem ent was drawn from  
its m arginal status into the m ainstream . Significant gestures towards a 
restructuring if not quite a rehabilitating o f the Anzac m ythology reached 
some kind o f peak in the celebrations surrounding the 75th anniversary 
o f Anzac D ay in 1990 and in the follow ing anniversaries o f the fall o f 
Saigon and the 1970 Australian M oratorium  marches, which were 
celebrated in the follow ing two weeks. A ll were m arked by a swathe o f 
print, radio and television program m es devoted to those events and their 
reassessment. On several occasions the Anzac m yth w as restructured to 
incorporate the V ietnam  material.
M oreover, as this popular m edia rewriting of both Gallipoli and 
Vietnam  at once created and enhanced the strongly evident sense o f the 
newly all-em bracing Anzac myth, it also served to construct w ith in 
popular culture another location for a new nationalism . The Labor 
Governm ent orchestrated a highly m edia-vaunted return to Gallipoli o f 
fifty-eight original Anzacs. The speech given there by the Prim e Minister, 
R.J. Hawke, exhorted Australians to rem em ber their earlier wars and the 
sacrifices m ade on their behalf, and m oreover urged Australians to follow  
the Anzac sold iers ’ m odel o f sacrifice, courage and m ateship. The speech 
refocussed these Anzac com m onplaces as the m eans o f carrying the 
nation through to the next century. Indeed Hawke urged the nation to 
face the new  current enem y—Australia ’s version o f the W est’s continuing 
economic adversity—  with a spirit em ulating that o f the original Anzacs. 
More, he urged this economic warrior spirit as a m eans o f refounding the 
nation as it neared its second federated century. The logic which 
appeared to be operating in Prime M inister Hawke’s speech is well 
known: “National character” and hence the nation ’s cultural integrity 
was bequeathed to the future not so m uch by the founding o f Australia 
as a federation o f 6 States in 1901, but through, in m ilitary parlance, the 
“b looding” o f the nation at Gallipoli in 1915. In appealing to the infusion 
o f a new ly invigorated Anzac spirit H awke’s speech seemed to argue that 
this would ensure the nation ’s econom ic integrity in the next century. In 
the weeks following Anzac celebrations, the media conflated the sentiments 
o f that 7 5 th Anzac D ay w ith a celebratory reassessment o f the Au stralian 
involvem ent in V ietnam , and rewrote that involvem ent into a revalued 
and “rem em bered” nationalist myth, praising the soldiers’ courage, then- 
sacrifices, their m ateship. Simple acknowledgm ent o f the effects o f 
V ietnam  upon the soldiery, let alone integration of their w ar into the 
myth, had not always been so straightforward.
At the cost o f simplification, the Australian pattern o f popular 
m em ory o f V ietnam  followed in the m ain the Am erican pattern—  
although naturally the culture-specific m yths demonstrate some variation.
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Indian Country
O f the many bizarre euphemisms which the war produced, the 
US high command’s “Indian country” came to refer both to the enemy 
territory in Vietnam and to the idyllic remembered time of the American 
frontiersman. Writing on Scorsese’s Taxi Driver (1976) Robert B. Ray 
develops an argument which can be applied more widely to the US film 
industry’s response to Vietnam. He points to the relevance of the basic 
American frontier myth of “regeneration through violence” and the 
pervasive tribal imagery of the film, and so links it back implicitly 
through a string of Vietnam westerns.1 The driving narrative behind 
“regeneration through violence” lies in the “captivity narrative” which 
depicted the Puritan forefathers engaging in swift and violent action to 
retrieve the woman captured by the Indians. Rescue had to be swift to 
ensure that the weaker-virtued woman did not succumb to the libidinal 
temptations for which Indian ways stood. These narratives allegorized 
the sinful falls and saving restitutions located within the deep-set mental 
landscape of Puritan religious turmoil. “Indian country” represented and 
was depicted less as a forest or jungle and more as an infernal reflection 
of the Puritan mind in religious foment.
It is hardly surprising that as American representations of 
Vietnam demonstrated the amelioration of the US experience of the war, 
emphasis shifted from the fighting man as the site of disruption to the 
failure of the nation and specifically its Government to embody and 
protract its otherwise just political will.2 Indeed in some Vietnam films 
individual soldiers win not only each engagement with the Vietnamese 
but, more significantly, victory over the forces of moral degeneracy 
within their own system.3 Vietnam becomes a mere site for the working 
out of the USA’s own problems, moral and political, and in effect Vietnam 
as a real geographical place disappears as a reality for further American 
consideration. To this day the United States obfuscates any need for 
reparation to Vietnam on the grounds of the non-ratification of Nixon’s 
Paris peace negotiations, coupled with moral indignation arising from 
the touchy issue o f MLAs. And while this latter is a popular source for 
Vietnam films, few if any of the American popular images present or 
accept liability for any long-term effects of the war on Vietnam. For 
Americans the Vietnam war has found an internal resolution, which has 
facilitated a strong redefinition of the nation’s own identity, largely at the 
cost o f erasing the former enemy.
Diggers in Vietnam
Australian popular culture’s representations of Vietnam have 
displayed a considerable appropriation of the American visual media’s 
presentation of the war, consciously or otherwise. In certain areas, such 
as Australia’s Welcome Home march in October 1987, this appropriation 
has extended to the returned servicemen themselves, for whom there 
seems to be an uneasy psychological conflation of fragments of the Anzac
112 J e ff D oyle
tradition, often brought together with elements derived from the US 
military and media imagery.4 Here and elsewhere the pattern of 
conflating wars was repeated as often as the Anzac story was retold. And 
in that retelling there was an image developing—the image of the 
revivified original Anzac conflated with the picture of a neo-patriotic and 
economically motivated digger. In the weeks surrounding the 75th 
Anzac celebrations there were many other confirmations that Australian 
society had reassessed the popular iconography of the military in 
general, and in this process had begun to restructure its responses to the 
Vietnam W ar in particular. But unlike the acceptable face of Vietnam 
now propagated by the American cultural industries, with Hollywood at 
the forefront, the Australian responses evident in those celebratory 
weeks in April and May 1990 did not find a resolution. Rather the various 
debates which ensued are suggestive o f a continuing and politically 
active irresolute stance within Australian culture, seemingly to dismember 
Anzac.
Earlier patterns of recalling Vietnam were sim ilartothe American 
evolution towards closure, but without the recuperation. Tracing that 
evolution may explain why the popular image of Anzac remains 
incompletely resolved.
As early as 1967-68 the Commonwealth Film Unit made a 
number of training films to aid in familiarising the troops with their 
duties and roles in Vietnam. Their imagery blends the traditional Anzac 
strands o f the defence o f a weak and defenceless ally and the necessary 
stand against the immoral enemy, with a resolute fighting spirit and 
intense comradeship. Australian Task Force Vietnam, and Diggers in 
Vietnam were made for the Directorate o f Public Relations, in 1966 - 
1967, while a third. Action In Vietnam, was made by the Commonwealth 
Film Unit in 1966. John Abbot made a fourth. The Third Generation, for 
Project ‘66’ and the National Television Network. In narrative structure 
and style all are extremely similar; in each troops are shown engaged in 
the various tasks of Vietnam, the least time consuming apparently 
actual patrols.5 In contrast to the surreal nowhere/everywhere o f the 
American frontier vision o f Vietnam Australians, at least as far as these 
films are concerned, are consistently interested in the strict defining of 
the material conditions, locations, intentions of their war. Initially this 
searching for a definite locus o f activities finds expression in images from 
the Anzac past. The jungle patrol scenes are nostalgic for the World War 
II New Guinea campaigns, as much as they are professionally located in 
the counter-insurgency techniques learned during Confrontation and 
Malaya. In the boldest terms of bodily icons, the soldiers upon whom the 
camera focusses are more often than not physically suggestive of the 
Anzac icon— the long angular-faced, tall and lean-bodied, sun-bronzed 
reticent, professing a preference for action; his humour is sardonic and 
often self-deprecating, his stare deliberate.
At the same time as they fix an Anzac icon, these films insinuate, 
in spite of themselves, the futility of the military activities being
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undertaken. In the contacts, the searches, the interrogations, and the 
operations to search and destroy, the films demonstrate time and again 
that the NLF was rarely to be found, let alone engaged, and yet seemed 
to be everywhere. Time and again the voice-over of each film laments ihat 
“Charlie”just simply wasn’t there, despite all the intelligence, despite the 
discovery of his food, his ammunition, his capture in large numbers and 
clearly in some encounters his overwhelming casualties by comparison 
with the allies. As the Australians return to base, these films observe that 
control returns to the invisible but ubiquitous enemy. This scenario is 
all too well known, but these films presented that dilemma in 1967 and 
1968 and their audiences either evaded or could not read the message.
The "tossed-up fucked-up never-come down land”
Australian popular cinema and television charted a course 
similar to but of a miniscule scale in comparison with Hollywood. Major 
Australian representations of Vietnam are relatively few in number. 
Where the US industries’ original evasion of direct comment and 
confrontation with Vietnam found expression in the appropriation of 
other genres, notably in the western, the smaller but burgeoning 
Australian film industry, and its television counterparts, emphasised 
Australian society at the turn of the century, that is upon an Australian 
equivalent of the western and upon the originating myth of Anzac itself. 
Films such as Breaker Morant (1980), Gallipoli (1981), The Man From 
Snowy River (1981), and mini-series such as A Town Like Alice, (1981), 
1915 (1983), Against the Wind [1978], and ANZACS (1985) explored the 
territory of the Anzac legend or its components, such as the alleged bush 
or outback (frontier) origin of the Australian national character. Embedded 
in the structure of many Hollywood westerns, the captivity narrative 
proved a seed bed for the development of Vietnam’s restorative narratives 
on the contrary in Australia the reassessment of Anzac in the 1970s and 
1980s offered no such pattern of redemption through enforced violence. 
The home grown product of Australian cinema became increasingly 
radicalised against the positive representations of military action.
Australia has so far produced three large-scale popular movie 
“texts” on Vietnam. The earliest. The Odd Angry Shot (1979), adapted 
from William Nagle’s novel of the same name, belongs to the tradition of 
Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front and Mailer’s The Naked and 
the Dead, focussing relentlessly on the ever decreasing squad or platoon, 
to the exclusion of the enemy, and typical of the latter novel and film 
drawing disturbing parallels between military power and sexual adequacy. 
Tom Jeffrey’s The Odd Angry Shot is focussed relentlessly on the squad, 
a closeness o f focus which it shares with most American films. The 
difference lies in the way Jeffrey’s film, following Nagle’s novel, introduces 
overt political comment— in a manner not found in most Hollywood 
“frontline” films. At the risk of over-simplification, Jeffrey’s introduces 
political content directed neither at a simplistic denunciation of 
communist aggression, as in the most politically naive (or at best black-
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vs-white) level o f John Wayne’s The Green Berets or some o f the MIA 
genre, nor is his political attack directed at the supposedly immoral 
government agents or agencies which betray the combat soldier in a 
number of examples o f the Rambo II genre. Instead Jeffrey’s film gives to 
the senior member o f the squad, Harry, a series of statements. These 
define the political locus of the fighting man as the sticky fingered 
politicians’ playthings, as counters in the politicians’ next election 
campaign. This comment is o f a different order to the Hollywood 
denunciation of venal politicians or the CIA. In the US examples, political 
comment rarely strays into posing more than suggestions about the 
distributions o f soldiers into ranks by class evident within the salaries, 
risk levels and social reimbursement of the officers and other ranks.
Certainly the inequitable distribution o f race and educational 
levels within the US forces are implicit in a number of Hollywood films 
but these issues are rarely if ever the focus of the film.6 When internal 
rifts occur within the Hollywood films they present opposed and competing 
versions of the American dream— either an extreme version o f the middle 
class pursuit o f happiness and leisure, the fruits of imperialism paid for 
by the blood o f colonised nations— or the barbaric distortion of 
individualism, in which extreme militarism stands not for reticent 
justice but as the all too willing executive arm of corporate greed. The 
happy resolution is a restoration of a middle class moderation in which 
the individual will stand for both his own and his nation’s sovereignty. 
(The use of the masculine pronoun is purposive here). Such a political 
stance is, this article contends, relatively simple-minded. This is not so 
in The Odd Angry Shot, where the class system and its correlative 
exploitation o f the lower orders is exposed not just as the symptom of the 
Vietnam W ar’s wrongs, but almost as if it were the root cause of the war. 
Jeffrey’s and Nagle’s attack is not simply directed at the failures of 
political will, neither the USA’s nor Australia’s; it falls more strongly 
upon the whole political and social structure of Australia— a nation in 
which the egalitarian appeal o fAnzacto the “fair go” holds sway. Harry’s 
speeches expose the fact that the “fair go” is a myth observed more in the 
breach. When another younger soldier. Bung, poses this question: “Why 
are we here then?" Harry replies:
You’re a soldier, the same as every other silly prick in this tossed- 
up fucked-up never-come down land, and that’s why you’re here, 
because there’s no one else and everyone’s gotta be somewhere 
and you're here, so get used to it.
If “Indian country” is the familiar though threatening environment of the 
US mythology of warfare, its resurgence in Vietnam “texts” marked a 
shift in experiencing the war— a move away from the surreally 
dehistoricised landscape that had characterised the early Vietnam 
“texts” , such as Dispatches and Apocalypse Now, to a site o f mythic re­
empowerment, no less dehistoricised, no less decentred from the physical
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site o f combat, but recognisably American, and rational. The Odd Angry 
Shot is significant in marking the early phase o f the Australian 
interpretation of the war as different to America’s. Harry's reasons for 
Australian being in Vietnam pose the Australian version of the surreal 
no place, the “funny place"7—"the tossed-up fucked-up never-come down 
land"—which was Australia’s Vietnam. The war is being fought by the 
lower classes: “not too many silvertails here”.
The sexuality of the Australians in The Odd Angry Shot is 
universally doomed as being more or less failures with women despite 
their own sense o f prowess. Harry found that his wife just did not want 
to be with him, preferring the company, the inference is sexual, of other 
men. He is bewildered by the female response to him. The only normal 
relationship depicted in the film, between Bung and his girlfriend, ends 
when she and his mother are killed. Bill’s girl writes only one letter—the 
proverbial Dear John—which sets a context for his R&R. Before 
conscription he urgently initiates sex with his girl lying down with her 
in the back garden— on R&R he refuses to lie down with the Saigon bar 
girl: his refusal manifests a damaged sexuality, a failure of trust. 
Throughout the film and the novel the soldiers’ language is obsessively 
sexual, but it is all telling, all masculine joking about sex. There is no 
evidence that any of them have had successful sexual relations over a 
long time. Their most effective sexual expression is the construction and 
presentation of a “wanking” or masturbating machine for the padre. The 
obsessions and limitations are stereotypically patriarchal. In a macabre 
reversal which proves the rule of sexual dysfunction, the hideously 
wounded Scott is visited by the rest of the squad. The scene parallels that 
in All Quiet on the Western Front’ when the platoon visits the wounded 
Kamerik who has lost a leg. Scott writes a note to his visitors, a one word 
question: “Balls?” As senior man again it falls to Harry to explore the 
circumstances and he lifts Scott’s bedclothes to inspect his body. 
Happily he reports that Scott has his due testicular quota. Here Nagle's 
novel is more specific about the loss of masculinity inherent it seems in 
the wounds of Vietnam. The film omits the novel’s commentary about 
soldiers wounded in the genitals, and the unforgiving social consequences 
they will suffer when they have returned to the homeland. It may be that 
the technical nature of Vietnam wounds— a large number of Australian 
wounds were related directly to mine injury— is reflected in these 
fictional observations; there is as well memorial evidence to suggest that 
at least for Australians the most recalled wounds are those to soldierly 
masculinity. Stuart Rintoul’s Ashes of Vietnam collects a large body of 
soldiers’ reports, and comments on the war. Among the numerous 
clusters of images which can be seen to develop from the diversity of 
memories, injuries to genitals is one of the most dominant.0
In the late 1980s Australian culture had begun the processes of 
rewriting Vietnam as a more positive account of the experience of war, 
and even as a means of reconciliation of Australia within the southeast
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Asian sphere. Two television m ini-series appeared in 1987, Simpson- 
LeMesurier’s Sword o f Honour and Kennedy-Miller’s Vietnam. Both 
presented a set o f “representative” Australians, and both map a route 
o f redemptive loss and reintegration via the varied experiences o f the 
Vietnam war.
In Vietnam, the microcosm of Australian society is the Goddard 
family, their concerns reflecting precisely the pattern of divisive reactions 
to Australia’s place within the larger contexts of southeast Asian and 
American politics and culture. In the figures o f the family the historically 
divided sectors of Australian society are drawn almost allegorically. The 
father, Douglas, is a senior public servant for the Liberal Government. 
Initially in favour o f the war, his development to a position o f political 
opposition schematises the development of political awarenesss in 
Australian society throughout the war. The mother, Evelyn’s, development 
from house bound and suppressed wife to liberated and mature femininity 
is suggestive o f the pattern o f social and political empowerment which 
some strands o f the 1970s women’s movement may have located in 
opposition to the Vietnam war. Megan, the daughter, “drops out of 
school, jo ins moratorium marches, experiments with sex and ‘life-styles’ 
and acts as the protector for her sometime boyfriend Serge— a draft 
dodger”; and lastly the son Phil, who is conscripted and is sent to 
Vietnam where he comes to believe in the necessity o f the war. He also 
establishes romantic connections with a Vietnamese woman, who turns 
out to be a Vietcong and is subsequently killed by his platoon. On his 
return to Australia he is alienated from the newly “aware” and anti-war 
nation, and suffers from PTSD.
W here the “funny place” of The Odd Angry Shot finds its location 
at worst as the locus of non-sense and o f political exploitation, Vietnam 
attempts mostly successfully to locate its action quite specifcially in 
geographic and historical space. To some extent the certainty of locale 
is lost in the m iddle o f the almost eight and a half hours o f television 
viewing time (excluding advertisements) when the focus shifts to Phil’s 
covert activities in a non-specifc war zone— "Vietnam”, but generally 
setting in time and place is detailed and precise. Precision is achieved in 
the first instance in the opening sequence, which consists o f a montage 
o f television images beginning with the then well known Australian 
Broadcasting Commission newsreader (in today’s parlance he would be 
an anchor man), Jam es Dibble, introducing a speech by the Prime 
Minister, Robert Menzies. Menzies’ speech is well known in Australia, 
opening with the lines “You know me, for better or worse"; doubly ironic 
in the context; first, it announced the commitment o f Australian support 
to Vietnam; secondly by appealling to recognition o f the past’s solid 
reality, Vietnam  seeks to place the unfolding drama as a fiction true to 
life, with a real political message. Menzies is followed immediately by a 
series of “grabs” o f American and Soviet politicians, various Australian 
and world celebrities, and increasingly intercutting snippets o f film
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reflecting aspects o f recognisably Australian life in the 1960s. This 
montage fades into a shot of Parliament House, Canberra, dated 
November 1964.
Precise Australian social and political setting is thereby framed 
by the wider set o f cultural values— easily recognised to Australians as 
their own, and this in turn is framed by wider social markers of 
international political and social events. This process of narrowing the 
focus from the world stage to the Australian is repeated in a number of 
ways throughout the series. In the first instance, in each o f the ten 
separate “hours” of Vietnam there is another montage adding new 
contexts, events and people relevant to the unfolding history o f the war. 
Additionally several o f the “scenes” within episodes conclude with a 
special historic event “freeze-framed” for emphasis. A  number o f these 
internal montages are further “naturalised” within the story as they form 
part o f a scene in which the family and associates watch television news 
reports about Vietnam as part o f the dramatic action. Effectively the 
preliminary montages and these intrusions of “history” into the fiction 
validate both the news and the complete drama of the miniseries— 
teaching the 1987 television audience how to watch historic television, 
and how to watch the miniseries itself. The news, the “history” , is also 
validated in the process, and it needs validation, since the history it 
presents is highly selective and urges a particular reading o f Australia’s 
Vietnam experience. This is not to argue that Vietnam is heavily biassed 
in its treatment of the Australian experience of the war. More often than 
not Vietnam is even-handed in its assessments of the various and 
opposed sides to the war, at least those within Australia. The reading it 
provides is comfortable with a balanced view of the war, and moreover 
with the more accommodating climate of 1986-87 in which the participant 
soldiers, if not the war itself, had begun to be accepted more easilywithin 
the community. In its overall shape Vietnam's message, beyond its appeal 
to entertainment, is anti-war, but not stridently so, and not without a 
large component of compassion for the serving men, like Phil, and the 
public servants and politicians, like Douglas, who became politically 
aware during and because of the war.
Television generally, and the soap-opera and mini-series genres 
in particular, tend to “normalise” middle-class values and lifestyles, and 
at the same time heighten the events of middle-class life into melodramatic 
tragedies. Running emotions at this high stress simultaneously evades 
the confrontation of serious and detailed dilemmas. Results or resolutions 
are achieved through catastrophic switches of circumstance, not through 
exploration and analysis. As miniseries go, Vietnam is exceptional since 
it does not opt in general for this style of drama nor for the all too glib and 
comfortable (and comforting) happy ending, neither for the family nor for 
the nation. Douglas has learned the need for political rigour and honesty 
but it may cost him his job, Evelyn’s maturity seems likely to depend on 
withdrawal from the family. Phil’s return to Australia and eventually to
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the family is rent by the lasting effects o f traumatic stress. On this level 
the drama is touched however with the light glow of optimism.
Nevertheless Vietnam’s urgent fixing of the specific location 
marks in spite o f itself a sense oflost certainty within Australian culture. 
Arguably perhaps, the sweep of world events framing the Australian 
material, together with the political events traversed by the action, 
demonstrate again and again just how marginal Australia was both in 
Vietnam and to the USA’s concerns generally in the southeast Asian- 
Pacific region. And this marginalisation finally isolates the abiding 
political attack of Vietnam. Its strongest anti-war message is most firmly, 
though often In insidious fashion, levelled against US imperialism. 
Douglas’ education in political subtlety begins when the Australian 
diplomat Montgomery tells him the truth about the disastrous effects of 
US materialism  upon Vietnamese culture. Later, in one telling montage 
sequence. President Johnson speaks of the strategic bombing o f North 
Vietnam ’s “concrete and steel” as a means o f combatting aggression and 
defending the weak South Vietnamese from the spread of communism. 
Immediately undercutting these words are file footage images o f the 
bombing o f villages. In the fictional story which follows the Vietnamese 
girl Le, who is friendly with the Australians, is raped and her grandfather 
murdered by a platoon o f American soldiers. Le is taking her grandfather 
to hospital with the aid both of money and foodstuffs given her by Phil 
and his comrade Laurie. In this incident motivation or more exactly the 
“excuse” is provided by the discovery o f the Australian aid— specifically 
a tin o f pears, and its wilful m isinterpetation as loot, by the Americans. 
After her gang rape, one o f the American soliders is ordered to kill Le and 
take a “souvenir”— her ear. In a string o f densely packed combat film 
cliches the soldier, who had not participated in the rape, is deemed a 
“cherry” and must redeem his manhood by the act o f murder and 
mutilation. Still within the bounds of cliche the American “wim p” only 
pretends to shoot Le but takes the souvenir. This tragic event is one of 
the more obvious elements of making Australia’s Vietnam comfortable 
for the television audience, by exculpating Australian soldiers from such 
acts while labouring the point of American imperialism ’s atrocities 
within Vietnam. For Australians there is the added irony, which redoubles 
the point, that it is their aid, their WHAM (Winning-the-hearts-and- 
minds) which effectively sanctions the atrocity. As a microcosm then, the 
aid o f Phil and Laurie mirrors the complicity o f Australian support within 
the larger theatre o f war.
In this fashion the specific montage and juxtaposition of “world 
events” with local familial history destabilises Australia’s role in Vietnam. 
Anti-Americanism is present everywhere in Australian writing, not only 
about Vietnam, but seems endemic within 1980s Australian culture. For 
Vietnam anti-American sentiment also touches upon the too easy 
appropriation o f the well known betrayal myth underlying Gallipoli’s 
adduction as the founding myth of the nation. Where the British high
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command’s bungling imperialism had cost Australian youth its life at 
Gallipoli, the nation found its origins. Vietnam as myth tended to replace 
the British flag with the American. Certainly as Australian political 
allegiances swung from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, the US 
replaced Britain as the major ally and not surprisingly as the major focus 
of the fascination-repulsion with the harbinger o f cultural dominance 
which characterises much that is Australian.9 But where Gallipoli 
provided a focus for fledgling nationalism, Vietnam had until 1990 
provided only layers o f dislocation. In Vietnam the underlying structure 
of anti-Americanism betrays the insecurity of Australia's movement 
from an inward looking, conservative and comfortable nation aspiring to 
an Anglo-European culture long since passed, to a player of whatever 
calibre on the world stage and in particular on the stage of Asia-Pacific 
matters. That move had been and remains troubling and problematic. 
Vietnam traces much o f the deep concerns within Australian culture.
Vietnam also explores all o f the familiar Hollywood tropes. Phil’s 
alienation from his family manifests a mild form o f PTSD and mirrors the 
larger disaffection of many o f his veteran colleagues from the whole 
society. His subsequent return to the fold plays a significant variation on 
the captivity narrative, as it is through the agency of women that the 
revenant soldiery is healed in this Vietnam narrative. Phil’s mental 
damage is reflected in the physical damage of his mate Laurie, whose 
sexual dysfunction again touches upon the failure of the masculine 
image to find a complete resolution. The mini-series ends with a tentative 
reconciliation, in which the lost son Phil arrives at his mother’s flat. His 
plaintive greeting, “It’s me—sort o f  sums up the dual impetus of the 
series towards a hopeful reunification of the family and by inference of 
the nation. The hesitancy suggests the residual trauma, refracting the 
hope that Australia had reached a point at which the healing process 
might begin in earnest.
In its tenth and concluding episode Vietnam drew to a close 
several strands of narrative. The images of physical dismemberment in 
the last episode are both literal and metaphoric, and become the focus 
o f two scenes in which Phil is able to recover some of his mental stability. 
Phil’s comrade Laurie has returned to Australia and married the rape 
victim Le. Laurie is confined to a wheelchair, the victim of an ambush 
which Phil believes was engineered by Le’s cousin and his one time 
romantic interest. Lien. Phil's stressed condition manifests itself strongly 
in Le’s presence as a distrust of all things Asian. If Lien was VC, Phil 
maintains the belief that Le is VC too, and that far from loving Laurie she 
is using her sexual favours as a means of staying in Australia. Le is 
constantly placed in physically threatening positions by Phil; camera 
angles and confined spaces argue that the rape may be repeated. As well 
Phil’s mental shattering is mirrored in the physical shattering o f Laurie’s 
body. Both men bear the marks o f their legacy of Vietnam. So too does 
Le; she is finally drawn to display her mutilation to Phil as a means of
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proving her bona fides as Laurie's wife, and of circumventing Phil’s 
sexual threat to her. Moreover she explains to Phil the family ties and 
cultural necessity of Lien’s actions, the reasons why she was forced to 
join the VC and why she seemed to use her sexuality duplicitously upon 
Phil. The audience knew much of the detail which Le relates, but the 
effect o f her telling the stoiy again of Lien’s VC connections empowers 
Phil’s understanding of Vietnamese culture, makes him see the damage 
necessarily enforced by the Vietnamese upon themselves in opposing 
Western actions. The long cultural history of family ties becomes the 
focus as Le explains that Lien had to jo in  the VC when her brother was 
killed. Put simply it is difficult to conceive of the power of this scene as 
acted. Structurally it is an essential scene, much like the resolution in 
mutual mercy and pity of King Lear and Cordelia in Act 4 scene 7 of King 
Lear. Nor is the comparison with the highest literary standard odious or 
completely detrimental to the quality of Vietnam's script, direction or 
acting. Finally, however, the resolution of the Laurie-Phil-Le triangle is 
an uneasy one as none of the participants is made whole. Rather in the 
marriage of Laurie and Le is allegorised a possible resolution o f Australia 
and Asian cultures, uneasily and uncomfortably resolved. Other examples 
will be more melodramatic, more oriented to the happy ending, and less 
true to the prevailing conditions within Australian culture.10
Turning to his family, Phil’s traumatic alienation from them and 
Australia stands for the way large sections of the veteran community 
perceived themselves to have been treated upon their return to Australia 
and subsequently. In the fictional version Phil has returned from 
Vietnam but has not contacted his family at all. Indeed he steadfastly 
refuses to contact them, seeing his sister’s anti-war stance as a betrayal. 
But released by the confrontation with Lefrom  the guilt and anger of his 
Vietnam experience he now turns to effect a resolution within the family. 
Both this turn and the preceeding one have focussed on issues of loyalty 
within families. Where Lien’s act marks the Vietnamese people’s history 
of unswerving loyalty to their state (as Vietnam comprehends it), Phil 
attempts to locate the root o f loyalty and hence love within his own 
family. This is effected by a confrontation by telephone with his sister. 
An activist in the peace movement, Megan is giving an interview and talk- 
back on local radio when Phil calls her to ask how she would offer comfort 
to Laurie and the other veterans who have given the integrity of their 
bodies to defence o f the nation, and have now been seemingly discarded. 
Once again the focus is on the bilateral mirroring of shattered minds and 
bodies. Phil asks Megan what she offers the shattered body of Laurie, her 
reply offers comfort to the shattered mind of her brother, wishing him 
back into the family’s heart. The war is condemned but the soldiers 
exonerated, the nation at last wishing to absolve them from guilt and 
return them to the fold. The last episode concludes with a restored 
though largely damaged Goddard family, as Phil finally returns. The 
restoration is incomplete as his telling “It’s me— sort oF last line makes 
clear.
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In 1987 when the series was first shown that hesitant resolution 
looked like a position to be desired; a desire partly fulfilled in the latter 
part o f 1987 when the Australian version of the Vietnam Welcome Home 
March was held in October. By early 1990. considerable distance had 
been travelled by the community and much of the, at least surface level, 
adjustment had been completed and a good deal of healing achieved. 
Curiously both Vietnam and Sword, o f Honour were subject to repeat 
broadcasts in early 1990, tapping or anticipating not only the society’s 
more ready level o f acceptance of Vietnam and an obviously high 
reappraisal o f the soldiers, together with the accepting context of the 
events surrounding the 75lh anniversary o f Anzac day in 1990. The 
three events, re-broadcasts and 75th anniversary, are perhaps apiece in 
charting the newly accepted militarism within Australian culture.11 If this 
inference can be drawn then the second screenings of Vietnam and Sword 
o f Honour might well measure less the community’s valuation o f the 
message they contain and more the all too easy accommodation of 
Vietnam as a piece of televised history relevant only as negative example 
of how to conduct a war, as it threatened to become for the United States 
during the 1980s and so blatantly did become in the early 1990s. Worse, 
these events may have been reduced to commercial opportunities 
wherein history and its fictional representations are alike mere 
entertainments: Vietnam as a war of the long distant past, with little to 
tell us save the universal truths o f suffering, courage and the like. 
Vielnam is a worthy vehicle for the more complex cultural context which 
produced it, than this latter treatment would allow, but the ease with 
which the militarism has again arisen within Australia and the popularity 
of Vietnam, among other vehicles which exploit Vietnam-as-subject for 
ratings winning melodrama (Tour o f Duly, and China Beach for example) 
argue for the worst case. It is too early to be definitive. Together with the 
long term outcome of the Gulf war such cultural indicators may effect 
different outcomes in Australia, than they appear to be doing in the 
United States.
Sword o f Honour is less complex, but its choice of characters is 
similarly schematic. From abackground of rural selectionTony Lawrence 
is the recipient of the “Sword of Honour” as the number one cadet in his 
year at the officers’ military training college, Duntroon, with a brilliant 
military career awaiting him. Both his career and personal life are 
blighted by Vietnam. His girlfriend. Esse Rogers, is enlisted in the peace 
movement at university and their relationship falls apart, signalled by 
her letter telling Tony that she has aborted their child. Unable to face the 
changed attitudes in Australia Tony flees to Thailand, with a Vietnamese 
refugee, Tam, from Phuoc Tuy. They have a child, Kim. Reversing the 
American captivity scheme. Esse searches for Tony, to discover that Tam 
has, one might unkindly say, conveniently died ofTB , leaving Tony and 
Kim ripe for the return. Their reconciliation at the Lawrence’s farm is a 
far less equivocal version of the Hollywood capivity narrative than that
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of the Goddard’s, and confirms a hopeful reconciliation o f the disputing 
factions within Australian society, here allegorically welded by the 
presence of the Asian son. Both however suggest that the reshaping of 
the national identity has been forged via an incursion into an Asian 
setting at the behest of the American ally.
Conclusions
Other exemplary “texts" o f the popular Vietnam imagery have 
largely followed the fictional desire for closure, and have also maintained 
the apparent inability of the nation to effect a reintegration o f the myth. 
The large and well attended march of the veterans community on 4 
October 1987 was for many held to be the Welcome Home march, the 
moment from which this re-integration could begin. And indeed it 
initiated a public process o f recognition and healing of the psychological 
wounds. But the march itself and its subsequent recorded versions, 
particularly the Martyn Goddard documentary, demonstrate that the 
incorporation o f Vietnam into Anzac was still lacking com plete 
recuperation. On the contrary, the continued exclusion of Vietnam 
veterans from the full tradition o f Anzac is enforced very noticeably in the 
Goddard documentary and in the numerous photographs reproduced in 
the media by the very corporeal intrusion o f the veterans. Again and 
again the camera lingered on the disabled, literally dismembered, 
veterans to the near exclusion o f the able-bodied marchers. The 
concentration on those whose bodies bear explicit evidence o f wounds 
denied the all too easy incorporation of Vietnam within Anzac. The 
documentary presents an extremely moving, even excessively moving, 
lingering on the grief o f the nurses and former patients, most especially 
the veteran Graham Edwards, a double amputee. In this lingering on 
excessive bouts of shared grief, the documentary is at odds with the stoic 
tradition o f Anzac’s “Lest We Forget” , and is consequently very' disturbing 
in its, until recently un-Australian, focus on emotional release. The 
strongest image of this grief was provided by several men who, as the 
popular song by political folk-rock band Redgum says, “kicked mines" 
and consequently lost limbs. Two such amputees are interviewed 
throughout the 30 minute programme. The last scene of the documentary 
shows Redgum leader John Schuman singing “I Was Only 19”, while to 
his right on the stage is the veteran— Frankie—who is the subject o f the 
song. An amputee, he sits in his wheel chair surrounded by family and. 
as the song continues, by more and more friends. A t the song’s 
conclusion Schuman shouts out “Welcome Home”.
Where the US imagery of the welcome home march proposed 
utopian redress, the Australian image is ambiguous, an uneasy 
acceptance o f the futility and the mutilation. The continued focus on the 
dismembered bodies of the soldiers makes impossible an appeal to the 
dehistoricised myth/memory o f Vietnam which characterises the US, 
Stone’s Bom  on the Fourth of July not withstanding, since that film turns
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the dismembered body into a pieta, if not pietistic image o f the veteran. 
Disability becomes the ticket o f entry to Hollywood fame. The American 
myth o f regeneration through violence is fulfilled. Nor is Stone’s film 
unique, for despite the elegance o f the Washington Vietnam monument, 
and its oft noted refusal to soar inspirationally above ground which 
ensures a lack o f glorification, its non-figurative nature and the brilliant 
metaphor of its reflective surface upon which the names of the fallen are 
inscribed, it evades the continuing legacy of the war, suggesting a 
disembodied loss. Those who survived physically in part or whole, whose 
lives and/or minds have been rent by the war, and those “members” of 
their families whose lives have been irreparably rent by the genetic legacy 
o f the war, may be reflected in its surfaces but they are not intrinsically 
part o f it.
The Australian Welcome Home march did not avert its gaze from 
those implications, but in 1990 the 75th Anzac Day celebrations 
presented the largest recent exfoliation upon the national myth, and 
here dismemberment was averted. Central focus in the media orchestra 
which accompanied the journey back to Turkey came to rest on the last 
group of original Anzacs ever likely to visit Gallipoli and return safely 
once again, for all o f these men were in their late eighties or nineties. If 
the Anzac myth, however modified, is speaking to a new militarism, a 
new spirit o f national identity, then its appeal lay in their faces and 
bodies which although age had withered, the myth had remembered, 
transmogrifying them once again into the bronzed .Anzacs. True they 
were old men, their faces were thin and withered, they walked slowly and 
often with assistance, but the promise of the Anzac myth lived in them, 
for they had survived and they were remembered. Will the dismembered 
Vietnam veterans be treated with the same fame? Unless they too can 
be turned to effect a political necessity the chances are slim. This finally 
is the message of the dismembering of the Anzac myth— its true political 
focus supporting The Odd Angry Shot's  contention that soldiers are the 
playthings of the sticky fingered politicians. 1
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1890, New York, 1985, especially ch. 2.
2 For seminal studies of the American cinematic representations of Vietnam, 
studies which underlie much of this paper see Albert Auster and Leonard Quart. 
How the War Was Remembered, New York, 1988; Gilbert Adair. Vietnam on Film, 
New York, 1981; Rick Berg. “Losing Vietnam: Covering the War in an Age of 
Technology", Cultural Critique, 3, 1986, pp. 92-125: Julian Smith. Looking Away: 
Hollywood and Vietnam, New York, 1975; and, Richard Slotkin. “Gunfighters 
and Green Berets: The Magnificent Seven and the Myth of Counter-Insurgency", 
Radical History Review, 44, Spring 1989, p. 67.
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3 This is most easily evident in John Rambo’s frustrated shooting of the array 
of CIA computers at the conclusion o f  R am bo: F irs t B lood  I I  but P la toon  and B o m  
on  the  F ou rth  o f  J u ly  also manifestly remove moral responsibility, and more 
tellingly failure from the soldier, placing it upon the system.
4 Jane Ross has written extensively on the contestatory nature of the “image” 
of the Vietnam veteran. See her essay, “Veterans in Australia: the Search for 
Integration”, in this volume, pp. 50-73 and others referred to in the Select 
Bibliography.
5 Section 1. d of the Select Bibliography lists a number of these films.
6 It might be argued that the training films meant to demonstrate a certain 
verisimilitude towards Australian military practice, in part the expectation that 
Vietnam like most wars was mostly spent waiting and preparing for action and 
not “in combat”. One of the differences that most reports of Vietnam seek to 
make, is that “in country” meant “in combat” all of the time, since the enemy was 
everywhere, combat stress was universal. This point is implicit in Lex McAulay’s 
The Battle o f Long Tan: The Legend of Anzac Upheld Hutchinson, Melbourne,
1986, and he attempts to make it explicit in his day-by-day account of a “typical” 
battalion tour in Contact. Australians in Vietnam, Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1989. 
However, it should be noted that the amount of time the training films infer that 
Australians would spend on “non-combat” duties, in varieties of logistic and 
perimeter maintenance, and on the Winning-the Hearts and-Minds tasks, finds 
uneasy in-practice confirmation in Terry Burstall. “Policy Contradictions of the 
Australian Task Force. Vietnam, 1966”, in this volume, pp. 35-49. Burstall 
argues the evidence for what the films prophetically imagine, that the Australian 
combat operations would be seriously attenuated as a result of military and 
political contradictions between Australian politicians and their military 
leadership, and more dramatically between American combat expectations and 
Australian performance.
7 See Chris Flaherty and Michael Roberts. “The Reproduction of Anzac 
Symbolism”, Journal o f Australian Studies, 24, May 1989, pp. 52-69.
8 While some films appear to touch on these issues—the separation of the “two 
cultures” in Platoon: or, the often clear demarcation of skills and education 
arrogated to the nominal protagonists of many films such as Full Metal Jacket, 
Platoon, or Casualties o f War, skills, which the films suggest, but do not pursue, 
enable them to “write” their way out of the war—the detailed political ramifications 
of race, education and economic back- ground seem hardly to rise beyond 
passing observations.
9 Analysis of the language of the political speeches made by both sides in the 
Gulf War will when they are written note the overlap of moral, legal, military and 
economic motivations. Commentaries unkindly disposed to the “Coalition" may 
well note also the conflation of the languages of corporate strategies and military 
intervention, and sub- sequently draw the veils shielding the links between 
certain kinds of imperialism and their self-justifying calls to defend individual 
and national sovereignties, when neither of these issues are the root of the 
military action.
10 For another discussion of the dis-location of Australia in Vietnam which 
makes specific points about the “funny place”, see Peter Pierce. “The Funny 
Place’: Australian Literature and the War in Vietnam", in this volume, pp. 98- 
108.
11 See Stuart Rintoul (ed). Ashes o f Vietnam, William Heinemann, Melbourne,
1987. Peter Pierce discusses in more detail Nagle’s novelistic comments about
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sexually damaged soldiers in “The Funny Place’: Australian Literature and the 
War in Vietnam**.
12 See Tom O’Regan. “The Enchantment with Cinema: Film in the 1980s", in 
Albert Moran & Tom O’Regan (eds). The Australian Screen, Penguin, Ringwood, 
1989, pp. 118-145.
13 For a more detailed corroboration of the swings in political allegiance see the 
two opening papers in this volume, Peter Edwards. “The Australian Government 
and Involvement in the Vietnam War", pp. 16-25; and Jeffrey Grey. “Vietnam as 
History: the Australian Case", pp. 26-34.
14 It is worth noting the colateral evidence of Australian reaction to Vietnamese 
and other Asian refugees as detailed by James Coughlan’s essay, “International 
Factors Influencing Australian Governments’ Responses To The Indochinese 
Refugee Problem", in this volume, pp. 84-97.
15 For one such early perception of this tendency see Graeme Cheeseman and 
St John Kettle (eds). The New Australian Militarism: Undermining our Future 
Security, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1990.
Australia and Vietnam W ar— A  Select Bibliography. 
J e ff D oyle and Jeffrey Grey
Introduction
In keeping with the wide range o f concerns of the essays in this volume 
the bibliography has attempted to cover as many “subject headings” as seemed 
possible. Thus while the title “Select Bibliography” suggests that the compilers 
have collected only the major “texts” of concern, the following lists are an attempt 
to be as complete as possible at the time of final compilation. “Select” is meant 
to convey the fact that the editors are certain (most likely the only certainty 
prevailing in scholarly life) that the lists are not complete. This incompletion 
applies to some areas more than to others. Newspapers and the general daily 
print media, and their radio and television equivalent news industries are the 
chief areas of extreme selection. Transience is the one problem, and the, not 
unrelated, determination of importance, the other—the question of which of the 
thousands of such daily reports are worth reading is unfortunately beyond the 
collecting and sorting powers of a study such as this.
In the related area o f electronic production, the overwhelming musical 
response to Vietnam in American popular and folk music areas, simply drowns 
most of the Australian output, but the fact that we have not here listed references 
to the little that was produced in Australia does not reduce its significance. A  
number of examples make the point—one would not look to Russell Morris’ late 
1960s single “The Real Thing” as directly related to Vietnam but its overall 
surreally apocalyptic lyrics, and the accompanying “nuclear explosions” (pre- 
David Bowie) o f the promotional television “film” (note, film since it predated the 
current “rock video” genre), are redolently anti-war. It would pay research to look 
into the numerous other popular songs which conflate psychedelia with the 
general millenarianism which infected popular music—even that of “flower 
power”— in late 1960s and early 1970s culture. A  major problem here is the 
overlap between Australian, British and American styles and influences. Later, 
in the 1980s Australian popularmusic found a number of voices, chiefly Jimmy 
Bames and his band Cold Chisel's “Khe Sanh”, redolently Bruce Springsteen 
in style, and the strong folk-politics of John Schumann and Redgum’s “(I was] 
Only 19”. Both “hits”, and therefore in the public ear, so to speak, these songs 
too require more study, and they are worthy of inclusion, if only in passing in 
this note. Their context is widened in the same way as that of the Actional 
literature when the array of songs both newly written and revived, dealing with 
Australian involvement in other wars, largely and not unexpectedly devoted to 
the First World War, is taken into account. Eric Bogle’s “The Band Played 
Waltzing Matilda” springs easily to mind as exemplaiy. Indeed the compilers felt 
that as its products came to light, the area of popular musical culture tended 
to grow so large that it required separate study.
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It has also been editorial practice to distribute the material into sections, 
more through broad media and generic criteria than by breakdown into more 
numerous and quite specific “subject headings”. Printed secondary texts have 
been the least distributed in this sense; so that where normal practice might find 
theses, monographs, articles, reviews andjoumalism as separate sets of entries, 
in section 2 they are all listed together. Effectively this presents the work of 
several scholars in one section, demonstrating not only the quantity but the 
breadth of writing styles, genres and so on, in which they have worked. 
Additionallyasremarked in the introductory comments, suchalistingfunctions 
methodologically—demonstrating the strengths, weaknesses, and the wider 
contexts of its production of any single example of Australian writing on the 
Vietnam War and its aftermath.
A Note on the bibliographic practice
In preparing this material for an American audience it seemed sensible 
to identify the origin of publication as the city in Australia, rather than the 
sometimes specific, but to a general US audience often more obscure, suburb 
which the strict bibliographic practice oftaking the location from the catalogu ing- 
in-publication information, or the title-page, would require. Thus, in the 
following lists, and especially in section l.e, and section 2, for example, a text 
published in Gladesville, 1965, will be listed as Sydney, 1965. There are two 
exceptions. Penguin books will be listed as published in Ringwood. and not as 
Melbourne, and University of Queensland Press at St. Lucia, as these are the 
common and well known points of origin of these major publishers. 1
1. Primary Sources
Prim ary Source: a ) Archive.e
All recordsgeneratedby the Australian Federal Government are subject 
to the Archives Act (1983) which provides for material to be released to public 
access thirty years after its creation, the so-called “thirty years rule”. Australia 
also possesses a Freedom of Information Act (1982), but unlike in the United 
States the provisions of this legislation do not cover records generated before its 
enactment.
In consequence, records relating to Australia's war effort remain closed 
to public researchers; the current official historian of Australia’s involvement in 
southeast Asian conflicts. Dr Peter Edwards (whose paper opens this Vietnam 
Generation Special No.) and hisstaff, have full and unhindered access to all such 
material for the writing of the history, but non-official historians will have to wait 
until 1993, when the first records related directly to Australian involvement in 
Vietnam will be due for release.
There is one significant exception to this state of affairs, and that 
involves material used in evidence before the Evatt Royal Commission on the use 
of herbicides, pesticides and other chemicals by the Australian Army. These 
records, all operational in nature, were released to public access in 1982, and 
are located at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra in a temporary record 
series, AWM 181. This series comprises some thirty shelf metres (approx. 93 
shelf feet) of documents and contains important runs of operational records 
generatedby Headquarters 1 AustralianTaskForce, MACVcombined campaign
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plans 1966-1972, intelligence summaries and some unit records, as well as 
some administrative files. The unifying principle lies in the observation that all 
this material contains references to the use of chemical agents in Phuoc Tuy 
province. The total run of operational records, some 500 shelf metres (approx. 
1600 shelf feet) of material, is contained in AWM 95 and is subject to the thirty 
year rule. This is the case for all other Australian Government records relating 
to Australia’s Vietnam War, such as those generated by the Departments of 
External Affairs or Labour and National Service.1
Private records and those created by non-Govemment agencies are 
subject to no such restrictions (unless private embargoes, or normal copyright 
rules are applied); there are important collections relating to the various anti­
war, anti-conscription movements held in State and university libraries around 
Australia. To give but two examples: the records of the Campaign for Peace in 
Vietnam, a pressure group formed in 1967 and based in the state of South 
Australia, are held in the State Library of South Australia in Adelaide (the state 
capital) as record Group 124; they occupy nearly nine shelf metres.2 Most states 
spawned a branch of the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign, formed in 1970, and 
these records are held in the State Library in South Australia's case, but in the 
University of Melbourne Library in the case of the state of Victoria.
The National Library of Australia in Canberra holds a number of 
important collections ofanti-Vietnam War material; prominent among these are 
the records of the Save Our Sons group (MS 3821), the Vietnam Moratorium 
Committee (MS 4969), and the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom (MS 7755). The papers of significant individuals in the protest 
movements are often valuable sources of material; at the National Library, to give 
but two examples, the papers of Ian Turner (MS 6206), radical Melbourne 
academic, contains three boxes of anti-Vietnam War records, while the 
collection donated by Andrew Reeves (MS 8076) concentrates particularly on 
student radicalism and anti-war agitation. A  further source of anti-war material 
is to be found in trade union records, many of which are held by the Archive of 
Business and Labour based at the Australian National University in Canberra.
Private groups which supported Government policy in Vietnam are 
much less well documented. Perhaps the principal organisation with relevant 
papers in the public domain is the Returned Services League (the equivalent of 
the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars), the records of whose 
federal body likewise are held by the National Library (MS 6609).
As Terry Burstall’s paper demonstrates, there are considerable though 
as yet relatively untapped US sources for the Australian participation in the 
Vietnam War. As well as operational records, held by the National Archives and 
Records Service, Washington, D.C., and the papers of senior military figures 
held, for example, by the United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, there are numerous items relating to foreign policy and 
governmental relations in the papers of the State Department. There are in all 
likelihood more references scattered through other American resources. 1
1 There is a lengthy, unpublished series guide to AWM 181, held at the Australian War 
Memorial. See also Helen Creagh. “Search and Re-search: Operation Mitchell: Information
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collected in the search to compile the Report on the Use of Herbicides and Insecticides 
and other chemicals by the Australian Army in South Vietnam**, Archives and 
Manuscripts, 11, May 1983: 7-13.
2 Malcolm J. Saunders. “ANote on the Files of the Campaign for Peace in Vietnam”, South 
Australians 21, September 1982: 105-10.
Primary Sources: b ) printed texts— Government and government institutional documents
As well as the following short list, one of the most essential resources 
for Australian Parliamentary matters are in the daily Hansard transcripts of all 
matters before the two houses (Representatives and Senate) o f the Australian 
Parliament, for example in CtimmmweallhParl^ Debates, vol. H[ouse]of
Representatives! 43, 1964. A  specific speech or report will be listed under the 
date it was given.
Ajler the March. Strengthening Support for the Veterans, Report of the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Canberra, 1988. 
Australian Naval History, Department of Defence, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1977.
Australian Veterans Health Studies. The Mortality Report. Part l. A Retrospective Cohort 
Study of Mortality Among Australian National Servicemen of the Vietnam 
Conflict Era and an Executive Summary of the Mortality Report, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984.
Australian Veterans Health Studies. The Mortality Report, Pan HI. The Relationship 
BetweenAspectsoJVietnamServiceandSubsequent Mortality Among Australian 
National Servicemen of the Vietnam Conflict Era, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984.
Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam, Paper tabled in accordance with the Prime 
Minister's Statement totheHouseofRepresentativesl3May 1975, Department 
of Foreign Affairs.
“Brief History: Australian Force in Vietnam 1962-1970**, Legislative Research Service, 
Parliamentary Library, Defence, Science and Technology Group, Canberra, 
1970.
Case Control Study of Congenital Anomalies and Vietnam Service, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1983.
The Division in Battle Pamphlet, N o ll: Counter Re volutionary Warfare 1965, The Military 
Board, Canberra, 1965.
Fitzgerald, Stephen, et aL The Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988.
Giblett, Noel (ed). Homecomings: Stories from Australian Vietnam Veterans and their 
Wives, 2nd ed. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990; 
1st ed. Vietnam Veterans’ Counselling Service, [Sydney], 1987.
Harries, Owen. Australia and the Third World, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1979.
Holt, E.S. & Lugg, George. “A Report on the spraying of herbicides at the First Australian 
Task Force, Vietnam”, Australian Army Operational Research Group Report, 
2/68, May 1968.
Lugg, George. “Herbicide Spraying at the First Australian Task Force Nui Dat, Vietnam”, 
August 1970, Department of Supply Report 397.
[McGibbon, I.C.] The New ZealandArmy inVietnam 1964-1972, [New Zealand] Ministry 
of Defence, Wellington, 1973.
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[Menzies, Sir Robert & Moyes, Rt Rev J.S., et al]. Vietnam Exchangeof Letters between 
the Prime Minister, theRL How Sir Robert Menzies, K.T., C.H., M.P., and theRL 
Rev. J.S. Moyes, C.M.G., and certain Archbishops and Bishops, Prime 
Minister’s Department, Canberra, 20 April 1965.
[Neale, R.G.] “Australia’s Military Commitment to Vietnam”, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Paper, 13 May 1975.
Odgers, George. Mission Vietnam: Royal Australian Air Force Operations, 1964-1972, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1974.
-------Australian Experience in Joint Armed Service Activities, Historical Monograph 10,
Directorate of Instructions, Orders and Manuals, Administrative Services 
Branch, Canberra, 1979.
Owens, Lt Col. A- G. Attitude of National Servicemen to Enlistment in the Regular Army, 
Research Report 3/67, 1 Psychology Research Unit, Australian Militaiy 
Forces, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, July 1967.
------- Satisfactions and Dissatisfactions of National Servicemen with the Army,
Research Report 5/67, 1 Psychology Research Unit, Australian Military 
Forces, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, July 1967.
“Repatriation Benefits for Special Overseas Service", Pamphlets from Repatriation 
Department.
“Report of the Consultative Council on Congenital Abnormalities in the Yarran District" 
Victorian Government, Legislative Assembly, 26 September 1978.
“Report on the Uses of Herbicides and Insecticides and other Chemicals by the 
Australian Army in South Vietnam", Department of Defence, November 1982.
Royal Commission on the Use and Effects of Chemical Agents on Australian Personnel in 
Vietnam, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1985, 9 vols.
South Vietnam: Austral ianMHilary Forces: Dept DefencePocketbook, Canberra, June 1967.
Studies on Viet Nam, Information Handbook 1, [Australian Government) Department 
of External Affairs, 1965.
Viet Nam First Half o f1965, [Australian Government] Department of External Affairs, 
2, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1965.
Viet Nam Since the 1954 Geneva Agreements, [Australian Government] Department of 
External Affairs, 1, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1964.
Viet Nam Questions ancLAnswers, [Australian Government] Minister ofExtemal Affairs, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, May 1966.
Viet Nanv Documents on Communist Aggression, [Australian Government] Department 
of External Affairs, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, n.d.
Ward law, G.R. Major. Proposal for the Management o f Combat Stress Reaction in the 
Australian Army, Research Note 7/88, Directorate of Psychology Publication, 
[Canberra], July 1988.
Prim ary Source: c ) newspapers, magazines, journals
Researchers of the printed news media’s reporting of the Vietnam War 
have produced a wealth of material in the US, particularly in search of the 
answers as to how influential (or otherwise) that media, in concert with the 
electronic media, were in bringing the war to an end. The relatively few studies 
of Australia’s print media (which are listed below in .sect ion 2) have concentrated 
on its influence and other aspects, notably the political allegiances of the media, 
but there is yet to be any overarching study, partly no doubt due to the daunting 
task of collecting the data. The news media archives are easily available in the 
case of the major newspapers, the city dailies and weeklies, but the material is 
on the whole insufficently indexed to allow effective access, other than reading
A ustra lia !* Vietnam—A  Select B ibliography 131
through each text in toto. Anumber of groups are collecting, however, either with 
specific subject criteria in train or more generally. Two examples: first, the 
Politics Department of the Australian National University has a large clipping 
collection, devoted as one might expect primarily to governmental and policy 
references, and less to operational or “social” material; secondly, the 
“Representation of the Vietnam War in Australia” Project at University College, 
ADFA has for three years been collecting all references from all the major dailies 
(such as the Sydney Morning Herald, Australian, Age, and Brisbane Courier), 
and the periodicals (Quadrant, Nation, and so on), beginning in 1962 and 
progressing to the present, but the task is daunting, and requires significantly 
more funds and research time.
The following list provides the titles and in some cases the affiliations of 
a laige selection of such organs, together with a selection of professional 
(military) journals, and the often short-lived journals of the various groups of the 
anti-war, draft resister's, Moratorium, and other peace movements/ Most of the 
issues of the major newspapers will be held in hard copy or micro-form (fiche 
or film) in the various state and university libraries as appropriate. In some cases 
the publishers will also provide access (and more substantial indexing) of their 
publications. The more ephemeral material is often hard to find, some of it will 
be found in collections such as those listed under section 1. a, above.
The Advertiser [daily Adelaide newspaper!
The Age [daily Melbourne newspaper]
Army
The Army Journal
Australian [daily national newspaper]
The Australian Women’s Weekly [weekly national magazine focussed on pre-feminist 
notions of women’s issues]
The Bulletin [weekly national journal]
The Canberra Times [daily regional newspaper]
The Cathdic Weekly 1963-1968
The Catholic Worker [Melbourne religious journal]
The Courier Mail [daily Queensland newspaper]
The Daily Bulletin [Townsville newspaper]
Debrief [Official Quarterly Journal of the Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia 
(WAA) PO Box 369, Parramatta, NSW, 2150, Australia]
Department of Veterans* Affairs Pamphlets
Despatch
Dissent
Farrago [Melbourne University, Students’ Representative Council newspaper]
Herald
Honi Soil [University of Sydney Student paper]
International: A Revolutionary Socialist Magazine 
The Listening Post
Lots Wife [Monash University. Students’ Representative Council newspaper]
The Mercury [daily Hobart Tasmania]
The Mirror [daily Sydney newspaper]
Moratorium News [Official organ of the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign, Melbourne] 
Mufti
Nation [periodical newsmagazine]
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National Times [weekly national newsmagazine]
New Basis
Old Mole [Sydney University paper]
Outlook
Partisan
Peacemaker
Print [Monash Labour Club Newsletter]
Quadrant [monthly periodical current ailairs and intellectual life journal]
Rabelais [La lYobe University, Students’ Representative Council newspaper]
Resist and Resistance Notes [Students for a Democratic Society Anti-Conscription 
Committee Newsletter, Melbourne University committee]
Reveille [Journal of the New South Wales Branch of the RSL]
TheRIetumed] Sfervicesl UeagueJ Newsletter 
The Sun Herald [Sydney Sunday newspaper]
The Sunday Observer [weekend newspaper]
The Sunday Telegraph [Sydney Sunday newspaper]
The Sydney Morning Herald [daily Sydney newspaper]
Tharunka [University of New South Wales Student paper]
Tribune [weekly national political newspaper]
VeRBosity [Repatriation Commission: Veterans’ Review Board publication]
Vietnam Action [journal from the Vietnam Action Campaign group]
The Vietnam Digest, December 1968-July 1970 [7 no.s (eel). Peter Samuel for The 
Friends of Viet Nam]
Vietnam Today [Newsletter of the Australian Vietnam Society]
Woroni [Australian National University Student newspaper]
YCAC Newsletter [Youth Campaign Against Conscription]
1 For a larger list of Victorian student and anti-war journals see Bariy York, Student 
Revolt: La Trobe University 1967-1973, Nicholas Press, Canberra, 1989: 171-2.
Prim ary Source: d) printed texU— unit histaries
Battle, Capt. M.R The Year of the Tigers: The Second Tour of 5th Battalion, the Royal 
Australian Regiment in South Vietnam, 1969-1970, 5RAR Sydney, 1970. 
Beck, G.J.J. (ed). No 2 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force Vietnam 1968, No 2 
Squadron RAAF, Asian Printers, Penang, n.d.
Channon, James B. The First Three years: A Pictorial History of the 173rd Airborne 
Brigade (Separate), Brigade Information Office, 1966.
Clarke, C.J . (ed). Yours Faithfully: Second Tour of 3rd Battalion the Royal Australian 
Regiment in South Vietnam, 1969-71, 3RAR Sydney, 1972.
Clunies-Ross, Major A. The Grey Eight in Vietnam: The History of the Eighth Battalion, 
The Royal Australian Regiment, November 1969—November 1970, 8RAR 
Brisbane, 1971.
Johnson, L.D. Major (ed). The History of 6 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion: Volume Two, 
1967- 1970, 6RAR, Townsville, 1972.
Newman, K.E. Major. The ANZAC Battalion: a Record of the Tour of 2nd Battalion The 
Royal Australian Regiment, 1 st Battalion, The RNZIR. In South Vietnam 1967- 
68, 2RAR& 1 RNZIR, Sydney, 1968.
O'Neill Robert. Vietnam Task. The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, 1966-67, 
Cassell, Australia Ltd., Melbourne, 1968.
Rickards, G.F.B. (ed). Twelve in Focus: 12th Field Regiment in South Vietnam 1971, 
12th Field Regiment, %dney, 1971.
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Roberts, A.R The ANZAC Battalion, 1970-71, Second Tour of the 2nd Battalion, the 
Royal Australian Regiment in South Vietnam, 2RAR Sydney, 1972.
Sayce, RL. & O’Neill, M.D. (eds). The Fighting Fourth: 4 RAR/NZ 1970-72: A Pictorial 
Record of the Second Tour in South Vietnam, 4RAR Sydney, 1972.
Seven in Seventy: Second Tour of 7th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment: Notes 
on Operations, Vietnam, 1970-1971, 7RAR [Sydney, 1971].
Stuart, RF. (ed). 3 RAR in South Vietnam, 1967-1968: A Record of the Operational 
Service of the Third Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment in South 
Vietnam, 12th December 1967-20th November 1968, 3RAR Sydney, [1968]. 
Webb, J.R Mission in Vietnam: First Tour of 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian 
Regiment in South Vietnam, 4 RAR Townsville, 1969.
Williams, Ian McLean. Vietnam: A Pictorial History of the Sixth Battalion, the Rcyal 
Australian Regiment, 1966-1967, 6RAR Sydney, 1967.
Prim ary Sources: c)  printed texts— fiction, memoirs, poetry c? drama
A  number of texts in this section may appear initially as dubiously 
related to the Vietnam War. But as will be clear following the arguments put 
forward throughout the articles of this special number, Australia’s response to 
the Vietnam War is tied intimately to its long and continuing relationships with 
the whole of the southeast Asian-Pacific region, and moreover to its own 
conceptions of its place within the myths and legends of a western tradition of 
warfare and colonialism. Focus of the texts below on occasion may fall less 
specifically upon Vietnam than on the wider region; as often on Vietnam, as on 
Indonesia, New Guinea, Japan, and Kampuchea/Cambodia, among others.
‘Alexander, David’ [McAulay, Lex]. When theBuffaloFighl Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1980. 
Allen, Robert Saigon: South of Beyond, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1990.
Astley, Thea. Beachmasters, Penguin, Ringwood, 1985.
Atkinson, Hugh. The Most Savage Animal Simon and Schuster, Sydney, 1972. 
Auchterlonie, Dorothy. The Dolphin, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 
1967.
Baillie, Allan. Little Brother, Collins Educational, Sydney, 1987.
Bartlett, Norman. Island Victory, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1955.
Beilby, Richard. The Bitter Lotus. Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1978.
Bich, Nguyen Ngoc (ed). “From an Antholoqu o f Vietnamese Poetry “, Quadrant 14:3, 
(No.65), May-June 1970: 93-96.
Boddy, Michael & Ellis, Robert. “The Legend of King O’Malley’, Jane Street Theatre, 
Sydney, 1970, and subsequently published by Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 
1974.
Bojtschuck, R.H. Operation Sea Dragon, Ryebuck Publications, Nerang, 
Queensland, 1986.
Brand, Mona. Daughters of Vietnam, Foreign Language Publishers, Hanoi, 1958.
------- "On Stage Vietnam”, New Theatre Sydney, 10 June 1967.
------- “Going, Going, Gone", [New Theatre Sydney], 1968.
Brass, Alister. Bleeding Earth, Alpha Books, Sydney, 1967.
Burs tall, Terry. The Soldiers’Story. The Ekittle ofXa Long Tan, Vietnam, 18 August 1966, 
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1986.
-------A Soldier Returns: A Long Tan veteran discovers the other side o f Vietnam,
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1990.
Cairn cross, C.J. The Unforgiven, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1977.
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Cameron, Martin. Australia's Longest War, author, 1087.
-------A Look On the Bright Side, author, 1988.
Campbell, David. The Branch o f Dodona, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1970. 
Carroll, John. Token Soldiers, Wildgrass Books, Melbourne, 1983.
Cass,Shirley, Wilding, Michael, etal(eds). WeTookTheirOrdersandAreDead, UreSmith, 
Sidney, 1971.
Clanchy, John. “Homecoming" in Homecoming, University of Queensland Press, St. 
Lucia, 1989: 1-90.
Coe, John N. (ed). Desperate Praise. The Australians in Vietnam, Artlook, Perth, 1982. 
Cole, Tom. “Medal of Honour Rag", Ensemble Theatre, Sydney, 31 March 1977. 
Cook, Kenneth. The Wine of God’s Anger, Cheshire-Lansdowne, Melbourne, 1968. 
Connell, R  Firewiryds, Wentworth Press, Sydney, 1968.
D’Alpuget, Blanche. Monkeys in the Dark, Aurora Press, Sydney & London, 1980.
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For Australia, Vietnam was by no means the media war it is commonly 
held to have been (and seemingly remains) for the US, but there was a moderate, 
and as the war progressed increasing, electronic media response. Little of this 
has been touched on in any detail, nor listed in any comprehensive manner, with 
the exception of the work of Ann Mari Jordens in a paper delivered at the 
Macquarie University Conference in 1987.1 It would be impossible, however, to 
list every reference to Vietnam made in the television and radio media during the 
period of the war, and subsequently as it came to feature weekly, if not nightly 
(as it seems in the US), in the various network news and current affairs 
programmes. There are other complexities: in the case of the numerous short 
films made by the Commonwealth and State bodies, a number of these may exist 
invariant prints, and occasionally differing dating and production details appear 
within the catalogues; in addition scenes from some of the earlier films reappear 
as if contemporary to the later film’s footage; additionally much has been edited 
for use within other commercial current affairs material, again without noting 
their “file footage" status. The list given below is therefore even more selective and 
imperfect than the term “select bibliography" might imply.
Action inVietnam, 1968, short film. Commonwealth Film Commission, forThe Directorate 
of Defence Information [restricted access].
ANZACS, 1985, TV miniseries. Burrowes-Dixon Co. P.L., producer Geoff Burruwes, 
script John Dixon, et oL
Army Advisers inVietnam, 1970, short film. Directorate of Public Relations, Department 
of the Army.
Army Nurses in Vietnam, 1972, short film. Directorate of Public Relations, Department 
of the Army.
Army Officers, 1966, short film. Department of Army, Commonwealth Film Unit.
Arts Vietnam: A Protest to Step the War, 1968, short film, Sasha Ivanovich.
Ashes o f Vietnam, 1988, Stuart Rintoul, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio 
broadcast and audio cassette [after the book of the same title, q.v. section 1 .e. 
Rintoul, 1987].
AustralianTaskForce. Vietnam, 1967, short film. Commonwealth Film Commission, for 
The Directorate of Defence Information [restricted access.
Australians at War, 1976, TV documentaiy series, 11 episodes, TEN Network episode 9. 
Australians Remember, 1977, short film. Film Australia Production Co., sponsored by 
the Australian War Memorial.
Beginnings, 1970, short film, made by Acme Films for Aquarius Foundation.
“British Broadcasting Commission TVVietnam Documentary", 1966, Michael Charlton, 
Impact, Australian Broadcasting Commission TV, current affairs programme. 
Call for Youth 1966, short film, Christopher Productions and Youth Campaign Against 
Conscription.
Cambodia Year 10, 1990, John Pilger, IV  Documentary.
Changing the Needle, 1981, film, director Martha Ansara, for Jequerity P.L. with 
assistance from Creative Development Branch, Australian Film Commission. 
Connections, 26 April 1990, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio National, 
“Phone- in” on the effects of Vietnam, producers Roger Penny & Christian 
Peterson.
Deathcheaters, 1976, film, director Brian Trenchard Smith.
Democratic Process, 1979, short film, Jada Films.
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Demonstrator, 1971, feature film, Warwick Freeman.
Diggers in Vietnam 1968, short film. Commonwealth Film Commission, for The 
Directorate of Defence Information [restricted access).
Diggers Relaxing, 1969, short film. Department of the Army.
DustoJJVietnam 1970, short film, Directorate ofPublic Relations, Department of the Army.
Every Day, Every Night, 1983, short film (originally video), director Kathy Mueller, 
Swinburne Film & Television School.
Front Line, 1978, film, David Bradbury, sponsored by the Australian Film Commission, 
Tasmanian Film Corporation, and the Australian War Memorial.
Frontline, Neil Davis, 1989, TV documentary and videotape.
GaRipdt 1981, feature film, producers R&R Film, director Peter Weir, script David 
Williamson.
Hearts and Minds, 1967, short partly animated film, Petty Film Productions.
Hit the US Aggressors, documentary, [banned from Australian TV May-dune 1966).
It's a New World Fbr Sure, Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV Documentary 
Series, including 2 pregrammes on the Sixties radical movements.
Land of Fire, 1981, film, Martha Ansara.
The Ijast March 1988, television documentary, producers Martyn Goddard, et al 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV.
Living in the Field, 1968, short film, Department of the Army.
Malaya Hosting, 1962, short film. Department of Army.
Minh: A Vietnamese, 1979, short film. Film Australia.
Mobile Advisory Teams in Vietnam 1971, short film. Directorate ofPublic Relations, 
Department of the Army.
“My Lai", 1990, documentary, Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV, Four Comers 
[weekly current affairs programme).
NationalServiceCorpsTraining—ArmouredCorps, 1966, short film. Directorate ofPublic 
Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Corps Training—Cooks Corp, 1966, short film, Directorate of Public 
Relations, Department of the Army.
Nat ional Service Corps Training—Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, 1966, short film. 
Directorate of Public Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Corps Training—Medical Assistants, 1966, short film. Directorate of 
Public Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Corps Training—Provosts, 1966, short film. Directorate of Public 
Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Corps Training—Survey Regiment (Bendigo), 1966, short film. 
Directorate of Public Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Officer, 1967, short film, Directorate ofPublic Relations, Department 
of the Army.
No Trouble, Vivian Walker, 1987, televised stage play, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation TV, Melbourne Theatre Company, Media World, and the 
Commonwealth Employment Service.
The Odd Angry Shot, 1979, feature film, Samson Productions, director Tom Jeffrey, 
script William Nagle [from his novel, The Odd Angry Shot, 1975).
On the Gunline, 1969, short film, Department of the Navy.
Once Upon a War, 1970, short film, director Patricia Penn.
One Crowded Hour. Neil Davis Combat Cameraman 1934-1985, 1987, presenter Tim 
Bowden, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio broadcast and audio 
cassette [companion to Bowden’s book of the same title, see section 2 : Bowden, 
1987.
One Shot, One Kill 1967, British Broadcasting Commission, shown on Inside 
Australia Series.
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Or Forever Hold Your Peace, 1970, film, Richard Brennan, et aL
Ordinance Support for Australian Force Vietnam 1970, short film. Army Design 
Establishment.
The Quiet Mutiny, 1970, short film, John Pilger.
The Quiet War, 1967, short film, Australian Broadcasting Commission.
“Power to the People", 5 May 1990, documentaiy, Geraldine Doogue, et al for the 
Hindsight series, Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV [Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Radio National held a phone-in forum the day 
following the broadcast].
The President Visits Brisbane, 1967, lYemier’s Department Queensland, Queensland 
Government Film Unit.
Public Enemy Number One, 1980, producers David Bradbury & Steward Young, for the 
Creative Development Branch, Australian Film Commission.
Ranger Advisors—Vietnam 1972, short film, Directorate ofPublic Relations, Department 
of the Army.
Red Cross Civilian Relief in Vietnam 1967, short film. Cine Service for the Australian Red 
Cross Society.
Rescue Vietnam 1968, short film, Mathais, Kenyan & Merton Pictures, for Australian 
Red Cross Society.
“Right as Rain", 17 December 1989, radio drama, David Knox, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation Radio.
Sad Song of Yellow Skin, 1976, film, directed Michael Rubbo (Australian) for the 
Canadian National Film Board.
The Siege ofFtie Base Gloria, 1989, feature film, director Brian Trenchard-Smith, script 
William Nagle [ostensibly a US film, shot in the Philippines, the director and 
script writer are Australians or Australian trained; echnical processing done 
in Sydney].
The Soldier, 1967, short film, Australian Broadcasting Commisision IV.
Special Air Service in Vietnam 1971, short film. Directorate of Public Relations, 
Department of the Army.
A Street to Die, 1985, film, producer/director Bill Bennett
Sword of Honour, 1987, TV miniseries, ATN7 Network, producersSimpson-LeMesurier, 
subsequently released on video.
Task Force Vietnam 1969, short film. Directorate ofPublic Relations, Department 
of the Army.
This Day Tonight, Australian Broadcasting Commission TV news and current affairs 
programme, active in the Vietnam period.
Three Bridges to Cross, 1966, film, Australian Broadcasting Commission TV & Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation.
The Trespassers, 1976, feature film, director John Duigan.
The Unlucky Country, 1967, short film, Australian Commonwealth Film Unit
Vietnam 1987, TV miniseries, TEN Network IV, producers Kennedy-Miller, directors 
Chris Noonan & John Duigan, script byTerry Hayes, Chris Noonan, John Duigan 
and others, [aversion edited from the broadcast time (excludingadvertisements) 
of approximately eight-and-a-half hours to six hours on two cassettes is available 
in the United Kingdom from CBS Video, American viewers should contact CBS 
US distributors to determine the availablity of this version].
“Vietnam Documentaiy, August 1989, documentary. Special Broadcasting System 
TV, producers Reg Boulter & Douglas Mann.
“Vietnam Retrospect", 1988, Australian Broadcasting Corporation audio cassette.
Vietnam Interpreters, 1967, short film, Department of the Army.
Vietnam Scene, 1967, short film. Department of the Army.
A u stra lia '* Vietnam—A  Select B ibliography 139
VietnamToday, 6 June—25 July, 1987,6 programmes on 2SER Macquarie University 
Radio Station. Selections from the Vietnam Conference, Macquarie University, 
27 April-1 May 1987 [see section 2 : Maddock & Wright (eds). 1987). 
"Vietnamese gangs in Melbourne", September 1990, news report A Current Affair. 
The Vung Tan Ferry, 1971, short film. Department of the Navy.
Warriors, Friends or Foes?, 1988, IV  documentary series, episode 2.
White Paper No. 1—Conscription, 23 April, 1966, TV Debate, producers ATN 7 Network, 
Sydney University, & Ampol Petroleum Australia 
Winter of Our Dreams, 1981, feature film, director John Duigan.
You Can't See Round Comers, 1968, feature film, David Cahill, based on the TV drama 
(soap), 1967-68, in turn an updated version of the novel by Jon Cleaiy. You 
Can't See Round Comers, 1947 [the novel deals with draft resistance and 
absenteeism in the Second World War, the TV and film updates presents the 
hero as a Vietnam drafi resister].
In addition single episodes of various serial (or soap) dramas and situation 
comedies, have been devoted to Vietnam and/or Vietnam veterans; these 
include: A Country Practice, 1989: Col’nCarpenter, 1990; The Flying Doctor, 1990; 
and Winners, 1985. Occasional “sketches” in television comedy programmes 
have depicted Vietnam film stereotypes (especially Rambo-like crazed killers); 
these include: The Comedy Canpany, 1990; Let the Blood Run Free, 1990; and 
The Big Gig: Tuesday Night Live, 1989-90.
1 See also Ann Mari Jordens. “Cultural Influences: the Vietnam War and Australia", 
Journal of the Australian War Memorial 15, October 1989: 3-14.
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A  Select Chronology o f 
Australian Involvement in the Vietnam W ar
1950 14 January Ho Chi Minh declares Democratic 
Republic o f Vietnam.
7 February United States and United Kingdom 
recognise the French sponsored 
government o f the former Emperor 
Bao Dai.
8 February Australia recognises Bao Dai 
Government.
9 March Percy Spender, External Affairs 
Minister, speaks of the Domino 
Theory in the House of 
Representatives.
8 May United States provides $10 million 
in military and economic aid to the 
Bao Dai Government.
1951 ANZUS treaty signed.
1953 Jean Letoumeau, French Minister in 
charge of Indochinese matters 
invited to visit Australia to discuss 
aid.
1954 John Foster Dulles, American 
Secretary of State, encourages 
"united action" during the Indochina 
crisis.
7 May The Battle o f Dien Bien Phu lost by 
the French and Bao Dai forces.
8 September South East Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) formed with initial 
signatories United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Australia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the 
Philippines.
9 October France leaves Hanoi.
1955 US aid is provided directly to Saigon. 
Australia sends troops to aid in 
Malayan Emergency.
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1957 May Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South 
Vietnam, visits the USA.
September Diem visits Australia.
1960 20 December The National Liberation Front ( NLF) 
is founded by Hanoi for the liberation 
of South Vietnam.
1961 Laos crisis. Indonesia incorporates 
former Dutch West New Guinea 
colony as Irian Jaya.
17 November United States seeks diplomatic 
indications of Australia’s stance on, 
and willingness to assist in. South 
Vietnam.
1962 Establishment at North West Cape, 
Western Australia o f a Very Low 
Frequency "joint" US-Australian naval 
communications station.
13 January Operation RANCH HAND (defoliation) 
begins.
24 May Athol Townely, Minister of Defence, 
announces that 30 advisers are to be 
sent to South Vietnam.
July-August The first o f the Training Team arrive 
in South Vietnam.
1963 Malaysia formed. Indonesia embarks 
upon Confrontation.
1 June William Francis Hacking, an adviser 
is the first Australian casualty, killed 
40 miles west of Hue. 15, 000 
American advisers in South Vietnam, 
and $500 million aid is given.
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1964 Australian advisers increased to 83.
June Robert Menzies, Australian Prime 
Minister, visits Washington, D.C..
2 August USS Maddox incident in the Gulf of 
Tonkin.
4 August USS Turner Joy incident.
7 August US Congress passes Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution.
10 November National Service (Conscription) Act 
proclaimed.
January
1965 Agent Orange first used.
March American marines land at Da Nang.
29 April Menzies announces the commitment 
of Australian combat troops.
May-June 1RAR (800 men) arrive in Bien Hoa, 
to jo in  the USA 173rd Airborne 
Brigade. US troop commitment 
reaches 50,000 men.
13 May Save Our Sons (SOS) founded.
September Morgan Gallup Poll shows that 56 per 
cent of Australians in favour of 
Australian participation, 28 per cent 
in favour of withdrawal, ten per cent 
undecided.
22 October First arrests (65 people) for anti-War 
demonstration in Sydney.
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1966 26 January Harold Holt succeeds Menzies as 
Prime Minister and leader o f the 
Liberal Party.
8 March Government announces an increase 
in troops - two Battalions and 
support, and the Special A ir 
Services, to be sent to Phuoc Tuy 
province, a total o f 4500 men 
including 500 conscripts.
16 March 2000 people march in protest 
against the war organised by the SOS 
group.
May Seamens’ Union refuse to load 
supplies for Vietnam on the Boonaroo
24 May Errol Wayne Noach, the first 
conscript killed in action.
14 June 5th and 6th Battalions RAR and 
supports in place at Nui Dat, with 
logistic support base at Vung Tau, 30 
kilometres (16 miles) south.
30 June Holt visits Washington D.C., and in 
speech utters the famous "all the 
way" in support o f L.B. Johnson's 
Vietnam policy.
18 August The battle ol Long Tan, Australia 
loses 18 KIA, for a claimed 245 
Vietnamese KIA.
21-22 October President Johnson visits Australia. 
One million Sydneysiders and 
500,000 in Melbourne line the 
streets to welcome him on 
successive days.
19 November Morgan Gallup Poll: 68 per cent in 
favour o f conscription; 37 per cent 
in favour of sending conscripts to 
Vietnam.
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1967 8 February E.G. (Gough) Whitlam succeeds 
Arthur Calwell as leader of the 
Federal Opposition, The Australian 
Labor Party.
May Morgan Gallup Poll: 62 per cent in 
favour of the War; 24 per cent in 
favour of Australian withdrawal; 14 
per cent undecided.
2 October A  'Teach-in" titled "National Forum 
on Vietnam" held at Monash 
University, Melbourne.
17 November Holt missing presumed drowned. 
John McEwan (Country Party - the 
Liberals' coalition partner) succeeds 
to Prime Ministership on 19 
December.
November - 
December
Australian commitment rises to a 
peak of 8,300 men.
1968 Australian Draft Resister's Union 
established.
10 January John Grey Gorton, Liberal Party 
leader, succeeds to Prime 
Ministership.
31 January Tet Offensive.
12 February Gorton announces semi-officially that 
there will be no increase in 
Australian commitment.
16 March My Lai occurs but remains unknown 
until 16 November.
May National Services Act amended to 
impose two year civil gaol term for 
draft evaders.
August Paris student riots.
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1969 June President Richard Nixon announces 
withdrawal of 25,000 men and the 
initiation of "Vietnamization".
August Morgan Gallup Poll: 55 per cent in 
favour o f withdrawal; 40 per cent of 
continuing the war; 6 per cent 
undecided.
3 September Ho Chi Minh dies aged 79.
4 October US Morgan Poll: 58 per cent believe 
the war is a mistake.
15 October Massive anti-war demonstration 
occurs in Washington, D.C..
1970 22 April Government announces one Battalion 
to be withdrawn.
4 May Kent State incident.
8 May Approximately 120,000 march in the 
first Moratorium March in Sydney, 
and approximately 70, 000 in 
Melbourne.
18 September Second Moratorium Marches in 
Sydney of 100,000 and Melbourne 
50,000. More than 300 arrested.
1971 10 March William McMahon succeeds as Prime 
Minister.
30 March 1000 men withdrawn.
30 June Third and final large anti-war march, 
110,000 people.
18 August McMahon announces that most 
troops will be home by Christmas.
17 December Last major troop withdrawal.
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1972 2 December Australian Labor Party wins 
Government. Whitlam becomes 
Prime Minister.
5 December National Service ended; imprisoned 
Draft Resisters released.
8 December Last Australian troops leave Vietnam.
18 December Last advisers leave. Nixon renews 
bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.
1973 23 January Nixon announces "peace with honor".
27 January Ceasefire.
26 February Whitlam announces the 
establishment of diplomatic relations 
with Hanoi, but retains diplomatic 
recognition of South Vietnam.
29 March Last American troops leave Vietnam.
1974 4 January South Vietnam's President Nguyen 
Van Thieu announces that war has 
been declared again.
1975 17 April Phnom Penh falls to Khmer Rouge.
25 April Australian embassy in Saigon is 
closed.
30 April Fall o f Saigon.
11 November Sir John Kerr, the Governor General, 
"sacks" the Whitlam Labor 
Government, appoints Malcolm 
Fraser, Liberal leader as "caretaker" 
Prime Minister.
December Fraser wins government. 1000 
Indochinese refugees resettled.
1976 April First Vietnamese Boat people arrive 
in Australia.
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1978 Fraser Government introduces 
refugee component into immigration 
programme.
1982 Arrival o f the first Vietnamese 
migrants under the Orderly 
Departure Programme. Vietnam 
Veterans Counselling Service 
established.
1983 June 4000 American veterans begin class 
action in New York State against the 
manufacturer of Agent Orange. 
Justice John Phillip Evatt charged 
with the Royal Commission into the 
mortality o f veterans.
1984 The AVHS mortality report published.
1985 July Evatt Royal Commission published 
finding Agent Orange "Not Guilty". 
Vietnam Veterans Association rejects 
findings.
1987 4 October 25,000 March in Sydney Welcome 
Home March.
1989 July At the Geneva Conference on 
refugees, Australia votes with ASEAN 
nations for the mandatory 
repatriation o f Vietnamese refugees. 
Australia is committed to resettle 
11,000 people during 1989-1992.
June-July First Cambodian boat people arrive in 
Australia.
1990 Two more Cambodian boats arrive.
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